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Abstract 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
The treatment of irregular migrants in Malta is problematic from a human rights 
perspective, for it contravenes the principle of universalism that is intrinsic to human 
rights philosophy. This study investigates this treatment. Crucially, it identifies four 
elements of political practice in the absence of which it is contended a human rights 
culture cannot flourish, as well as underlying patterns in Maltese political culture 
which contravene these four elements. Its ultimate aim is to propose meaningful, 
effective and long-lasting human-rights-compliant solutions to the treatment of 
irregular immigrants in Malta. 
Based on a reading of foundational documents of the modern human rights 
movement, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the thesis posits that 
human rights should be ‘located’ between the political and the cultural. The four basic 
principles of human rights identified as framing the optimal political conditions for the 
nurturing of a human rights culture are related to dignity, a cosmopolitan orientation, 
democratic practice and a commitment to equality.  
This concept of a human rights culture is innovatively used as an analytical tool for 
examining Maltese responses to irregular migration. This is done in a two-way manner, 
with the examination of practice enriching the identified theoretical framework, and 
the theoretical framework then guiding the search for possible new human-rights-
consistent policy directions which Malta could take.  
Drawing on a range of ethnographic methods, including in-depth interviews and 
participant observation, this study brings to light the difficulties of putting into practice 
human rights principles within an already established local culture grappling with its 
own ghosts like occupations and colonial experiences. Although resistance to change is 
often difficult to identify since it is shrouded in ‘modern’ language, hidden under 
security arguments or bureaucratic explanations. Interviews and a range of documents 
illustrate the multi-layered misconceptions, stereotypes and fear that play out among 
the Maltese.  
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Note on Gender/Interviews 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
The researcher’s responsibility to guarantee full anonymity to the interviewees is a 
challenge when writing about a small community. In addition, irregular migration in 
Malta is a highly charged and politicised field making the preservation of anonymity 
even more important. The reader is therefore being alerted to the following action 
that has been taken to avoid the identification of interviewees.  
When referring to interviewees, gender has been deliberately mixed up. This means 
that when an interviewee is referred to as a ‘he’ or ‘him’, it can be either a man, or a 
woman, and vice versa. This was the most effective way to safeguard anonymity and 
avoid any negative repercussions on the interviewees. To this end the reader will note 
that very little information is given about the interviewees. This should not detract 
from the value of the interviews since the role of the interviews was not one of 
statistical analysis, but used to obtain collective wisdom, to give further depth to the 
discussions and to furnish the text with quotes. 
Although this measure understandably removes some of the texture of the research, it 
was justified with the reasons given above but also because gender was not explored 
in this study. This should not, however, be taken to mean that the researcher believes 
gender is not significant or important. Ideally it would also have been explored, but the 
limitations of this study did not permit it. Similarly, there are other characteristics of 
the interviewees which could have been explored but were not referred to such as 
class and age.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The research: Human rights, irregular migration and Malta 
Decades have passed since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) first saw 
the light of day in 1948.1 The contemporary global community now boasts of a 
complex, relatively well-funded global human rights system which includes 
international and national laws, international and national institutions and a vibrant 
NGO community. More importantly, many people all around the world have used 
human rights to gain advances to their quality of life that have resulted in a re-
articulation of the human person. Amongst these one can find the women’s movement 
and the disability rights movement. Human rights, it would seem, are ‘working’. The 
implementation of the human rights vision is on track. All this brings to mind Eleanor 
Roosevelt’s famous quote: 
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home - so 
close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet they are the 
world of the individual person; the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he 
attends; the factory, farm, or office where he works. Such are the places where every 
man, woman, and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without 
discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning 
anywhere. Without concerted citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall 
look in vain for progress in the larger world.2 
The other side of the story is that, in spite of all these positive developments, human 
rights violations continue to occur. One particular group has been singled out as facing 
daunting issues of access to human rights, all around the world. These are irregular 
immigrants: immigrants who for some reason or another are outside their country of 
citizenship and have an irregular status in the country of residence. Given that irregular 
migration is defined by national immigration rules, and is not a fixed condition, 
irregular migrants are a mixed ‘group’ in terms of motivation for migration, mode of 
entry, country of origin, age and so on. Notwithstanding this, irregular migrants share 
                                                          
1
 United Nations General Assembly. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217 A(III), adopted 10 
December 1948. 
2
 Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘In your Hands’, Speech at the Presentation of the booklet on Human Rights ‘In Your Hands: A 
Guide for Community Action for the Tenth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, 
<http://www.udhr.org/history/inyour.htm>, 1958, (accessed online 23 April 2011). 
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two things which condition their relationship with human rights: the first is that they 
are human beings and the second is that they are non-citizens. The former gives them 
full entitlement to human rights, the latter maps out problematic access to these 
human rights.3  
These issues are not new. The human rights researcher Stephanie Grant has shown 
that the affirmation of the human rights of non-citizens, including migrants, has been 
characterised in the early years firstly, by the ‘failure’ to protect non-citizens, with the 
exception of refugees for whom protection measures were enacted, and secondly, by 
the overall ‘marginalisation’ of issues surrounding irregular migration.4 Grant shows 
that since the 1990s this situation has taken a more positive turn at the UN.5 The 1990s 
also saw a striking increase in the number of international migrants worldwide, and a 
similar increase, albeit on a smaller scale, of irregular migrants. Amongst the global 
forces cited as leading to this situation are widening income inequality, civil strife in 
African, Asian and Arab countries and more generally factors associated with cultural 
globalisation. Irregular migration is a global phenomenon. Irregular migration from the 
global south to the global north is characterised by the following developments: the 
mushrooming of migration detention centres,6 the construction of walls between 
countries,7 and the numerous examples of alleged ‘refoulement’ of migrants to their 
countries or origin when at risk of ill-treatment are examples of this. This situation has 
been continually (re)produced, in the last two decades, by an increasing securitisation 
of migration management. The factors leading to this situation are multi-causal and 
complex. The end result is that irregular migration appears more and more as an area 
                                                          
3
 This theme is explored in a recent collected volume of works: Marie-Bénédicte  Dembour & Tobias Kelly, eds. Are 
Human Rights for Migrants? Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United States, 
Routledge, Oxon, 2001. 
4
 Stephanie Grant, ‘The recognition of migrants’ rights within the UN human rights system: The first 60 years’ in Are 
Human Rights for Migrants? Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United States, 
eds. M-B. Dembour & T. Kelly, Routledge, Oxon, 2011, p. 25. 
5
 Ibid, p. 39. 
6
 The Global Detention Project aims to map ‘the detention in response to growing global migration’. In Global 
Detention Project, ‘About the Global Detention Project’, <http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/about/about-the-
project.html>, 2007 – 2011, (accessed 29 July 2011). 
7
 The following are three examples of physical walls built with the intention of managing irregular migration: the 
planned construction of a wall between Greece and Turkey in Jean-Pierre Stroobants & Guillaume Perrier, ‘Plans for 
a wall on Greece's border with Turkey embarrass Brussels’, The Guardian, 11 January 2011; the walls/fences in 
Ceuta and Mellilla erected in the 1990s(Spain – Moroccan border)  BBC News, ‘World's barriers: Ceuta and Melilla’, 
BBC News , <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8342923.stm>, 5 November 2009, (accessed 26 April 2011); 
and the metal wall at the US – Mexico border erected in 1994, BBC News, ‘World's barriers: US-Mexico’, BBC News, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/8343278.stm>, 5 November 2009, (accessed 21 May 2011). 
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devoid of human rights. This is the fate of the majority of irregular immigrants in 
Malta.  
Since 2002, this small island state in the Mediterranean Sea has seen a marked 
increase in the number of irregular immigrants, who arrive by boat or are saved at sea 
by the Maltese Armed Forces. All irregular immigrants are indiscriminately detained on 
arrival for up to eighteen months in deplorable conditions – unsanitary, overcrowded 
and for lengthy periods of time. Upon release, the vast majority are accommodated in 
open centres consisting of a ‘tent’ village, a hangar, depleted barracks in a remote part 
of the island, or an old school in a district notorious for its associations with 
prostitution, criminality and more recently severe pollution. Such a shocking situation 
stands in sharp contrast to the peaceful vision of ‘a world made new’8 put forward by 
the UDHR and human rights treaties to which Malta has been an avid signatory since it 
gained independence. 
The onus of responsibility for the safeguarding of the human rights of irregular 
immigrants, as with other peoples’ human rights, rests primarily with states. Living up 
to this responsibility has generally proven difficult in Western countries since irregular 
immigrants tend to be perceived by policy-makers and the public as an additional and 
unwarranted burden on the country and as transgressing a culture of ‘legality’ often 
associated with ‘civilisation’.  
Why is the safeguarding of human rights of migrants problematic in a country which 
claims to be a member of the human rights system? Why has the human rights system 
not yet effectively addressed the ill-treatment of irregular immigrants? I argue that 
these are the result of a lack of a human rights culture and could be overcome by 
focusing on nurturing a human rights culture ‘on the ground’. This would complement 
the establishment of human rights as a legal and institutional system which has so far 
been the primary focus of the human rights movement.  Are human rights in Malta 
ineffective? Or have human rights in contemporary societies become ineffective, 
                                                          
8
 Mary Ann Glendon,  A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Random House, New York, 2001.  
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thereby reaching, as the philosopher Costas Douzinas put it, ‘the end of human 
rights’?9 
This research project initially grappled with these questions, but concluded, and such is 
the basis of the argument of this thesis, that human rights still have the potential to be 
effective. What is needed is a re-articulation of the bridge between human rights ‘in 
theory’ and human rights ‘in practice’. What is being proposed here is that this can be 
done with the concept of a human rights culture, defined in this study as a culture 
which highly regards human rights principles.  
1.2 Purpose of the research: Aims and research questions 
The aim of this research project is to investigate the phenomenon of irregular 
immigration in Malta using human rights culture as an analytical tool. The purpose of 
this research is to find meaningful, effective and long-lasting solutions to treatment of 
irregular immigrants in Malta in accordance with human rights principles. This thesis 
seeks to do this by first identifying some of the underlying patterns in Maltese political 
culture exposed by irregular migration which are not in tune with human rights 
principles. The assumption is that the ill-treatment of irregular immigrants would not 
happen if human rights principles were used to guide political decisions and behaviour. 
The overarching research question is: What patterns in Maltese political culture could 
be identified as leading to the violation of human rights of irregular immigrants? And in 
what way can human rights guide political decisions that will lead to the improvement 
of the treatment of irregular migrants in Malta? 
The central research question is followed by a set of other questions which can be 
considered critical to this research. They are addressed primarily in this introductory 
chapter as well as in Chapter 2 where the theoretical framework is outlined in more 
detail, and albeit to a lesser degree, in the subsequent chapters: 
- What is a human rights culture? What can a human rights culture do? 
- How can a human rights culture be ‘reconciled’ with local cultures? 
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- Why are ‘human rights’ a solution to the problem?  
- In what way is my contribution in this study different to the way human rights 
culture has been used so far? 
- How is it possible to assess the gaps between contemporary local practices and 
a potential human rights culture? 
- What are the building blocks of a human rights culture? How can one use this 
as a conceptual tool to analyse a situation? 
The analysis of the case study of irregular migration in Malta, from Chapter 3 onwards, 
is led by the following generic questions: 
- What is the nature of the ill-treatment of irregular immigrants? 
- What are the main elements in contemporary Maltese political culture that 
hinder the establishment of the political vision of human rights? 
- Why is the adoption of a human rights approach particularly problematic in 
relation to irregular immigrants in Malta? 
- How does this understanding differ from mainstream interpretations of human 
rights? 
- How can a human rights culture be nurtured? 
This study will not give comprehensive solutions to the problem of irregular 
immigration in Malta, but will indicate what kind of paradigm shift needs to be made 
to find ‘human rights friendly’ solutions. It will not give a comprehensive analysis of the 
issue of irregular immigration in Malta, but focuses on those issues crucial to the 
nurturing of a human rights culture, which refers to a state of cultural internalisation 
or appropriation of human rights principles. 
1.3 Significance and contribution of the study 
1.3.1 The case study of irregular migration in Malta 
Reports by international authoritative bodies in the last decade suggest that the 
affirmation of the human rights of irregular migrants in Malta appears to be at a 
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stalemate.10 The majority of developments in this field appear to be more from the 
pragmatic point of view of migration management, and take less into consideration 
human rights aspects. Indeed the dire situation that irregular immigrants are in, to 
which I can attest to from my own investigations, would support this view. Research in 
this area has tended to focus on specific areas or topics. This includes, amongst other 
works, Victor Martinelli’s article investigating discrimination in education;11 Ruth 
Farrugia’s articles on legal developments and integration;12 Mario Cardona’s studies 
commissioned by the Centre for Faith and Justice on poverty in Malta;13  Colin Calleja 
et al on education and ethnic minorities;14 ENAR’s empirical reports focusing on 
discrimination and racism.15 
Apart from contributing to the existing literature on this topic, irregular migration is a 
good case study for this thesis. It has brought to the surface political forces in 
contemporary Maltese culture which hinder the nurturing of a human rights culture. It 
is not a coincidental choice. This should not, however, lead to the assumption that all 
other people in Malta are treated with respect, in line with human rights standards. 
Rather the lack of a human rights culture that emerges so clearly with irregular 
immigrants, strongly suggests that there must also be huge gaps in other fields. From 
my observations one of the differences is that whereas human rights violations in 
other fields for a variety of reasons are generally well-concealed, irregular migration 
issues are made public. A second reason, which many of my informants highlighted, is 
that traditional cultural and social structures provide the necessary protection and 
minimal well-being for other disadvantaged groups. The lack of a stable foundation 
built on human rights principles, means that any sudden changes in society would 
result in problems for other groups too. This study also overlaps, and could be seen as 
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 This refers to reports by for example, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, the 
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a contribution, with the broader literature on Maltese political culture and human 
rights which is often unrelated to irregular migration. 
1.3.2 Why human rights? 
In the search for more humane and long-lasting solutions to the ill-treatment of 
irregular immigrants in Malta, why should one persist and have faith in human rights? I 
believe that human rights are best suited to address the problems that irregular 
migrants in Malta face, for the following reasons. First, human rights aim to ensure 
that everyone is treated with respect in view of their innate human dignity. Second, 
human rights promote a vision of a shared humanity which is all the more important 
when dealing with non-citizens. Third, the human rights system has been created to 
keep governments in check, generally promote human rights and provides tools to 
individuals and groups to claim such basic human rights. Fourth, human rights, by 
virtue of a widespread consensus they enjoy, are a legitimate tool. Finally, Malta is 
generally a keen (not reluctant) signatory of many international human rights treaties, 
in line with the declaration of human rights enshrined in the Constitution of Malta. 
This is taken to mean that in principle, the Maltese community is generally in favour of 
human rights principles. 
1.3.3 Why culture?  
The concept of culture in this thesis is used in various ways to explain and analyse 
social practices and global phenomena. It is first used as a conceptual tool in the 
attempt to identify social and political customary practices and traditions that hinder 
the adoption of human rights principles in the irregular migration field in Malta. In this 
regards, the central influence is the cultural theorist Clifford Geertz who proposed that 
culture could be used by social scientists in their quest for interpreting patterns of 
behaviour. Geertz thus defined culture as: 
...an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of 
inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men [and 
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women] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes 
toward life.16 
This understanding of culture marked a shift from former conceptualisations of culture 
which were broadly essentialist and projected culture as static, unchanging and having 
clear boundaries. Geertz’s definition on the other hand, by presenting culture as fluid, 
changing and without rigid boundaries, paved the way for a broader usage of culture. 
In addition Geertz’s focus on the interpretative techniques needed to discover and 
understand culture opened new avenues for social scientists concerned with 
understanding behavioural patterns of groups of people. Finally, Geertz’s cultural 
tradition opened avenues, which were availed of in this thesis, of retaining the focus 
on social practices. 
Culture is then used in a second way, most notably in the concept of ‘human rights 
culture’ in this thesis which is used to describe any culture which adopts and values 
human rights principles. A human rights culture is therefore not an end state, but 
remains a process by which local cultures engage with humanist values, cosmopolitan 
norms and global issues. An in-depth discussion of this concept is presented in Section 
2.3. The process by which human rights principles are adopted by local cultures, that is 
how human rights principles gain cultural legitimacy, is discussed in a Section 2.2.2. 
Culture in this sense is still informed by the Geertzian understanding, and highlights 
cultures’ capacity for including and reacting to both local and global developments. In 
spite of this constant adoption and negotiation of cosmopolitan and global norms, 
culture is still produced, reproduced and perpetuated at a local level.  
1.3.4 Inadequacies of other views 
Most scholars’ view of human rights is that they are entrenched in, what I call, the 
‘dominant paradigm’, which views human rights as a legal-political system 
(re)constructed and (re)negotiated in diplomatic and legal arenas. The critical 
sociologist Kate Nash observes that even the concept of ‘human rights culture’ has 
been employed within this dominant framework, thereby divesting it of the added 
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richness and inclusion of social and political processes.17 She draws on the approach 
undertaken by the cultural sociologist Jeffrey Alexander who makes a case for viewing 
culture not as causal but as constitutive of patterns of meanings. It is necessary to 
‘bring the unconscious cultural structures that regulate society into the light of the 
mind’ according to Alexander.18 The need to understand cultural structures better 
arises from the recognition that cultural structures are strong forces in society which 
can both constrain and enable. Alexander describes cultural structures as the result of 
socially constructed subjectivity which forms the will of collectivities. He says: 
The secret to the compulsive power of social structures is that they have an inside. 
They are not only external to actors but internal to them. They are meaningful. These 
meanings are structured and socially produced, even if they are invisible. We must 
learn how to make them visible.19 
For Alexander, the question of how to analyse and expose cultural structures 
theoretically lies in a combination of structuralism and hermeneutics: 
We have suggested here that structuralism and hermeneutics can be made into fine 
bedfellows. The former offers possibilities for general theory construction, prediction, 
and assertions of the autonomy of culture. The latter allows analysis to capture the 
texture and temper of social life. When complemented by attention to institutions and 
actors as causal intermediaries, we have the foundations of a robust cultural 
sociology.20 
In addition, by arguing for greater recognition of the concept of a human rights 
culture, this study shows that analyses using the proposed cultural paradigm generate 
different solutions which could complement those generated by the ‘dominant 
paradigm’ (See Figure 1 below: The Cultural Paradigm of Human Rights). 
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Figure 1: The Cultural Paradigm of Human Rights 
The dominant legal-positivistic paradigm of human rights gives superior value to 
judicial interpretation and adjudication. Analytical methods within the human rights 
system tend to fall under this paradigm. For example, the majority of institutional 
monitoring is carried out by treaty-based bodies which analyse the developments or 
adherence of a state to its mother Convention or Treaty. This system of reporting, 
including the so-called civil society shadow reporting, focuses on legal, policy and 
institutional development. Value or reference to socio-cultural and political processes 
are limited and often absent. This is often problematic because proposals lack the 
cultural information that could produce solutions which are truly effective and long-
lasting. This situation calls for an analytical tool which uncovers socio-cultural and 
political processes. The concept of human rights culture as a normative and discursive 
tool could, proposes this study, fill this gap. It will be explained in further detail in 
Section 1.5. 
1.4 Methods and Methodology 
Social research has been practiced in the last decades with increased sensitivity to the 
inbuilt dynamics of dominant practices and their effects on the social research process, 
which it is now recognised conditions the end results. This section demonstrates the 
awareness of the researcher in this regard. 
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1.4.1 Human rights culture as an analytical tool (The Research 
Process) 
In order to establish how human rights culture in practice should actually operate, an 
analytical tool or (at least) a heuristic device is needed. This would enable a systematic 
analysis to expose those indigenous cultural processes of a social and political nature 
which hinder the adoption of human rights principles. Such a tool was not found. I 
therefore embarked on devising an original methodology to first construct a heuristic 
device with which I could then analyse the case study. I kept the awareness of ‘culture’ 
as the realm where activity and appropriation of political principles happened at the 
heart of my heuristic device. For this reason, I used the case study itself in two ways: a) 
to feed back and complete the heuristic tool, and b) to analyse the case study in itself 
by reference to the completed tool. (See Figure 2: The Research Process) 
The aim of the first phase of analysis was to identify key aspects of the modern human 
rights movement which were constitutive of the political vision of human rights. This 
was done by conducting a broad research on human rights theory and analysing the 
UDHR, in particular its Preamble. The aspects identified were: person, state, 
international relations and political philosophy; they lead to the construction of a 
heuristic device I refer to as the ‘Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture’. The 
second phase involved going out into the field to identify key concepts in political 
culture which would feed back into the basic structure of the model. These resulted in 
the building blocks of a human rights culture: human dignity, cosmopolitanism, 
democracy and equality. 
The third phase of analysis of the case study could then be conducted using the 
completed model, which allowed the usefulness of the model to be tested by 
attempting to generate possible solutions and policy directions to ensure that the 
human rights of irregular immigrants would be safeguarded. This would then bring 
Maltese society closer to the establishment of a human rights culture. 
This section gives an overview of Phase 1 and Phase 2, whereas Phase 3 (the 
application of the completed model) is discussed in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
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Figure 2: The Research Process 
1.4.2 Primary sources 
Fieldwork in Malta was conducted between August 2008 and February 2009. A 
preliminary four week visit to the field was carried out between December 2007 and 
January 2008 to lay the groundwork and design the methodology. After fieldwork, 
contact by email and social networking sites like Facebook remained with some of my 
main informants. This contact and a few other short visits made it possible to keep 
updating my material. 
The aim of my fieldwork was two-fold: 
a. Identification of issues in political culture: Following the first phase of analysis, 
the four characteristics of human rights had been identified and modelled on 
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the tetrahedron model. The exact concepts of ‘political culture’ were expected 
to arise out of the fieldwork. Fieldwork therefore entailed an investigation into 
the main elements of Maltese political culture which were hindering the 
adoption of a human rights approach. 
b. Data collection: Empirical data was collected about the situation of irregular 
immigrants. The nature of data had to address the investigation for underlying 
socio-cultural and political processes in Maltese society, which were 
problematic to the undertaking of a human rights approach in the field. Data 
collected therefore ranged from in-depth interviews, participant observation, 
reports, court cases and media articles. 
The conduct of this research necessitated a flexible multi-method qualitative approach 
to gain a multi-layered understanding of the way human rights are implemented in 
Malta in the irregular migration field. 
Open in-depth interviews 
Interviews were conducted with around 20 informants, who occupied key and 
professional positions. The primary criterion for selection was a willingness to openly 
discuss one’s ideas for addressing the challenges brought about by irregular migration 
in Malta.  A cross-section of people working in different areas of the irregular 
migration field was ensured, as well as a number of people who could be considered 
independent experts (not affiliated to any institution). The intention of the interviews 
was to tune in to the ‘collective wisdom’ amongst as diverse a group of people as 
possible, all of whom were in contact with irregular immigrants or were highly 
conversant with developments in the field. 
The age of the interviewees ranged between 27 and 78 years. Four of the interviewees 
were women, and 15 were men. References to interviewees by gender - ‘he’ or ‘she’ – 
have been mixed up in the thesis to avoid identification as explained in the ‘Note’ at 
the beginning of this study. Interviewees have been referred to by their main 
occupation. However all were selected on the basis of their experience with irregular 
immigrants. Typical of people living in small countries, most of them were occupying, 
or had occupied in the past, various roles. So for example, one of the government 
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officials volunteered with an NGO twice a month; one of the NGO workers had worked 
with a government agency and the refugees interviewed had experience working for 
NGOs and government agencies. In all the following were interviewed: seven NGO 
workers, four government officials and government agency employees, three 
academics and experts, two refugees, two international NGO workers and one Church 
agency employee. All are referenced throughout the thesis in self-descriptive 
references with the real date of interview and their role, for example, A, Personal 
Interview - NGO worker, 24 October 2008. Initials have been used to retain anonymity 
and are given randomly.  
 All interviews conducted were guaranteed anonymity. This was made clear at least 
twice: in the first contact email and reiterated just before the interview. Anonymity 
was of critical importance to the fieldwork as some participants made it very clear that 
they would have not participated had the study not been anonymous. For example, 
the following international NGO worker said: 
I would never have this interview with you like this if you told me that I am going to be 
quoted, because I cannot be quoted.21 
Special care has been taken to ensure that interviewees could not be identified in the 
text of the thesis. Reference to anything which put their anonymity at risk has been 
either partially or totally omitted.  
Although around half the interviewees expressed a wish not to remain anonymous, it 
was still reiterated that anonymity would be preserved in order to ensure that other 
external factors which might have influenced the interviews would be removed. Such 
influences included: 
a. The sensitivity of the topic, at a time when violence and aggression against 
Maltese people perceived as pro-immigrant was rampant. 
b. The possibility that an interviewee could have used the research study as a 
platform to ‘speak out’ – an expectation that the interview or my research 
could not reach. 
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c. The risk that interviews lose the frankness that was needed in a time when 
public (and populist) discussions on irregular migration was common. 
Interviews were conducted between October 2008 and January 2009. The languages of 
the interviews were Maltese and English, with most having a mix of both languages as 
is typical and common in Malta. During the translation into English, part of the 
authenticity of some of the expressions and idioms was lost, although being Maltese 
myself helped a great deal in grasping the actual meanings intended. All the interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. The lengths of the interviews ranged between one 
hour and three hours. 
Interviews were conducted in a broadly exploratory perspective and interviewees were 
encouraged to lead the conversation. The following keywords were used during each 
interview: irregular immigrants, human rights, human rights culture, disadvantaged or 
vulnerable groups, detention, open centres, Maltese society’s reaction, racism, 
universal, moral, state, person, cosmopolitan, equality, democracy and human dignity. 
Many of the interviewees were key informants throughout my fieldwork and offered 
me support afterwards too by inviting me to events, including me in e-groups, sending 
me publications and generally being available for clarifications and further discussions. 
‘Trust’ was crucial to the success of my interviews. I took special care to nurture this 
trust by presenting the interview as an exploratory conversation to help me (the 
researcher) understand the way Maltese society and government interact with the 
issue of irregular migration. Using the word ‘conversation’ gave the sense of 
informality and intimacy that I wanted and dispelled anxieties that the word 
‘interview’ provoked. In addition I made sure that the meeting place was informal and 
personal, that is, places where the interviewee felt comfortable like coffee shops, their 
own homes and common friends’ houses. I avoided work offices to minimise 
association with their professional roles. I capitalised on my Maltese and immigrant 
networks. For example the majority of interviewees knew me personally and I made 
sure I approached those who did not with a ‘reference’, usually in the form of a 
greeting, from common trusted friends. This proved invaluable as I do not believe I 
could have otherwise managed to discuss such a sensitive and politicised topic. It is fair 
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to say that this accounted for the relaxed interviews. The rich narratives that emerged 
were full of personal information, anecdotes and at times, politically sensitive issues. 
I generally felt that the willingness to help came partly from a burning need to discuss 
irregular migration in a ‘safe space’ and most interviews were intertwined with 
personal moral reflections. For example, one of the interviewees who was passionate 
on the safeguarding of the human rights of irregular immigrants, suddenly lapsed into 
a guilty account of her own fears when she encounters groups of African men walking 
on the street.22 In another interview, with a person passionate against social injustices 
and very much in favour of diversity, there was another ‘guilty’ confession, which was 
that he would never allow his teenage daughters anywhere near the Marsa Open 
Centre – one of the large migrant open centres housing around 800 men.23 In another 
interview full of disparaging remarks about immigrants’ behaviour, the interviewee 
suddenly mentioned his own afflictions when he comes face to face with immigrants 
because ‘these are people our age, and it’s like you’re denying them a future, and you 
feel bad, you know.’24 Therefore what emerged from the interviews was that 
irrespective of their ideological and/or pragmatic beliefs, all were personally struggling 
to make sense of the situation. My interview was ‘used’ as a ‘self reflexive vent’ giving 
me precious and unique insights into individual’s moral dilemmas on political issues. 
The interviews generated key information for this research, generally conditioned by 
the interviewees own ‘positionality’ in the irregular migration field, which consisted of: 
- the identification of underlying issues in Maltese political culture. This included 
the connections between seemingly under-related issues; 
- understanding the different ‘constructions’ of reality. The interviewees’ 
predominant view generally reflected that of their full time job; 
- important leads with empirical value like the development of particular 
incidents, and other research in this field. 
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 C, Personal Interview - Government official, 29 October 2008. 
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Participant observation 
Participant observation was carried out regularly, seven days a week. Given the nature 
of the research questions I felt it would be limiting to choose one spatial location to 
conduct participant observation. It was possible to conduct multi-sited observation 
due to the short distances involved in Malta. I chose to ‘accompany’ people working 
with immigrants, and immigrants themselves, as they moved between their location of 
work, official meetings, public seminars, informal meetings, their homes and so on. 
Participant observation was therefore mobile and the ‘spatial’ site was ‘Malta’. The 
following key places featured prominently: NGOs offices and activities organised by 
NGOs, Ħal Safi Detention Centre as a volunteer, Ħal Far Open Centre, Marsa Open 
Centre, various Ministries and ministerial agencies. In addition I conducted visits to the 
following places for which I needed official authorisation: Ħal Far Tent Village, Ħal Far 
Open Centre for Women, Dar is-Sliem, Dar il-Qawsalla, Dar il-Liedna and Balzan 
Residence for Immigrants. I also attended social events and celebrations of migrants 
like weddings, funerals and parties. 
The smallness of the island lent itself to ease of mobility and interaction with various 
actors, but is not the explanation for the high access and immersion I enjoyed 
throughout the fieldwork.  This was due primarily to two sets of work experience (from 
my past history) which were of particular use to my fieldwork. The first was that of 
being Maltese, having worked closely with various government departments and also 
having been for many years active with (Maltese) youth and workers’ associations. This 
experience meant that I knew how to frame requests to Government departments or 
which strings to pull, and when. My ‘second’ experience had to do specifically with my 
activism with immigrants in Malta. For several years prior to my fieldwork I was one of 
the few Maltese visibly active with immigrants: visiting detention centres and open 
centres, assisting with case work, collecting clothes, speaking on radio and TV 
programmes. This was a period when being seen around with an African or Asian 
immigrant, even just having a coffee or walking down the street, was generally enough 
to attract attention. This however meant that I had gained a lot of trust and access to 
the various immigrant groups. 
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Field notes were recorded both of incidents which appeared rich and interesting, but 
also in relation, in a broad sense, to the main inquiry: why were irregular immigrants 
ill-treated by Maltese society, and what role do ‘human rights’ play? The assumption, 
as mentioned before, is that if human rights were ‘working’ well and their 
implementation was in order, then irregular immigrants would not be ill-treated. The 
focus of the use of human rights in the irregular migration field was retained 
throughout. As in the interviews, the exploration uncovered people’s ‘construction’ of 
the irregular migration field. Due to the wide scope of the field, the preferred method 
was detailed documenting of incidents which were out of the ordinary. 
One recurring observation was that the small size of the Maltese community provided 
ample spaces in everyday social life for interaction between the Maltese ‘actors’: NGO 
workers, government officials, Detention Service (DS) staff and so on. These ‘spaces’ 
were often completely un-related to the irregular migration field and included: 
community village activities like the traditional festas or festivals, arts events like 
performances and exhibitions, (extended) family-related activities, their children’s 
activities and so on. This kind of social interaction was important to note because it 
influenced relationships and interaction between irregular migrants, influential actors 
in the field and the host community. 
As will be explained in Chapter 3, with over 40 different countries of origin the variety 
of languages is too much for anyone to master. I mainly communicated in English, but 
also used French, Italian, Maltese and rudimentary Arabic. In situations where I was 
desperate to ask something in detail, I never had problems in finding, at short notice, a 
member of their circle of friends who knew enough English to interpret. In Maltese 
circles, English and Maltese were enough, and presented no barriers. Overall, given 
that irregular immigrants were not my main focus, I do not consider this a significant 
limitation to the study. 
During my fieldwork I was also invited to become a member of the National Contact 
Point of the European Migration Network (EMN) as a researcher.25 This gave me access 
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to additional material, presentations as well as a professional network and other 
researchers. I was also invited to conduct two sessions on human rights and irregular 
migration on a course run by the Centre for Faith and Justice on the Catholic Social 
Teaching. The discussions during these sessions specifically on the human rights of 
migrants in Malta were particularly useful. 
Participant observation generated rich information on socio-cultural and political 
processes and served in the ‘construction’ of my own perception of the interaction of 
human rights within the irregular migration field. This was of crucial importance 
because the intense politicisation of the irregular migration field combined with the 
highly charged reactions that mention of ‘human rights’ provokes, lead to complex and 
contradictory ‘constructions’. In most cases I found I could not rely on what even my 
key informants were telling me but needed to visit a place or see for myself. 
Participant observation on the whole gave me additional sensitivity to the various 
complexities which the irregular migration field is made of, and external factors, 
equally complex, which condition it. Finally participant observation served to address 
my concerns of undue biases due to my previous involvement in the field (as will be 
explained below in the section on ‘Researcher’s positionality’). 
1.4.3 Secondary sources  
The strictly empirical data necessary to answer the more empirically-oriented 
questions was collected during fieldwork and throughout the writing up process. These 
consisted of reports by government agencies and departments, local NGOs, 
international NGOs, intergovernmental organisations and the National Statistics Office 
(NSO). The vast majority of these reports are posted online which largely facilitated the 
updating of data after fieldwork. 
I had access to a printed collection of local media articles which mentioned irregular 
immigrants from 2004 – 2007. I pursued this online when I started this research 
project and collected media articles from 2007 to the present day from The Times of 
Malta and The Sunday Times of Malta. Both newspapers are published by Allied 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Maltese National Contact Point is the Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs, meets annually and encourages the 
sharing of research in this field. 
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Newspapers Limited and are the most popular and generally considered reputable 
English-language newspapers. This was possible because they have a good online 
version. Other articles from online versions of Maltese newspapers L-Orizzont and In-
Nazzjon were also included even if these newspapers can largely be considered party 
propaganda. MaltaToday and The Malta Independent were also regular checked, as 
well as e-newspapers like di-ve.com, maltarightnow.com, maltastar.com. 
I collected copies of the proceedings of a selection of local court cases involving 
irregular immigrants, generally contesting the length of their detention or their 
vulnerability. Finally, I gathered four collections of photos: a) taken by Reuters of 
irregular immigrants in detention; b) photos of irregular immigrants from the 
collection of a professional photographer; c) some photos downloaded from internet 
sites; as well as, d) my own collection of photos shot during fieldwork. 
1.5 Researcher’s positionality 
The researcher Elizabeth Chiseri-Strater who focuses on ethnographic enquiry as a 
research tool, notes that the concept of positionality in research includes two aspects. 
The first is the researcher’s ‘given’ attributes such as race, nationality and gender, 
which are fixed or culturally ascribed. 26 In my case, I was always conscious that most 
of my ‘given’ attributes gave me a distinct advantage. Being Maltese, white and female 
meant that I was free to mingle in different circles without standing out. During my 
preparatory visit, I met an Italian researcher who was faced with some covert hostility 
when interviewing key officials. He received snide remarks when going for interviews 
about ‘his’ country’s interpretation of international maritime law, or ‘his’ ‘cowboy-
style’ Prime Minister pushing immigrants ‘our’ way. These were allusions to the various 
international (and highly publicised) disputes with Italy on the rescue of irregular 
immigrants at sea and rumours that the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, had 
ordered the Italian Coast Guard to redirect immigrants into Maltese waters. During my 
fieldwork, I also met an Austrian statistician gathering data on immigration for a 
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European project, and he mentioned a similar problem. He was clearly told that 
instead of chasing statistics he would be more useful to the Maltese by ‘taking’ the 
immigrants to the EU. These incidents are not surprising given the nationalist 
overtones of debates on irregular migration at the time. 
Overall I was perceived as an insider and this proved beneficial. It was often made 
clear during conversations. People would tell me things like ‘ħa ngħidilek kif inhi, mhux 
se noqgħod indurlek mal-lewza’ – ‘let me tell it to you exactly the way it is, without 
beating round the bush’; ‘inti taf kemm hi diffiċli s-sitwazzjoni hawnhekk’ – ‘you know 
how difficult the situation is here’; ‘miegħek ma nistax nistaħba wara subgħajja’ – 
‘with you I can’t conceal information’.27 When I felt a risk that things may be skipped 
over, because they assumed that ‘I understand’, my gender and age, which in other 
situations may be considered unfortunate, in this regard came in useful. Maltese 
society is generally patriarchal and patronising. Being female, and ‘young’, meant that I 
could legitimately expect more patience and longer explanations to my inquiries. 
Fluency in both Maltese and English was extremely useful. 
There were instances where these same fixed attributes made me stand out and could 
have been negative. This was in the migrant detention centres and open centres where 
the majority of residents are African and Asian and male, and so is the vast majority of 
staff. In this regard I was lucky that I was well known, or they had heard of me. This 
was true with the detention services personnel and people running some of the open 
centres, and in particular with several immigrant communities. For most of my adult 
life I have been heavily involved either through voluntary work or full time jobs in 
human rights-related activity both locally and internationally (Europe-wide and 
Commonwealth). This experience gave me a birds’-eye view of the development and 
implementation of human rights in Malta, and also an idea of differences and 
similarities with other countries. From a more ‘fixed’ point of view, people in key 
positions in Malta associated me with human rights, non-partisan politics and civil 
society. An active involvement with irregular immigrants primarily as a volunteer with 
the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Malta built on the association of human rights, this 
time in relation to irregular immigrants. Whereas the former image was overall a 
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positive one, the latter was rather more controversial. Luckily my concerns that this 
would create barriers to carrying out this research proved futile because people in 
authoritative positions knew I had moved country and presumably did not consider me 
a threat any more. 
This brings me to the second aspect of ‘positionality’ which Chiseri-Strater refers to as 
‘subjective-contextual’ factors such as personal life history and experiences.28 I was 
very much aware that my personal experience as an activist could potentially not only 
have disrupting effects of a practical nature on this research project, but that my 
outlook and receptivity as a researcher would be negatively affected. A self-reflexive 
approach and outlook has helped counteract some bias although I am conscious that 
such biases are difficult to remove altogether and for this reason need to be stated by 
the researcher. 
Moreover, relinquishing this role altogether was not possible because irregular 
immigrants had invested me with a lot of trust based on my activist background. I was 
generally accepted in most immigrant communities, and even though I had been away 
from Malta for a year, immigrants ‘knew of me’. This was a role I could not easily belie 
in immigrant circles which are very small. In addition, my reputation with the 
immigrants afforded me unique access and a level of sincerity which I feel has only 
served to enrich this thesis. This is not to say that I did not inform them of my new 
‘role’ and the fact that I was now investigating, writing and reporting on their situation. 
This information was however always met with a very positive reaction and often 
gratitude. I wanted to make sure that I was not giving them the impression that I was a 
journalist, and was very careful in explaining what the outcomes of such a research 
project could be - for example, a book or a lecture. Many immigrants were keen to 
show me their gratitude for choosing to write about their situation: ‘it is by the Grace 
of God, that I am alive today, and it is by His Grace that you are writing about us’.29 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Elizabeth Chiseri-Strater, ‘Turning In upon Ourselves’, 1996, p. 116. 
29
 Ghanaian immigrant. My fieldnotes. 
39 
Chapter 1 
 
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into 8 chapters. The opening two chapters are both of an 
introductory nature. This chapter - Chapter 1 – introduced the research project and 
describes the methods and methodology that have been utilised in this study. These 
combine immersion in the field and anthropological style fieldwork, in-depth 
interviews as well as the gathering of other data like reports, research studies, and 
statistics.  
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework of human rights that will 
be used in this thesis which centred on a particular understanding of human rights that 
gives prominence to the concept of culture. This is the basis of the heuristic tool that I 
construct to expose socio-cultural and political processes in Maltese society, in 
particular in the approach to irregular migration, which hinder the cultural 
appropriation of human rights principles. This heuristic device I refer to as the 
‘Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture’.   
Chapter 3 introduces the case study by giving a broad overview of irregular migration 
in Malta. The structure of the chapter reflects the overarching view that the 
phenomenon of irregular migration would best be seen as a subsection of other forms 
of migrations into Malta. Chapter 2 therefore presents empirical data of a statistical, 
legal and sociological nature with the intention to familiarise the reader with the case 
study. 
The next four chapters use the Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture to analyse 
irregular migration in Malta. By using human rights culture as an analytical tool these 
chapters attempt to reveal embedded meanings and socio-cultural patterns in the way 
Maltese society relates to irregular immigrants. Each chapter will focus on one of the 
four constitutive elements of the Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture which 
are human dignity, cosmopolitanism, democracy and equality. They will follow a 
common pattern: 
a. describing the ‘element’/concept as understood within the philosophy of 
human rights; 
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b. applying the ‘element’/concept to the case study of irregular migration in 
Malta; 
c. proposing measures whose adoption would help to close the gap between the 
human rights understanding of the ‘element’/concept and the contemporary 
practice in the irregular migration field in Malta. (These ‘proposals’ are not 
meant to present a ‘comprehensive’ solution but are meant to illustrate the 
kind of solutions that come out from this analysis); 
d. reflecting on what this means for the function of the ‘element’/concept in 
human rights culture. 
Chapter 4 analyses the detention policy for migrants from the perspective of human 
dignity. This Chapter will show how the predominant discourse employed by the 
Government of Malta on detention serves to perpetuate a system whereby irregular 
immigrants are stripped of their human dignity. By doing so, the Government is, 
inadvertently or otherwise, undermining human rights. The treatment of irregular 
immigrants in migrant detention centres in Malta and the upholding of the policy 
detention itself, are symptomatic of a greater malaise in the relationship of Maltese 
society and irregular migrants. 
Chapter 5 moves on to analyse the cosmopolitan orientation necessary for the 
enactment of the human rights vision showing how the development of a selective and 
exclusive nationalism proves to be a barrier to the acceptance of a cosmopolitan 
norms, and negatively impacts on accepting minimum core obligations towards 
‘outsiders’ and foreigners. The development of this radical kind of nationalism is traced 
back to the political consciousness present amongst the Maltese during the era when 
Malta was administered by the Knights of St. John in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, 
its suppression during the 200 years under British colonial rule and the limited 
narrative adopted in view of an unexpected ‘independence’. Juxtaposing the often 
radical pseudo-nationalism in contemporary Malta with the historical reality of an 
island society brings out the tensions in a society which has not only experienced, but 
is also in many ways the result of a cosmopolitan environment. The remnants of such 
elements present avenues for addressing the insularity and the lack of a cosmopolitan 
approach that is detrimental to human rights. 
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The next chapter, Chapter 6, discusses the understanding of democracy within the 
human rights movement and the workings of the democratic system in Malta. The 
popular assumption that the notions of democracy and human rights are strongly 
related is far from self-evident. Indeed democracy, and in particular representative 
democracy, faces moral and theoretical difficulties to implement human rights. 
However, notwithstanding this, the human rights movement has been very clear on 
the choice of a democratic system which prioritises the ‘will of the people’. Another 
aspect of democracy that will be analysed is bureaucracy, as the anthropologist 
Michael Herzfeld has pointed out, through the practice of ‘indifference’ can play an 
active role in creating insiders and outsiders. In fact, the interplay between the political 
elite and bureaucrats in Malta shows how disempowering and excluding the system 
could be in spite of the enactment of legal frameworks and the provision of services 
whose objective is to cater for immigrants. The final discussion in this Chapter focuses 
on why and what model of active citizenship is necessary for a democratic culture 
which respects human rights. In Malta one can see that civic engagement with regards 
to irregular immigrants is rather poor and this, in part, reflects the reluctance of civil 
society actors to adopt an overtly human rights approach. 
Finally, Chapter 7 looks at the understanding and application of the concept of equality 
and social justice with regards to irregular immigrants in Malta. Human rights 
philosophy defines a multi-dimensional notion of equality which aims to ensure that 
the minimal core standards for the well-being of everybody are upheld. The analysis of 
the unequal treatment of irregular immigrants in Malta uses Nancy Fraser’s theory of 
justice, which proposes action on the redistribution of wealth, the recognition of 
differences and representation in society. It is shown how the lack of ‘presence’ and 
empowerment of immigrants is due to forcefully excluding practices which are 
resulting in poverty and destitution. This is justified by the Government’s discourse of 
a ‘lack of resources’, a discourse which is accepted but rarely questioned. The 
exclusion of immigrants is further reinforced by the notable absence of a national 
integration policy. 
The concluding chapter, Chapter 8, gathers the conclusions of the previous four 
substantive chapters to describe the concept of human rights culture and reflect on 
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the importance of recognising this concept in efforts to bridge the gap between human 
rights in theory and human rights in practice. Furthermore the potential of the 
Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture as a heuristic tool that exposes 
underlying forces responsible for resistance and resilience to change, calls for the dire 
need of a cultural appropriation of human rights principles. This Chapter muses on the 
advantages of such an approach which could be complementary to other more popular 
approaches. 
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Chapter 2: The Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights 
Culture 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents the theoretical framework of human rights that is employed in 
this thesis. This includes a description of the Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights 
Culture, the heuristic device that I have constructed in order to facilitate the analysis of 
the case study of irregular migration in Malta from a human rights point of view.  The 
Tetrahedron Model arises out of the epistemological framework of human rights put 
forward by the modern, or post-1948, human rights movement.  
The modern human rights movement is epistemologically different to previous rights’ 
movements. When Mary Ann Glendon wrote her book on how the UDHR came into 
being, she appositely entitled it A World Made New, clearly alluding to the post-war 
project of rebuilding the world on the foundations of peace and respect among 
nations, part of which was the United Nations project. The world was however ‘made 
new’ in another (epistemological) sense: the humanist project(s) of rights was 
conceptually re-conceived into a project which combined local and global interests and 
necessitated a cultural approach that would enable the internalisation of human rights 
principles. The process of internationalisation of universal rights, not only had a huge 
influence on international relations and the state, but also had a considerable impact 
on the construction or conceptualisation of the universal cosmopolitan community.  
Human rights therefore took on a different form.1 This view contrasts with other 
widespread views of human rights which trace a linear development from the French 
or American Declaration of Rights, from the Magna Carta, or even ‘from civilisation’s 
first light’.2 The historian Samuel Moyn gives an example of why it is misleading to 
present previous rights movements as the source of modern human rights: 
...the droits de l’homme that powered early modern revolution and nineteenth-century 
politics need to be rigorously distinguished from the ‘human rights’ coined in the 1940s 
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2
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Kirstin Sellars, The Rise and Rise of Human Rights, Sutton Publishing, UK, 2002, p. vii.  
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that have grown so appealing in the last few decades. The one implied a politics of 
citizenship at home, the other a politics of suffering abroad. If the move from the one 
to the other involved a revolution in meanings and practices, then it is wrong at the 
start to present the one as the source of the other.3 
The watershed and symbol of this change is the UDHR which was passed unanimously 
by the General Assembly of the UN on the 10th of December 1948. The UDHR, the only 
international declaration that is now easily invoked as part of customary international 
law, is critically important to the movement because it constitutes the first articulation 
of this new human rights vision.4 In addition it sets a precedence of intercultural and 
international dialogue and negotiation. For this reason the UDHR is often considered 
to be close to the genesis of the ‘modern’ human rights movement.  
Modern human rights envisaged that human rights should not remain an intellectual, 
political or diplomatic project but would be equally, if not primarily, owned by people. 
Modern human rights philosophy is therefore imbued with an understanding that the 
driving force, or ‘motor’ of the modern human rights movement will be people 
themselves. This could only be realised in practice if human rights principles were 
valued and internalised by people. For this reason, culture, understood as the social 
aspect of the person, necessarily assumes a decisively significant role in the new 
human rights movement. This Chapter echoes the critique, made directly or indirectly 
by Ann-Belinda Preis, Jane Cowan, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Richard Wilson, Kate 
Nash and others that mainstream human rights theories generally fail to acknowledge 
or assign ‘culture’ the prominent role that it deserves.5 
Since the rise in significance of culture within human rights is intrinsically tied to the 
post-1948 modern human rights movement, this Chapter starts by discussing three 
premises that inform some of the characteristics of the epistemological view of 
modern human rights. These premises implicitly make the case for a ‘human rights 
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culture’, a concept which, as will be discussed in Section 2.3, has only had limited use 
in human rights theory and practice. Finally Section 2.4 describes the details of the 
Tetrahedron Model of Human Culture, a heuristic device that will be used in this thesis 
to identify those cultural and social processes that are hindering the adoption of a 
human rights approach in the irregular migration field in Malta. 
2.2 Human rights: Modern visions 
Three premises which characterise the modern human rights movement and shed light 
on its essentially different nature will be presented in this Section. The first premise, 
presented in Section 2.2.1, is that after 1948 human rights were conceived 
conceptually as a political utopia. This utopia envisaged the human being at the centre 
of political decisions and activity at both a local and a global level. For this to happen, 
human rights could not be relegated to the legal or diplomatic fields, but had to be 
understood and internalised by people, as well as politicians and other professionals. 
The effectiveness of human rights could only be achieved if they were recognised as 
targeting the nexus between politics and culture with culture being understood, as 
explained before, as patterns of meaning and not simply a ‘causal’ element. The issue 
of cultural legitimacy is therefore necessary for an effective internalisation of human 
rights and this constitutes the second premise discussed in Section 2.2.2. The third 
theoretical premise serves to explain how human rights could be made to operate in 
different cultural settings without foregoing the basic principles or imposing a separate 
‘culture’. Human rights would best be seen as empty signifiers as Section 2.2.3 
describes in further detail. 
2.2.1 Modern human rights are a global-local utopia 
Utopia is about how we would live and what kind of world we would live in if we could 
do just that.6 
This is the opening sentence of a book on utopian studies by the sociologist Ruth 
Levitas. It can easily describe the motivation of the drafters of UDHR. This utopianism, 
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‘the heartfelt desire to make the world a better place’7 is what makes human rights 
such a powerful tool. It can also be considered a ‘shared’ sentiment amongst human 
rights theorists and practitioners. This appears to be common across the four different 
human rights schools presented by Marie-Bénédicte Dembour – the natural school, the 
protest school, the deliberative school and the discourse school. Moreover, even 
among sceptics or human rights ‘nihilists’ as Dembour defines herself, the realisation 
that there is no alternative to human rights at present, brings about some minimum 
respect for their contemporary functional uniqueness.8 
One of the main distinguishing characteristics, between the modern human rights 
movement and previous rights' movements, is that modern struggles – such as the 
disability rights movement, the LGB rights movement, and the children’s rights 
movement - could effectively contest the nation-state with potentially global 
implications. Modern human rights were reconceptualised as entitlements that might 
‘contradict the sovereign nation-state from above and outside rather than serve as its 
foundation’.9 The human rights movement was not an internal or domestic struggle for 
recognition, but it was re-constructed as a local struggle for the global re-articulation 
of the human. This universal aspiration of human rights and the separation from state 
citizenship gave a distinctly different character to the modern human rights 
movement. Using this argument the African-American civil rights movement (1955 – 
1968), for example, was a pre-cursor to the modern human rights movement but not a 
human rights movement in itself.10 It may have been inspired by human rights 
principles, but it was not a modern human rights movement because its struggles were 
of a ‘civil’ nature, and not of a universal nature. It involved more a re-making or 
refinement of the notion of an ‘American citizen’ rather than the notion of ‘human’.11 
This universal quality of human rights is strongly present in the UDHR and makes the 
case for the human rights of non-citizens. The human rights scholar Stephanie Grant 
shows that in spite of the absence of a specific mention of non-citizens in the UDHR, 
                                                          
7
 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia, 2010, p. 225. 
8
 Marie-Bénédicte  Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European Convention, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 2 & p. 14.  
9
 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia, 2010, p. 13. 
10
 Ibid, p. 159. 
11
 The example of the African-American civil rights movement shows that the transition to the ‘modern human 
rights movement’ is an ongoing process and did not happen instantaneously when the UDHR was adopted. 
47 
Chapter 2 
the premise is that states are primarily responsible for safeguarding the human rights 
of everyone – citizens and non-citizens - within their territory. Grant identifies four 
reasons which make the case that non-citizens were clearly included in the UDHR. 
These are, first, the principle of universality which infuses so-called positive and 
negative rights in the UDHR:12 ‘“everyone” has the right to recognition as a person 
“everywhere”’.13 Second, the draft International Bill of Rights presented by Lord 
Dukeston, the representative of the British Government and an influential member of 
the Drafting Committee, had included in an article that ‘citizens, persons of foreign 
nationality or stateless’ should all enjoy human rights. This was articulated by René 
Cassin in the presentation of the Declaration to the General Assembly on 10 December 
1948, and supported publicly by the Indian representative.14 The third reason is that 
this inclusive approach generally reflected the position of aliens under international 
law. Paradoxically, at the time that the UDHR was adopted, aliens unlike citizens 
already enjoyed some protection under international law.15 The fourth reason, 
according to Grant, is in the use of the word ‘dignity’ in article 1 which was used to 
refer to the equal worth of every human being, without distinction.16 
In tracing the modern history of human rights, the historian Samuel Moyn argues that 
the survival of human rights in the politically turbulent Cold War decades could partly 
be attributed to a crisis in other political utopias. Moyn’s observation is that, ‘morality, 
global in its potential scope, could become the aspiration of humankind’.17 Human 
rights, conceived as ‘neutral’ and ‘antipolitical’, had the potential for transcending 
traditional political structures in a way that could break through the ideological climate 
of the time. 
After the 1970s human rights were increasingly expected to provide a ‘programme of 
action’, to become less ‘antipolitical’. Moyn implies that the challenges human rights 
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were facing to provide a political agenda and a programmatic vision stem from their 
‘suprapolitical’ birth and the historical circumstances which drove the success of 
human rights as ‘antipolitical’ during the 1970s.18 Moyn’s restricted use of the term 
‘political’ and ‘politics’ to refer to traditional political schemes and ideologies is at 
times misleading because human rights are part and parcel of political culture. 
Paradoxically therefore, the same characteristic which appeared to have led to the 
success of human rights in the 1970s was, and in some regards still is in contemporary 
times, the characteristic which is criticised most. Moyn describes this as such: 
Because they [human rights] were born at a moment when they survived as a moral 
utopia when political utopias died, human rights were compelled to define the good life 
and offer a plan for bringing it about precisely when they were ill-equipped by the fact 
of their suprapolitical birth to do so.19 
In brief, post-war human rights can be described as a utopia which derives some ideas 
from previous rights movements, but is paradigmatically different. Modern human 
rights are both local and global in vision and action. With this worldview no distinction 
in entitlements is made on the basis of citizenship. In this regard, this thesis can be 
seen as part of the project of equipping human rights by employing a constitutive 
definition of ‘culture’ as the space in which social and political processes imbue activity 
with significance and meaning. 
2.2.2 Modern human rights need cultural legitimacy  
How are human rights ‘internalised’? Or, in other words, how do human rights 
principles ‘gain entry’ into a culture? This question leads us to the concept of cultural 
legitimacy. A thorough understanding and appreciation of human rights culture is 
essential to bridge the gap between human rights in theory and human rights in 
practice. Without cultural legitimacy, human rights would be outright repudiated by a 
community. They would be perceived as an alien imposition or principle. One should 
not take membership of states in the human rights system, conducted by 
governments, as a sign that human rights have been adopted by society and local 
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communities.20 The philosopher Abdullahi An-Na’im rightly argues that ‘the difficulties 
in implementing human rights effectively...derive from the insufficiency of cultural 
support for the particular right or claim.’21 Moreover, cultural legitimacy is essential for 
a healthy human rights culture since it opens the way for people from different 
cultures to engage with human rights in their endeavours to make human rights 
relevant for their communities and for others. 
Governments have for long focused their efforts on human rights in the international 
field as a diplomatic tool. This is limiting on the implementation of human rights, for 
which there needs to be an equally incisive focus on local development. This could 
partly explain why governments’ relationship with human rights is often imbued with 
suspicion and the threat of external interference. States’ perception of human rights is 
at times limited to a condition of their membership in the international community of 
states. This has, counterproductively, led to a situation where governments are 
reticent in making known, and let alone discussing, human rights issues locally and 
globally. With the exception of a few so-called rogue states, most states try and ‘keep 
up appearances’ with the international community through self-promotion which can 
take various forms, from using the accepted rhetoric at international meetings, to 
responding to international human rights reports in a pro forma manner. Such 
attempts to retain or achieve greater moral authority within the international 
community, do not always reflect the real situation on the ground. An-N’aim points 
this out: 
With internal cultural legitimacy, those in power could no longer argue that national 
sovereignty is demeaned through compliance with standards set for the particular 
human rights as an external value.22 
At a national level, once a human right becomes legitimate within a given culture, the 
same internal processes of change and adjustment which happen naturally within any 
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given community would accommodate human rights. Cultural legitimacy may be seen 
as a politically-imbued process that serves as a channel for the interpenetration of 
ideas between ‘local’ cultures and human rights culture. Cultural legitimacy is 
therefore the process of cultural change by which an alien norm, whether simply 
perceived as such or otherwise, comes to be seen as making sense in the intricate 
webs of significance that make up a local culture. Once a norm is seen as culturally 
legitimate, actions based or motivated by such norms are given value and not 
discredited by the people who make up the culture. 
In much the same vein, any discussion on human rights and culture will also 
undoubtedly provoke controversial questions on how a framework conceived by an 
international group in the UN ambit could come to be called a ‘culture’ and have such 
influence worldwide beyond the diplomatic circle it was originally conceived in. Human 
rights culture could well be seen as a transnational culture. An-Na’im makes reference 
to transnational cultures, made up of people ‘who share a set of values, who subscribe 
to certain institutions’ and are not ‘bound to locality, either regional or national’.23 He 
links the emergence of these transnational cultures to the processes of globalisation 
like the ‘global business culture’, ‘technology culture’ and ‘security culture’.24 
In this sense culture is most usefully conceptualised in a broad and dynamic Geertzian 
sense. The boundaries of culture and nation-states should not be reduced to each 
other. Rather one should view cultures, and sub-cultures, as different fields of 
contestation in their own right with their own dynamics of cultural politics. For this 
reason the Geertzian view of culture as a complex, multi-faceted system, which is 
constantly in flux, is very useful. In Geertz’s words, 
...an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of 
inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men [and 
women] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes 
toward life.25 
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A political elite’s endorsement of a human right acts as a facilitating factor for the 
acceptance of a norm but, contrary to the way it is popularly presented, it will not 
directly bring about automatic cultural legitimacy. The human rights historian Bonny 
Ibhawoh points out that, ‘...the cultural legitimacy of rights cannot be deduced or 
assumed from the mere fact that existing formal documents officially recognize the 
claim as a human right.’26 Instead Ibhawoh indicates that cultural change comes about 
when individuals adopt and alter their ways of thinking,27 
Cultural change can result from individuals being exposed to and adopting new ideas. 
Individuals are actors who can influence their own fate, even if their range of choice is 
circumscribed by the prevalent social structure or culture. In so doing, those who 
choose to adopt new ideas, though influenced by their own interest, initiate a process 
of change which may influence dominant cultural traditions. Culture is thus inherently 
responsive to conflict between individuals and social groups [here he quotes Rhoda 
Howard 1986]. It is a network of perspectives in which different groups hold different 
values and world views, and in which some groups have more power to present their 
version as the true culture.28 
Cultural legitimacy happens at an intersection between the cultural and the political. 
This, as Karen Engle points out, is an argument put forward by the anthropologist Sally 
Merry ‘...Merry identifies human rights as a site for the intersection of the cultural and 
the political...’29 For Merry ‘by using this [human rights] discourse as a site for political 
resistance, indigenous groups have ‘reinterpret[ed] and transform[ed] Western law in 
accordance with their own local legal conceptions.”’30 Engle goes on to say that ‘she is 
most sympathetic to Merry’s understanding of the interpenetration of politics and 
culture. Whether done consciously or not, the continued appropriation of international 
law by those who have traditionally been subjugated by it might well have the 
potential for liberal, if not radical, reform.’31 
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2.2.3 Modern human rights best seen as empty signifiers 
Drawing on the previous section, it would follow that human rights principles can be 
appropriated by different cultural systems. But how can human rights claim to be 
normative and at the same time be adaptable to different cultural signifiers? In an 
attempt to address this dilemma, in this section I propose that human rights could be 
seen as ‘empty signifiers’. 
It is thus useful to view the human rights system as a discursive field in its own right, 
made up of smaller discursive fields of human rights struggles, such as (a) movements 
which have an international impact like the civil rights movement, the women’s 
movement and the international disability rights movement; (b) movements of smaller 
magnitude which are country or group specific like the national movements of self-
determination and the disability rights movement in Malta. Seen in this way one could 
conceive of different human rights discursive fields which are separate but overlap (at 
different axes) at the same time.32 Each human rights discursive field consists of 
signifiers and signifieds (meanings) and includes an ‘empty/master signifier’. The 
political scientist Claes Wrangel explains it thus:  
In his well known Course in General Linguistics (1974) Saussure portrayed a linguistic 
structure as a system of difference where every sign gets its meaning from its relational 
position vis-à-vis other signs. In such a system meaning is only constituted through 
difference and every sign becomes non-essential in character, but on the other hand, 
the meaning of the system itself becomes essential – something in itself as it is not 
standing in relation to anything at all.33 
The concept of the empty signifier, which was defined by Roland Barthes as a signifier 
with no definite signified, was of strategic importance to political philosophers Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s ‘field of discursivity’. The field of discursivity is 
characterised by unlimited combinations, that is, by the multitude of meaning that 
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every sign can take. This field conditions every discursively constituted sign, while at 
the same time prevents every attempt at fixing meaning, since new combinations are 
always possible leading to new meanings. However, there is always something outside 
every discursive structure which makes every discourse into a non-complete entity – 
and it is this which allows us to theorise about structural change and power. The 
political struggle, according to Laclau, consists of trying to enter the space created by 
the empty signifier, which has essentially no content but has universalising effects. 
Human rights can be seen as playing that role of bringing together a system of signs 
and meanings. This can only be achieved through a hegemonising process. The role of 
the empty signifier acts as a nodal point. Therefore the appropriation of part of the 
nodal point of human rights means that boundaries are created by what is deemed 
acceptable or unacceptable by the particular mix and interrelation of signs and 
meanings in the particular discursive field. This means that the conceptual mix present 
in the discursive fields contributes to an interpretation of human rights for a particular 
group of people. Laclau and Mouffe go further and allude to the social effects of a 
discursive structure when they define it as, 
...not a merely cognitive or contemplative entity: it is an articulatory practice which 
constitutes and organizes social relations.34  
When applying this to the struggles of different ‘particularistic’ groups like disabled 
people, women, gay people, children or irregular immigrants, it means that the same 
human right of freedom of expression could, driven by their different contexts and 
countries, lead to a different interpretation. Despite these differences, the discursive 
fields significantly overlap. This is evidenced by some common shared meanings, which 
allow for meaningful communication across discursive fields or human rights of 
particular groups. However, the human rights discursive structure of disabled people is 
distinctly different to that of irregular immigrants as their placement within the local 
culture is different, the history of their struggle is different, and so on. 
Laclau makes the concept of empty signifiers clearer and redefines the global 
emancipation by highlighting the difference between the foundation and the 
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horizon.35 The ‘foundation’ is a relation of delimitation and determination; it is 
totalised and its operations are limited by the concrete argumentative practices 
existing in society. On the contrary, the ‘horizon’ is open-ended; it is a formation 
without foundation; and its very groundlessness ensures that argumentative practices 
operate over a backdrop of radical freedom.36 The philosopher Richard Bernstein 
builds further on Laclau’s idea of an open-ended horizon and interestingly adds the 
qualities of ethical and political, ‘ethical-political’, to the horizon.37 Human rights are 
therefore empty signifiers as well as an ethical-political horizon, towards which all the 
discursive fields aspire to reach. 
2.3 The concept of a human rights culture 
The concept of a human rights culture only started gaining popularity in the 1990s and 
signals an increasing awareness of the relevance of ‘culture’ to human rights practice 
and study. This was not an unexpected development given that, as has already been 
explained, culture achieves a more prominent role following the transition to the 
modern human rights. However, this popularity is deceptive because the term ‘human 
rights culture’ is used rather loosely in political rhetoric, academic literature and by 
NGOs. Moreover there has been no systematic study of human rights culture.38 During 
the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, the need for ensuring the effectiveness of human 
rights and not allowing it to remain in the cosy bed of political rhetoric was brought up 
but no direct mention of a ‘human rights culture’ was made at the time. 
Notwithstanding this, Nash observes that there does appear to be a: 
...fairly well-established understanding that culture is crucial to fostering the realisation 
of human rights in practice.39 
‘Human rights culture’ has also been used in reaction to the heavy criticism that 
human rights have become an elitist enterprise, and to the growing criticism of an 
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over-legalisation of the human rights field.40 Human rights culture is thus proposed as 
the ‘future’ in that it would constitute the ‘realisation’ of human rights. This is 
captured in the following quote by UN Human Rights Commissioner Jose Ayala Lasso: 
I am convinced that the development of a culture of human rights throughout the 
world is one of the most important contributions that can be made to future 
generations. The foundation for this culture is enshrined in the principles of the 
Universal Declaration. A culture of human rights would result in a profound change in 
how individuals, communities, States and the international community view 
relationships in all matters. Such a culture would make human rights as much a part of 
the lives of individuals as are language, customs, the arts, faith and ties to place. In this 
culture, human rights would not be seen as the job of "someone else", but the 
obligation and duty of all.41 
The most comprehensive description of human rights culture, which is closest to what 
is used in this thesis, has been proposed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(JCHR) of the UK House of Lords. The JCHR report broadly explains the origins and 
fundamentals of a ‘human rights culture’, used interchangeably with ‘a culture of 
human rights’ or even, a ‘culture of respect for human rights’. The JCHR’s definition 
advances the position undertaken by the 1998 UK Human Rights Act of mainstreaming 
human rights and human rights approaches in government institutions. It then moves 
beyond this call to emphasising the ‘ethical dimension’ inherent in human rights. 
Human rights culture therefore should not be limited to the legal or institutional fields, 
but should also involve the moral and personal. The following is the description of 
‘human rights culture’ by the JCHR: 
A culture of human rights has two dimensions – institutional and ethical. So far as the 
former is concerned, it requires that human rights should shape the goals, structures 
and practices of our public bodies....So far as the moral or personal dimension is 
concerned, a culture of human rights could be characterised as having three 
components. First, a sense of entitlement. Citizens enjoy certain rights as an 
affirmation of their equal dignity and worth, and not as a contingent gift of the state. 
Second, a sense of personal responsibility. The rights of one person could easily 
impinge on the rights of another and each must therefore exercise his or her rights with 
care. Third, a sense of social responsibility. The rights of one person could require 
positive obligations on the part of another and, in addition, a fair balance will 
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frequently have to be struck between individual rights and the needs of a democratic 
society and the wider public interest.42 
This description is also similar to Nash’s understanding of human rights culture. Nash 
however prefers to use the term ‘cultural politics of human rights’.  She identifies two 
main problems with the concept of human rights culture. The first problem, she says, is 
that there seems to be an assumption of what she calls ‘an essentialist understanding 
of culture as a “way of life”’ where stability and coherence are more emphasised than 
the fluidity and the inherent ambiguity of any cultural life. According to Nash, 
advocates of human rights culture therefore risk falling into the trap of an essentialist 
definition of culture.43  
Nash’s second criticism is based on the observation that a human rights culture is 
generally understood as a point of arrival and not as a concept constitutive of 
practices. The example that she gives is an observation that human rights culture is 
often presented as the solution to human rights wrongs and not, as she proposes, a 
space of activity in itself. This does not enable the internal investigation of how culture 
effects change. Nash expresses grave reservations on the predominant use of the 
concept of human rights culture as providing a ‘point of arrival’ style answer to the 
problem of how human rights can be realised. As she says: 
Rather than accepting that human rights culture is the ethical answer to the question 
‘how can human rights ideals be realised in practice?’, it is important to think about 
how we might study the cultural politics of human rights and their effects on social 
institutions.44 
The contemporary understanding of the concept of culture that Nash refers to above, 
which is that culture is all-encompassing, leads to another important assertion: human 
rights are cultural.45 This observation has had a mention in other works too, amongst 
which there is a journal article by Ann-Belinda Preis,46 and an edited volume by Jane 
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Cowan, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Richard Wilson.47 Nash advocates for this 
approach: 
From the perspective of contemporary cultural theory, human rights are not just 
supported by culture: human rights are cultural. There is nothing meaningful in social 
life that is outside culture: human rights are cultural insofar as they are meaningful. 
Furthermore, there is also, then, no absolute distinction between practices of state and 
civil society...In so far as representations of human rights formed in civil society are 
influential on state practices, this is possible because human rights are meaningful on 
both sides of the analytic and socially sustained distinction between civil society and 
state. What links officially sanctioned state practices and public pressure from civil 
society is cultural politics.48 
Human rights culture is not brought about by legal and institutional change only, but 
needs social, moral and personal change too. Human rights culture is not about a state 
of realisation of human rights, but a culture which appropriates human rights 
principles and is participatory in the modern human rights movement. The next section 
will demonstrate how this same concept can be used as a normative discursive tool to 
analyse a culturally-situated issue from a human rights point of view. 
2.4 The Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture  
The Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture is a heuristic device that I 
constructed to facilitate my human rights analysis of irregular migration in Malta. The 
Tetrahedron Model is moulded out of the two arguments posited above: a) an 
awareness of the distinctiveness of the modern human rights movement; b) the 
prominence of the concept of culture to the realisation of the modern human rights 
vision. The underlying assumption is that in an ideal scenario where a human rights 
culture is present, irregular immigrants would not be subjected to inhuman and 
discriminatory treatment. More specifically, the Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights 
Culture is therefore a heuristic tool which aims to identify those socio-cultural and 
political barriers hindering the nurturing of a human rights culture.   
2.4.1 Four basic elements of the modern human rights movement 
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The human rights movement in this thesis refers to all those individuals who believe in 
the post-1948 paradigm of human rights and act, together or individually, inspired by 
its philosophy. These are a diverse group of individuals active at local, national and 
global levels and in various areas of the human rights system. Members of the human 
rights movement would therefore include the original drafters of the UDHR, individuals 
working with inter-governmental organisations, individuals working with governments, 
individuals working with non-state organisations at a local or global level and simply 
anyone who believes and is inspired by the new human rights paradigm of the UDHR.  
The use of the word ‘movement’ in this case has no deliberate links to the new social 
movements. Structurally, insofar as new social movements have adopted human rights 
as their highest aspiration, as Moyn has argued, social movements could constitute 
part of the modern human rights movement.49 Indeed new social movements are 
characterised by such a human rights aspiration. However, not all social movements 
have contributed specifically to the human rights mission, and as such cannot all be 
considered ‘human rights movements'. An example which will be discussed at length in 
Section is the American civil rights movement. Due to the fact that its primary concern 
was a re-articulation of American citizenship rather than the ‘human’, it should not be 
considered as part of the human rights movement. The modern (post-1948) human 
rights movement is understood throughout this thesis as a broad umbrella category of 
human rights believers and activists, who knowingly or unknowingly, are adding ‘flesh, 
blood and sex to the pale outline of the “human”’.50  
The above-given delimitation, albeit broad, of the modern human rights movement is 
not entirely novel. It builds on other understandings of ‘human rights movement’ but 
differs significantly by not sticking to the typical categorisations. For example in 
Glendon’s book on the Universal Declaration, where, surprisingly, a definition of 
‘human rights movement’ is never found, there is an index entry entitled: ‘human 
rights groups and movement’.51 A closer look at the referenced pages yields mention 
of international human rights activists and the new social movements starting from the 
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1960s/1970s, some of whom had ‘programs rooted explicitly in parts of the Universal 
Declaration.’52 It would appear, although never expressly clear, that the ‘human rights 
movement’ for Glendon was a collective term to denote the new social movements.  
On the same lines as Glendon, Jack Mahoney devotes a whole chapter to ‘The Modern 
Human Rights Movement’, again without giving a clear definition.53 The UDHR is when 
the modern human rights movement was conceived with the second major landmark 
being the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights.54 The addition of the latter 
is interesting because the World Conference was considered a huge milestone not only 
by the new social movements and international human rights activists but also by 
governments, by intergovernmental organisations, and others. From the point of view 
of a history of ideas, Douzinas clearly states that human rights are drawn from a 
‘combination of disparate events, ideas and traditions’. For him the creation of the 
human rights movement following the Second World War,55 which was a 
preoccupation and priority of Western (predominantly American) politicians,56 is one 
major event contributing to this idea of human rights. 57 Again, a similar scenario: no 
clear definition, an idea of the UDHR as the conception.  
What is of concern in these three examples I have cited is that there is an uncritical 
acceptance as well as an unhelpful essentialisation of international human rights 
activists as somehow more authentic, presumably because they are deemed to be 
‘outside’ the influence of states. I found this to be over-simplistic during my research 
for this thesis. Certainly not all individuals working with international organisations 
could be deemed ‘authentic’ or at any rate ‘more authentic’ than individuals working 
for intergovernmental or even governmental agencies.  More pertinently, the success 
of human rights initiatives could never be attributed solely to one category but was 
usually the outcome of various individual actions, which were not all visible. Therefore 
while acknowledging the structural forces and typical ethos which pervades the 
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various categories, with regards to the definition of ‘human rights movement’ I resist, 
on the basis of my own findings, singling out one of the categories as more ‘authentic’ 
than the rest. The human rights movement, Douzinas says, can be seen as ‘the ongoing 
but failing struggle to close the gap between the abstract man of the Declarations and 
the empirical human being.’58 This struggle should not be seen as exclusively belonging 
to members of one category (eg. International organisations) because the picture of 
how things happen in practice. The human rights movement in this thesis refers to 
those individuals who are inspired by the post-1948 paradigm human rights and base 
their actions on it. 
Four ‘elements’, I propose, are critical to the constitution and workings of the modern 
human rights movement. This hypothesis was informed by knowledge of human rights 
theory and supported by my practical experience of the human rights system. The 
interplay of these four intertwined strands stand out as critically important to the 
contemporary human rights movement. The following are the four elements I 
identified, followed by a brief introduction of each one:  
1. The person or individual as beneficiary and actor;  
2. A political philosophy or vision as the aim;  
3. International relations between states as the facilitator;  
4. The state as the guarantor/the place where it will have to happen 
Person 
The first element identified is the ‘person’ as the beneficiary and thus primary 
motivation for human rights. In A World made New Glendon records discussions at the 
first meeting of the Human Rights Commission in which Charles Malik, one of the 
intellectual minds behind the UDHR, proposed four principles to guide the work of the 
Commission.59 In brief his view was that philosophically it would be better to use 
‘person’, rather than the individual, and that there should be a distinction between 
state and society. Although several representatives were openly against this, on the 
second day of the Commission meeting, Roosevelt endorsed these principles and put 
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her weight as chair behind Malik’s proposals and philosophy.60 Yet, as Glendon has 
interestingly observed, Roosevelt (knowingly or otherwise) used the term ‘individual’ 
instead of Malik’s preferred term ‘person’. In so doing, Roosevelt had either not 
grasped Malik’s intent fully or had purposely used ‘individual’ for other unknown 
reasons.61 Malik, well-known for his insistence on rigorous thinking, had specifically 
used the term ‘person’ to ‘emphasise the social dimension of personhood and to avoid 
connotations of radical autonomy and self-sufficiency.’62 
Apart from this diversion, the focus on the individual retained its primacy throughout. 
Glendon recounts how during a particularly rough patch at the negotiations, when the 
Soviet representative Alexei P. Pavlov tried to insert references on the role of the state 
as the sole guarantor of human rights, there were successful efforts to reduce this 
emphasis. The UDHR makes clear that responsibility for protecting human rights 
belonged not only to nation-states, but to people and groups above and below the 
national level. A revealing part of the Declaration is the recognition of institutions 
(non-state actors) as partners and their endowment with a mission to ensure that the 
spirit and principles of the Declaration reach everyone. This is done not just in any way, 
but through teaching and education, recognising that a certain amount of formation is 
needed for the proper appreciation and implementation of human rights at grassroots 
level. 
This was a major shift, and although the primary onus of responsibility remained on 
the state, it was highly significant that individuals and non-state associations were also 
singled out in the UDHR. The Preamble appeals to ‘every individual and every organ of 
society’ to ‘strive by teaching and education to promote respect for those rights and 
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of the 
member states themselves and among the peoples of territories under their 
jurisdiction.’ In so doing, the UDHR transposes some of the power traditionally vested 
in governments onto individuals. This is a significant change in international law and 
international relations. Individuals’ well-being and security are not only at the heart of 
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this document and its primary motivation, but they are also called upon to ensure that 
these principles are adhered to.63  
Political philosophy 
The lengthiest and most heated discussion at Lake Success involved political philosophy.64  
The ideological side of human rights is immediately captured in the Preamble’s 
opening sentence which states that ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world.’ This inspirational side is supplanted by two 
articles in the actual text of the Declaration. Article 1 states that ‘All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’.65 
Immediately afterwards, article 2 states that all are to be equal before the law and 
have a right to protection against any form of discrimination.66 Agreement on the 
insertion of articles of an inspirational nature in the main text was not easy. Glendon 
credits René Cassin’s interventions during the negotiations with their inclusion. Cassin 
believed that article 1, article 2 and the article on limits and duties constituted the 
framework within which all rights were contained: 
It was essential...for the United Nations to proclaim to the world the basic principles of 
freedom, dignity, equality, and responsibility that had come close to extinction during the 
preceding ten years.67 
In so doing, however, states firmly rooted the basis of all human rights, the rationality 
of human persons and their obligation to deal fairly with everyone else, regardless of 
race, sex, wealth and so on. The eclectic mix of these two perspectives in one 
                                                          
63
 In Individual duty within a human rights discourse (Ashgate Publishers, Aldershot, 2003), Douglas Hodgson makes 
the point that there are two different kinds of individual duties appearing in the UDHR in an explicit or implicit 
manner. First is the implied duty of individuals to adhere to the standards and spirit of the UDHR. Second is another 
explicit recognition of non-State duties is found in Article 29 (1) which states that ‘Everyone has duties to the 
community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.’ This provision lays down a 
general rule for individual behaviour in the community to which the individual belongs.  
64
 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New,  2001, p. 38. 
65
 United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Article 1.  
66
 Ibid, Article 2.  
67
 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New, 2001, p. 148. 
63 
Chapter 2 
document signified the way ahead for the human rights movement and 
cosmopolitanism. 
International relations  
International relations between states play a huge role in the human rights movement. 
The UDHR itself, just like its mother organisation the UN, is a product of international 
relations. Without any doubt the agreement on the text of the UDHR and the 
adoption, without a single dissenting vote, was a diplomatic feat.68 The UDHR signalled 
and symbolised a change in international relations. Glendon writes that when the 
General Assembly of the UN adopted the UDHR, ‘the moral terrain of international 
relations was forever altered’.69 
This aspect of international relations was an even greater achievement for the newly 
de-colonised independent states, like India, and the smaller and less powerful states, 
like Lebanon. Glendon further remarks on how the tensions leading up to the 
breakdown of the Soviet-US alliance could already be felt at the opening session of the 
UN Assembly in 1946, and even more so from 1947 onwards. By 1948, tensions 
between Russia and the US began to raise the fear of another war, and in the 
meantime civil war had erupted in China (the US-backed government forces against 
Mao Tse-tung’s Soviet-backed forces) and the Middle East was plunged into conflict. 
Amidst what can only be described as an international mayhem, the drafting and 
meetings of the Commission on Human Rights continued through to the UDHR’s 
adoption.70 What is even more remarkable is that after 1948 the human rights 
movement continued to develop in spite of the difficult global climate. It is not a 
coincidence that human rights for a long time were primarily seen as a diplomatic tool. 
Although this study implicitly criticises this almost-entrenchment of human rights in 
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international relations, one cannot but acknowledge the vital role that international 
relations carry in the modern human rights movement. 
The tension between the value of national sovereignty – upon which the international 
community of states rests - and the emphasis on the individual’s worth, remains a 
constant within international relations and the global system. In particular, state 
sovereignty had until then been considered sacrosanct and understood as the state’s 
power to manage domestic affairs without interference. This essentially misconceived 
postulation depicted sovereignty as absolute and obscured the interdependency 
between states. Therefore just as the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ushered in 
the global system made up of sovereign states, and international law are an expression 
of sovereignty, there is also the implicit awareness and acknowledgement of 
interdependency.71 This will be discussed further in the section on the ‘state’ below.  
The acute tension between sovereignty and human rights was revealed in an 
important report called The Responsibility to Protect, drafted by the International 
Commission on Intervention and state Sovereignty, an independent commission 
established by the Government of Canada in September 2000.72 The Responsibility to 
Protect promotes the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their 
own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to 
do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. The 
Responsibility to Protect asserted the legitimate right, and duty, of humanitarian 
intervention in domestic affairs of the international community to protect individual 
citizens from the governing elite. This report was intended to serve as a basis for 
collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The 
endorsement and adoption by the General Assembly of the UN took almost nine years. 
A Resolution adopting the responsibility to protect was finally passed by the General 
Assembly of the UN in 2009.73 It has been said that the reason for the prolonged 
endorsement by the UN was its unfortunate timing a few months after the 11th 
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 The Treaty of Westphalia stressed independence and autonomy, and is therefore most popularly referred to for 
its establishment of state sovereignty and the birth of international law. The focus on state sovereignty, however, 
should not obscure the mere fact that interdependence was always a necessary constant in this formula.  
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 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, International 
Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001. 
73
 United Nations General Assembly, ‘The responsibility to protect: Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty’, Resolution 63/308, Sixty-third session, A/RES/63/308, 14 September 2009. 
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September attacks on the twin towers in New York. One could see, however, that the 
claim that it is legitimate for states to breach another state’s sovereignty in defence of 
individuals is highly controversial as it hinges on the tension between state sovereignty 
and human rights.74  
In brief, the international community of states is where the modern human rights 
movement was conceived and continues to develop through various forms of inter-
state dialogue, enactment of international laws and international actions. This 
acknowledgement of the importance of international relations should not be taken 
uncritically as fundamental tensions remain which could undermine human rights. 
State 
Within the human rights system, states occupy a singularly unique position 
encompassing two roles which can, at times, produce conflicting interests. On the one 
hand, states as members of the international community are direct participants in the 
upholding of the human rights system: states are responsible for both its modern re-
construction through the UN, its development in international law and policy as well as 
the day-to-day implementation of human rights within their domestic sphere. This was 
the case even during the drafting of the UDHR. Indeed a fact which is often 
overlooked, is the important and active role played by state representatives in the 
discussions, negotiations and facilitation of adoption of the final draft of the UDHR.75 
On the other hand, human rights remain primarily a regulation of the relationship 
between states and individuals. This model assumes that states are willing to uphold 
human rights over and above state-centric interests. Examples however abound of 
governments and dictators in the last decades who have trumped the human rights of 
people whilst retaining membership (at times active) in the human rights system. 
Apart from this, the inevitable obligation of states to keep up appearances with the 
international community has lead to the anomalous situation whereby state have 
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 There are other examples of human studies which address issues dealing with this tension. For example, 
professor of migration law Thomas Spijkerboer argues that according to human rights law and international law, 
States should be held responsible for deaths occurring as a result of pre-emptive measures of border control. 
(Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘The Human Costs of Border Control’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, pp. 127-
139, 2007). 
75
 This is documented in Chapter 9 ‘The Nations have their say’ in Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New, 2001.  
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mastered the skill of compiling reports in a way which will not lead to incrimination or 
criticism. This is exacerbated by the ‘name and shame’ technique of human rights 
adopted in the absence and/or effectiveness of proper enforcement mechanisms. In 
addition, international institutions and Western countries generally posit respect for 
human rights as a condition for development aid. This use of human rights as ethical-
moral principles of the international community and global society could be taken to 
indicate the ‘success’ of human rights. However, with economic revenues at stake, 
governments will do their best to avoid criticism and devise means to shroud their 
shortcomings.  
Therefore the main tension in this element is the aforementioned issue of state 
sovereignty and human rights, which warrants another mention in this sub-section. By 
signing up to human rights treaties, states end up in the double role of agreeing to 
restrictions to their own power over internal affairs and taking on the role for 
safeguarding the human rights of all. Human rights treaties, like any other 
international law, can be seen both as an expression of sovereignty and a constraint on 
sovereignty. This is an uneasy tension much of which has been brought about by the 
enduring myth of the concept of so-called Westphalian sovereignty as a near-absolute 
value. State sovereignty was in fact put into question as from its inception by the 17th 
Treaty of Westphalia. This Treaty motivated by the awareness that war could be 
avoided if rules were established to govern the conduct of independent states, 
recognised sovereign states as the subject of international law. Therefore, what states 
fail to acknowledge is that the mere presence of international law, intended to govern 
the conduct of independent states, is brought about by the reality of global 
interdependence. 
*** 
In brief therefore, these four key elements – person, political philosophy, international 
relations and the state – are important to the construction of the contemporary 
human rights movement. These elements can also be seen to be present in the 
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Preamble and the UDHR. 76 The UDHR in René Cassin words was meant to be the 
‘portico’ to another world, the putting into practice of a new vision for societies in the 
universal cosmopolitan community. The discovery that this ‘new vision’ included the 
four elements above serves to confirm my intuition of the importance of these 
elements to the modern human rights movement.  
It is important to point out at this stage that the identification of these four elements is 
not in itself novel. Renowned studies which have focused on one or more of these 
aspects include the following: for example, Seyla Benhabib has highlighted the 
importance of political philosophy to human rights theory,77 R. J. Vincent has explored 
the relationship between on human rights and international relations,78 Louis Henkin 
and Richard Falk, amongst others, have focused on the singular role of the state when 
investigating state sovereignty and human rights by,79 and Alan Gewirth and Pheng 
Cheah have highlighted the importance of the person in human rights theory.80 It is 
however rare that studies focus on the four aspects. I wanted to provide an analysis 
which captured the equal importance of all four elements, an exercise which is difficult 
to do separately since the four elements are intertwined and mutually constitutive. 
This would reflect the complex and multi-faceted phenomenon of human rights. The 
attempt to combine the four elements in one analysis is an innovative aspect of this 
study. 
The result is the Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture which is best 
conceptualised as a three-dimensional model as depicted in Figure 1 – The 
Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture (three dimensional). The Tetrahedron 
Model is made up of four regular triangles, with the sides being equal in length and 
having four points/apexes. Each apex stands for one of the four elements listed 
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 The Preamble has been described by the international legal academic Maarti Koskenniemi as one that ‘can be 
read and defended both as a human enactment, the result of actions of concrete and tangible “peoples”, “nations” 
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previously, with the result that every surface/side appears as an equilateral triangle 
linking three different elements. The following are the four combinations: 
1. Political philosophy – Person – International Relations  
2. Person – International Relations – State  
3. International Relations – State – Political philosophy 
4. State – Political philosophy – Person 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  The Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture (three-dimensional) 
 
International relations 
Political philosophy 
State 
Person 
69 
Chapter 2 
 
Figure 4: The Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture (unfolded) 
The four main elements that surfaced lead me to reflect on how different 
combinations of these same features shed light on a variety of approaches to human 
rights. The problem with these elements was that they were too abstract to work with, 
and in spite of producing greater clarity of thought, I realised that their usefulness was 
at best limited, as they lead to an undesirable abstraction of human rights which, albeit 
intriguing, I wanted to avoid. I therefore sought to engage more with this model in 
search for characteristics of political cultures. These would constitute not the political 
vision of human rights, but the building blocks of a human rights culture. 
2.4.2 Four building blocks of a human rights culture 
Themes and patterns that emerged from fieldwork were categorised roughly according 
to each facet of the Tetrahedron Model. This represented different combinations of 
the inter-relation between four basic  elements arising from the Preamble of the 
UDHR, as seen in Figure 4 above - The Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture 
(unfolded). 
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Four broad themes in Maltese political culture were identified as hindering human 
rights culture. They completed the Tetrahedron Model as seen in Figure 5 below. The 
‘building blocks’ of a human rights culture which emerged were the following (with 
their corresponding combination/facet): 
1. Cosmopolitan Outlook --- Political philosophy – Person – International Relations 
2. Equality ---------------------- Person – International Relations – State 
3. Democracy ------------------ International Relations – State – Political philosophy 
4. Human Dignity ------------- State – Political philosophy – Person 
The strengths of this Tetrahedron Model are, first, the emphasis on the inter-
connectedness and inter-relation between the main elements of human rights and the 
building blocks of a human rights culture. Second, the three dimensionality of the 
model is a good representation of the risks of perceiving just one ‘facet’ of a complex 
system. All too often academic work focuses on tensions and relationships between 
concepts, without devoting enough time to limitations or assessing ‘what is being left 
out’. Taking the Tetrahedron Model as an example, when looking at the two-
dimensional ‘human dignity’ facet, which was construed from the interplay between 
person, political philosophy and state, the ‘apex’ of international relations is 
completely ‘hidden’ as well as the other three facets of cosmopolitanism, equality and 
democracy. The Tetrahedron Model therefore leads to further inquiry of the kind: is it 
possible to have a human rights culture in cosmopolitan, democratic and egalitarian 
setting in which human dignity is disrespected? Or, is it possible to have a human 
rights culture in a setting which is democratic, egalitarian and respectful of human 
dignity but not cosmopolitan? These questions might appear at once obvious and 
difficult to answer because of the overlapping nature of the concepts in question. 
However, they are not as far removed from reality as one might think. The first 
question is what Chapter 4, discussing the human dignity of irregular migrants in 
detention, revolves around. It will be argued that Government’s understanding of 
human rights is one which appears to do away with the concept of human dignity. The 
second question, underlying Chapter 5, brings out a strong view in Maltese society that 
human rights can be ethno-centric to the Maltese. 
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The main risk in using this model is that dissociating concepts might lead to an 
undesirable conceptual essentialism. This is contrary to the underlying rationale of 
interdependency and interconnectedness. However, this study will hopefully 
demonstrate that the risks run by dissociating the concepts are more than 
counterbalanced by the benefits that singling out concepts brings along.  
 
Figure 5: The Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture (unfolded; complete) 
2.5 Conclusion 
The Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture that I constructed arose out of the 
need for an analytical tool which would enable an investigation into those socio-
cultural and political processes that are resulting in the ill-treatment of irregular 
immigrants in Malta. As a heuristic device its construction involved a dynamic interplay 
of theoretical and practical knowledge, from scholarly literature as well as information 
gathered from the field. The epistemological framework from which the Tetrahedron 
Model was conceived is the modern human rights movement, which amongst others 
gives more prominence to the concept of culture than previous rights’ movements.  
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Without making a claim to comprehensive coverage of the field of human rights, the 
model proposed here has the merit of incorporating the four ‘building blocks’. This 
study will explore these four building blocks of human rights culture: cosmopolitanism, 
equality, democracy and dignity. Each Chapter will start by outlining the understanding 
of the concepts in human rights philosophy before moving on to present the analysis 
of the case study from the perspective of the respective building block. This model 
serves to locate my approach and methodology in human rights praxis, or the 
intersection between theory and empirical studies. What emerges is a picture of the 
structures and processes of Maltese political culture which are at present obstructing 
the nurturing of a human rights culture in this field. 
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Chapter 3: Irregular immigrants in Malta: Context, 
facts and figures 
3.1 Introduction 
Since March 2002, Malta has seen a significant change in patterns and numbers of 
irregular migrants reaching its shores. Contemporary irregular migration in Malta must 
be viewed with sensitivity to the socio-historical and political context. Similarly to 
other Southern European countries, Malta witnessed a ‘migration turnaround’ since 
for the most part of the 20th century it was primarily a country of emigration.1  
In addition, Malta has had, for centuries, an ambivalent relationship to foreigners. 
Suffice to say that Malta has only been independent since 1964, and before that had 
been occupied by different powers. The foreign population in Malta makes up only 
four per cent of the total population, and the majority are originally from Britain and 
other EU countries. The Maltese landscape does not, however, lack foreigners – Malta 
receives over one million tourists every year. All this serves as a background to 
understanding the reception of irregular migrants and the reluctance to extend 
hospitality. 
This Chapter has been categorised systematically with the intention to give a situated 
picture of the contemporary phenomenon of irregular migration. Section 3.2 is an 
introduction to the larger context of Malta. The Chapter will then move on to focus on 
irregular migration and asylum in Malta. Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 follow the trajectory 
of an irregular immigrant arriving by boat: starting from detention and asylum, moving 
on to life in the community and finally describing the basic infrastructure and services 
available. In an attempt to paint as true a picture as possible, detailed facts and 
statistics as well as a description of the development of legal and institutional 
frameworks are given. The very final section describes five important incidents which 
again introduce the reader to the complexity of issues making up this field. 
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 Russell King, Anthony Fielding & Richard Black, ‘The international migration turnaround in Southern Europe’, in 
Southern Europe and the New Immigrations, eds. R.King & R. Black, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 2007, pp. 1-
25. 
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3.2 The Republic of Malta and foreigners: A snapshot 
3.2.1 Physical geography 
Malta is a small island state situated in the centre of the Mediterranean sea. It is 
located 93km south of the Italian island of Sicily, 288km east of Tunisia and 300km 
north of Libya.2 The Maltese archipelago consists of six islands: Malta, Gozo, Comino, 
Cominotto, Filfla and St. Paul’s Islet, of which only the first three are inhabited.3 Malta 
is the largest island in the group accounting for 77 per cent of the islands’ total area of 
316 kilometres squared.4 
The length of the shoreline round Malta is 136km, and 43km round Gozo. Malta has no 
mountains or rivers and few trees. No mineral resources have been discovered apart 
from salt. Malta only produces 20 per cent of its food needs. A strata of globigerina 
limestone provides the local building material. Fresh water is scarce, extracted from 
the aquifer below its layers of limestone and the islands are increasingly reliant on 
water produced by desalinating plants from the sea. 
Malta’s territorial waters and search and rescue zone 
In addition to its physical territory, Malta also exercises full sovereignty over its 
territorial waters, which are 12 nautical miles out in the open seas. This is enshrined in 
the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone Act.5 Malta’s jurisdiction and powers 
extend, albeit to a lesser degree, also to the ‘contiguous zone’, which extends 24 
nautical miles. With respect to immigration, the Act states that Malta may exercise the 
control necessary to prevent any contravention of any law relating to immigration and 
to punish such offences. 
Irregular immigrants’ vessels generally constitute ‘suspect vessels’ as per the Act 
mentioned above. This means that, in the territorial waters and the contiguous zone, 
the following actions can be taken against them: a) to hail a vessel, b) to stop a vessel, 
c) to board a vessel, d) to search a vessel, e) to arrest and detain any person suspected 
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 Department of Information – Malta, ‘The Maltese Islands, <http://www.doi.gov.mt/EN/islands/location.asp>, 
2010, (accessed 20 March 2011). 
3
 Idem. 
4
 Idem. 
5
 Laws of Malta, ‘Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone Act’, Chapter 226, 1971. 
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of being about to commit a criminal offence or of having committed such an offence, f) 
to seize anything on board a vessel suspected of having any connection with a criminal 
offence, g) to require the master of a vessel to take the vessel and crew out of Maltese 
waters or to a port or harbour in Malta.6 
Whilst the extent of the territorial waters and contiguous zone follow customary 
measurements, Malta’s Search and Rescue (SAR) Zone, in comparison to the country, is 
far bigger than usual. It extends from Tunisia to Crete, covering in excess of 250,000 
kilometres squared.7 The following map illustrates this. 
 
Figure 6: Malta Search and Rescue Region 8 
 
The SAR area was defined by Great Britain when Malta was still a British colony. The 
SAR area corresponds to Malta’s Flight Information Region which constitutes a direct 
source of revenue since the payments of traffic passing the airspace go to Malta.9 This 
revenue enables Malta’s Air Traffic Control to be self-sufficient avoiding the need for 
state subsidies. Within the SAR Zone, Malta is responsible for the coordination of all 
search and rescue missions. This in part explains why irregular migration is seen as 
straining Malta’s resources. The obligations of the country under international law 
have been the object of scrutiny by international organisations. They have also 
                                                          
6
 Ibid, Article 2. 
7
 Search and Rescue Training Centre-Armed Forces of Malta, ‘Search and Rescue in Malta’, , Search and Rescue 
Training Centre, <http://www.sarmalta.gov.mt/sar_in_Malta.htm>, 2004, (accessed 20 March 2011). 
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 Fiona Texeire, At the Gates of Fortress Europe – Irregular Migration and Malta, Unpublished study, Institute for 
Political Studies of Rennes, France, <http://www.alternattiva.org.mt/page.asp?p=5884&l=1> (accessed online 14 
March 2008), p. 6. 
9
 Raphael Vassallo, ‘Between a rock and a hard place’, Maltatoday, 13 Sept 2009. 
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contributed to various diplomatic incidents with neighbouring countries, in particular 
with Italy. A description of one such incident can be found in 3.6.5. 
3.2.2 Socio-historical, political and economic overview 
Malta has been occupied for centuries, making the description of ‘a serial colony’ 
particularly apt.10 Malta has been under the foreign rule of: Phoenicians (800-480BC), 
Carthaginians (480-218BC), Romans (218BC-AD395), Byzantines (AD395 –  AD870), 
Arabs (870-1090), Normans and Angiovins (1090-1283), Aragonese and Castillians 
(1283-1530), the Knights of St. John (1530-1798), the French (1798-1800), and the 
British (1800-1964). Of particular significance, as will be seen in Chapter 5 in the 
discussion on the formation of a national identity, is that the Maltese enjoyed a degree 
of self-government since the Middle Ages. 
Following independence on 21 September 1964, Malta’s acceptance and participation 
in the international community of states was immediate. Malta joined international 
organisations like the following: the Commonwealth, the UN, the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation, the World Health Organisation, the International Labour Organisation, 
the Universal Postal Union and the Intergovernmental Committee of European 
Migration (this subsequently became the International Organisation of Migration). In 
1965, Malta joined the Council of Europe, and on the 12 December 1968, the Prime 
Minister signed the European Convention on Human Rights. In 1970, an Association 
Agreement was also signed with the European Community which through three 
financial protocols provided aid for development and infrastructural projects. 
Under its 1964 Independence Constitution, Malta became a liberal parliamentary 
democracy within the British Commonwealth. Queen Elizabeth II was the sovereign of 
Malta, a governor general exercised executive authority on her behalf, while the actual 
direction and control of the Government and the nation's affairs were in the hands of 
the cabinet under the leadership of a Maltese prime minister. The Constitution 
safeguarded the fundamental human rights of citizens, established a separation 
between the executive, judicial and legislative powers, and ensured that regular 
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 ‘A serial colony’ is used to describe Malta in Gary Armstrong & Jon P. Mitchell, Global and Local Football: Politics 
and Europeanisation on the Fringes of the EU, Routledge, Oxon, 2008, p. 6. 
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elections would take place based on universal suffrage. Malta had these three organs 
of the state, even before independence. 
On 13 December 1974, the Constitution was revised, and Malta became a republic 
within the Commonwealth, with executive authority vested in a Maltese president. 
The president is appointed by parliament every five years. In turn, the president 
appoints as prime minister the leader of the party that wins a majority of 
parliamentary seats in a general election for the unicameral House of Representatives. 
The cabinet is selected from among the members of the House of Representatives. 
General elections are held every five years, and members of Parliament are elected by 
the Single Transferable Vote System. There are two major political parties, the 
Nationalist Party (NP) and the Malta Labour Party (MLP). 
On 1 May 2004 Malta joined the EU. It joined the Eurozone in 2008. 
Socio-cultural facts 
According to the Constitution, both Maltese and English are national languages. The 
2005 Census states that the main language of verbal communication at home was 
Maltese  - 90.2 per cent of the population.  English followed by 6.0 per cent, 
multilingual 3.0 per cent and a very small fraction speak languages other than Maltese 
or English at home.11 Maltese is descended from Siculo-Arabic (the Arabic dialect that 
developed in Malta and Sicily between the ninth and the fourteenth centuries).  About 
half of the vocabulary is borrowed from Italian and Sicilian,12 and English words make 
up as much as 20 per cent of the Maltese vocabulary. It is the only Semitic language 
written in the Latin alphabet in its standard form. This has lead the Maltese language 
expert Manwel Mifsud to describe the language as ‘a mixed language with a Semitic (in 
particular Arabic) substratum, a Romance superstratum and an English adstratum’.13 
Maltese subsequently became one of the official languages of the EU. 
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National Statistics Office, Census of Population and Housing 2005, Volume 1: Population, National Statistics Office, 
Valletta, 2007, p. xiii.  
12
 Joseph M. Brincat, ‘Maltese-an unusual formula’, MED Magazine, Issue 27, 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20071105030202/http://www.macmillandictionary.com/MED-
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 Manwel Mifsud, Loan verbs in Maltese: a descriptive and comparative study, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1995, p. 25. 
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Ethnically the Maltese regard themselves and are often described as Mediterranean 
Caucasian. The estimated percentage of people adhering to the Roman Catholic 
religion is 95 per cent (2004 estimate), out of which 53 per cent regularly attend 
Sunday services (estimate of 2005).14 Of an estimated 6,000 Muslims, approximately 
5,250 are foreigners, 600 are naturalized citizens, and 150 are native-born citizens. 
There is one mosque (and two informal mosques) and a Muslim primary school. There 
is a Jewish congregation with an estimated 100 members.15 There are a few other very 
small congregations: Coptic and Greek Orthodox Christians, the Bible Baptist Church, a 
union of 16 groups of evangelical churches comprising Pentecostal and other 
nondenominational churches, as well as Jehovah's Witnesses, The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Seventh-day Adventists, Zen Buddhists, and 
Baha'is.16 
The Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the state religion and declares that 
the authorities of the Catholic Church have ‘the duty and the right to teach which 
principles are right and which are wrong.’17 Religious education is mandated by the 
Constitution and compulsory in all state schools; although, there are constitutional and 
legal provisions for the parent, guardian, or student to opt out of the instruction. The 
school curriculum includes general studies in human rights, ethnic relations, and 
cultural diversity as part of values education to promote tolerance. Marital divorce was 
not available in the country up until July 2011; however, the state generally recognized 
divorces of individuals who had completed divorce proceedings in a competent court 
abroad. 
Economy 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Malta stood at an estimated 10.4 billion US 
Dollars in 2010. The services sector accounted for 80.9 per cent of national GDP, while 
                                                          
14
 United States Department of State, 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom - Malta, 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4cf2d081c.html>,17 Nov. 2010, (accessed 20 March 2011). 
15
 Idem. 
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 Idem. 
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 Constitution of Malta, Article 2. The full article reads ‘ 2. (1) The religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic 
Religion. (2) The authorities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church have the duty and the right to teach which 
principles are right and which are wrong. (3) Religious teaching of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith shall be 
provided in all State schools as part of compulsory education. 
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industry and agriculture accounted for 17.2 per cent and 1.9 per cent of national 
GDP.18 The major industries are semiconductors, beverages, electronics, food, 
information and communications, jewellery, shipbuilding, toys, rubber and plastic 
products. Agricultural products include fodder crops, vegetables, potatoes, 
Mediterranean fruits and onions. The primary markets that Malta interacts with are 
the Eurozone, the US and Singapore.19 
Tourism is one of the main sources of revenue. It contributes directly to 12.0 per cent 
of the GDP but it indirectly supports in a substantial manner the services sector such as 
restaurants, transport, retail, financial services and to a lesser extent also the real 
estate sector. The annual number of tourists in 2009 was 1,182,490. The majority of 
tourists are from Western European countries, with the UK topping the list with 
398,472 tourists in 2009. It was followed by Germany - 127,373, Italy - 161,737, France 
- 71,930, The Netherlands - 33,419, Libya - 14,281 and others - 375,278.20 
3.2.3 Demographic details 
As at 2009, the total resident population in Malta was estimated at 412,970. Children 
under 18 years of age comprised nearly 20.0 per cent of the total population, while 
persons aged 65 years and over made up 15.0 per cent of the population.21 
Projections reveal an ageing population, with the share of older persons increasing in 
comparison to the share taken by the younger counterparts. In 2050, the percentage 
of persons aged less than 20 years is expected to decrease from 22.0 per cent, as 
recorded in 2009, to 17.0 per cent. On the other hand, the share of individuals aged 65 
years and over is expected to increase significantly in the coming forty years to 24.0 
per cent from the 15.0 per cent recorded for the year under review.22 
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 Central Intelligence Agency. ’The World Factbook’, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/mt.html>, (accessed 20 August 2011). 
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 Economy Watch, ‘Malta Economy’, <http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/malta/>, Economy Watch, 
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 National Statistics Office, Malta in Figures 2010, National Statistics Office, Valletta, 2010, p. 40. 
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 National Statistics Office, Demographic Review - 2009, National Statistics Office, Valletta, 2010, p. vi. 
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 Ibid, p. vi-vii.  
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Malta, with 1,307 residents per square kilometre as at 2009, is by far the most densely 
populated Member State in the EU as the chart below shows:23 
 
Table 1: Population density: a comparison of Malta with EU Member-States24 
The proportion of the population under 25 years is 31.5 per cent when compared to 
29.1 per cent across the EU. However, 20.3 per cent of the Maltese population is aged 
between 50 and 64 years, this being significantly higher than the EU average of 17.9 
per cent. This means that within the next ten years, most persons in this age bracket 
will be over 65 years. Malta’s population when compared to the EU is higher in the 
younger bracket, but also higher in the older bracket. Assuming that current socio-
demographic trends continue in the future, the main characteristics being a declining 
fertility rate and a low immigration intake of young persons, a steady increase in the 
old-age-dependency ratio (measures the number of elderly people as a share of those 
of working age ) is expected in the coming years.25 
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 National Statistics Office, Demographic Review – 2009, 2010. 
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 In fact, the main island is even more densely populated – 1,513 residents per square kilometres - than Gozo and 
Comino (only 452 residents per square kilometre). (National Statistics Office, Census of Population and Housing 
2005, preliminary report, National Statistics Office, Valletta,2006, p. xxiv). 
25
 Idem. 
81 
Chapter 3 
3.2.4 Foreigners on the islands 
According to the Demographic Review 2009, the total number of immigrants residing 
in Malta in 2009 was 16,692. Immigrants are defined as those individuals who establish 
their residence in Malta for a period that is expected to be, or is, to last a minimum of 
12 months. This would include: a) foreigners with a permanent residence permit26 (See 
Malta Permanent Residence Scheme); b) foreigners with a temporary residence 
permit27; c) refugees and asylum-seekers and d) other irregular immigrants in 
detention and outside in the community. 
The migrant population in 2008 accounted for 4.4 per cent of the total population.28 It 
shows a steady increase from 2005, when the migrant population accounted for 3.0 
per cent,29 and the increase becomes even starker when compared with 1995 when it 
accounted for 1.9 per cent of the total population. 
A large number of migrants are of working age. In particular, foreign nationals in the 
25-49 age bracket accounted for 47.0 per cent of new arrivals in 2008.30 The majority 
of migrants are from the EU – 57 per cent. The remaining 43.0 per cent do not only 
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 For more on this see Malta Permanent Resident Scheme, which was originally set up in 1988 to attract non-
resident individuals who would like to settle down or retire in Malta. It has, over the years, also generated interest 
amongst business people and high net worth individuals who benefit from an international tax point of view. 
(Foreigners who can satisfy the financial criteria (minimum global capital worth LM150,000 or minimum annual 
income from abroad LM10,000) can apply for a Permanent Residence Permit without being present in Malta. Our 
immigration consultants will help you determine whether you qualify and will handle the application process from 
beginning to end. Euro-Malta boasts a 100 per cent success rate to date.) The following short article entitled gives 
an overview of this. It can be found online at Fenech and Fenech Advocates, ‘The ‘Permanent Residence Permit 
Scheme’: A Tax Residence Scheme’, <http://www.taxplanet.com/research/countries/malta/news-and-topics/2009-
Malta-Permanent-Resident-Permit-Scheme.pdf>, 2009, (accessed 23 July 2011). 
27
 A temporary residence permit is granted to foreign nationals who enter Malta with an entry VISA. Any foreign 
national may proceed to Malta with an entry VISA (where required). Nationals from practically all European and 
Mediterranean countries may remain in Malta for a period of three months from their date of entry under the 'no 
employment' condition and such 'permit' is endorsed on their passport upon arrival in Malta. 
If a person desires to stay here for a longer period, he or she is required to apply for an extension of stay to the 
Principal Immigration Officer, Central Immigration Office, Police General Headquarters. Normally such requests are 
acceded to provided, amongst other conditions that the Principal Immigration Officer may require, the person 
concerned can satisfy the said officer that he or she has sufficient means at his/her disposal to subsist on. The 
foreign national concerned would have to follow this procedure each time he or she wishes to extend the 
permission that has been granted to him or her by the Principal Immigration Officer, if that person wishes to 
continue to reside in Malta. 
The Central Immigration Office, which forms part of the structure of the Police Department, is responsible for all the 
administrative tasks related to temporary residence in Malta. 
28
 National Statistics Office, Census of Population and Housing, National Statistics Office, Valletta,  2008.  
29
 National Statistics Office, Census of Population and Housing, 2005. Also reported in Natalino Fenech, ‘More 
foreigners living in Malta’, The Times of Malta, 11 August 2007.  
30
 Jean-Pierre Gauci, ‘Malta: Migration trends’ in Part 1: Migration and the labour markets in the European Union 
(2000 – 2009), Independent Network of Labour Migration and Integration Experts, 
<http://www.labourmigration.eu/research/report/15-part-1-migration-and-the-labour-markets-in-the-european-
union-2000-2009>, (accessed  24 July 2011). 
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constitute asylum seekers, but also other third country nationals, from countries like 
the US. Almost half (48.3 per cent) of EU migrants are women, whereas the majority of 
third country nationals are male (65.8 per cent).31 
Established ethnic groups of foreign origin currently present in Malta 
There are five main ethnic groups present in Malta. The most numerous is the British 
expat community, most of whom do not have Maltese citizenship. British expats 
number around 4,713 and constitute one third of foreigners in Malta.32 
The Arab-Muslim community is another ethnic group made up of around 3,000 
individuals, ‘many of whom are now Maltese citizens and the majority of whom come 
from Libya.’33 The existence of the Libyan community can partly be explained by the 
special political partnership that Malta and Libya enjoyed in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
The migrationist Katia Amore notes that: 
Even at the time when Libya was in the international spotlight for its alleged 
involvement in terrorist attacks, Malta maintained friendly relations despite UN 
sanctions, and opened the door to cooperation. Overall, the number of Libyan tourists 
increased drastically in 1992, when the United Nations imposed a number of sanctions 
on Libya as a response to its refusal to surrender suspects wanted by the US and Britain 
in connection with the 1988 PAN AM plane bombing over Lockerbie. For many Libyans, 
Malta came to be considered as a stepping stone to the world and thousands of them 
travelled to Malta as a stopover to other destinations, or to buy essential foodstuffs, 
American cigarettes and other products that had been rendered scarce by the 
imposition of the sanctions.34 
Another ethnic group present in Malta having Maltese citizenship is the Indian 
community. There are around 45 families, about 300 people, of Indian origin in Malta 
all from the town of Hyderabad in Singh. They have Maltese nationality. Amore 
comments: 
The majority of l-Indjani (the Indians) as the Maltese call them, belong to a well-
established and respected business community which has been part of Malta’s 
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 Idem. 
32
 National Statistics Office, Census of Population and Housing, National Statistics Office, Valletta, 2005. 
33
 Katia Amore, ‘Malta’,  in European Immigration: A sourcebook, eds, A. Triandafyllidou & R. Gropas, Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 2007, p. 242. 
34
 Idem. 
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commercial life for the last 115 years and has integrated fully into Maltese society 
while retaining its cultural roots.35 
Another group of foreigners who came to Malta, this time as refugees, in the 1990s 
were Albanians (more about this can be found in section 3.3.1). Amore writes: 
Over the years, some of them have settled, some have married Maltese citizens, others 
have moved to a third country or returned to Albania. Kosovo Albanian refugees 
arrived in Malta during the Kosovo crisis of 1999, when the country accepted 110 
refugees through the UNHCR evacuation programme.36 
Finally, there is the Nigerian community. This is a very small community, possibly the 
most visible and well-known due to their members’ involvement with the fifty 
different football clubs in Malta. Amore reports that there is no statistical data 
concerning their presence in Malta.37 
Prison 
A considerable group of foreigners is in the state prison facility. The statistics below 
raise a number of questions regarding foreigners relationship with the law in Malta 
and their treatment by the authorities. More importantly, however, it shows why 
public perception links some nationalities to criminal activity. This is reflected on 
irregular immigrants and contributes in part to the justification of migrant detention 
(non-criminal/reception centres). 
Foreign inmates at the Corradino Prison Facility make up a considerable number since 
they were up to 40 per cent in November 2009, from 31 per cent in May 2008. In 2009, 
Libya, Nigeria and Somalia were the most represented foreign nationalities in prison. 
Eighty-five prisoners hail from sub-Saharan African countries, while 48 hail from North 
Africa. Mid-Dlam għad-Dawl, an NGO active among prisoners, says that many of these 
people end up in prison because they cannot pay their bail, generally because they do 
not have a fixed residence.38 
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 Idem. 
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 Idem. 
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 Idem. 
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 James Debono, ‘Foreign inmates represent 40 per cent of prison population: Detainees petition President on long 
detention without trial or sentence’, MaltaToday, 17 November 2009. 
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In November 2009, the same NGO presented a petition to the President of Malta 
signed by 50 foreign inmates calling for a ‘stop to the inhuman and unjust 
incarceration of foreign detainees without trial or sentence’, and suggesting that a 
detainee must be tried within 12 months. On the subject of discrimination between 
foreign and Maltese inmates, the NGO wrote: ‘If a detainee pleads guilty he must be 
sentenced immediately so that the correctional and reforming programme starts in 
earnest, for foreigners and Maltese alike.’39 To support their plea, the detainees 
pointed out the example of Kalif Ahmed Eid, a Somali who was accused of importing 
the plant khat to Malta, and given a sentence of six months. Kalif Ahmed Eid spent 34 
months detained before he was tried and sentenced. This, they claimed, is the norm 
rather than the exception as applied to foreigners. 
3.2.5 Naturalisation and citizenship issues 
The citizenship regime is characterised by protectionism, and at times outright 
exclusion. Recent developments have facilitated citizenship acquisition to people of 
Maltese descent living abroad. This is a significant cohort since it approximates at least 
200,000.40 Importantly, citizenship does not translate into voting rights, which is 
dependent on residence. This is significant since general elections in Malta, which have 
a voting turnout of around 96 per cent, are highly contested by the two major political 
parties. The last elections were won by 1,600 votes.  
Law 
Acquisition of citizenship in Malta is regulated by the Maltese Citizenship Act of 1965 
(as amended by Act IV of 2000 and X of 2007 and Legal Notice 410 of 2007). The 
Maltese Citizenship Act currently states that there are five ways of obtaining Maltese 
citizenship: 
a. citizenship acquired on the appointed day and by registration by certain other 
persons; 
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 Idem. 
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 According to the Australian census of 1986 in which people were asked about their ancestry. One of the problems 
with these estimates was whether the descendants of Maltese migrants actually identified themselves as ‘Maltese’ 
down the generation line.  
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b. acquisition of citizenship by birth or descent; 
c. citizenship acquired by registration after marriage; 
d. multiple citizenship; 
e. citizenship by naturalisation. 
This Act has undergone considerable reform since Independence. Reforms in 1989, 
2000 and 2007 brought about a radical change of policy regarding citizenship in three 
ways. First, there was the removal, in certain instances, even retrospectively, of the 
prohibition of dual/multiple citizenship. Dual citizenship was extended to those who 
had been Maltese citizens by birth in Malta and lost their Maltese citizenship by 
emigrating. It was also extended to first, second and subsequent generations of 
Maltese born outside Malta and living abroad whose Maltese citizenship derived from 
descent rather than birth in Malta. Second, by shifting to a rule based more on ius 
sanguinis than on ius soli. The third change was the removal of gender inequality.41 In 
an attempt to address marriages of convenience, the amendments in 2000 also 
introduced the five year period of marriage for citizenship acquisition through 
marriage.42 Dr Eugene Buttiġieġ, a legal expert on citizenship issues, explains that: 
The main motive for the acknowledgement of dual and multiple citizenship was to do 
justice to the thousands of Maltese citizens who had lost their citizenship when, due to 
economic circumstances, they had been forced to emigrate to seek work overseas and 
thereby acquired foreign citizenship. By now extending citizenship to the third 
generation, the latest regime amendments have extended the link to the diaspora 
beyond former Maltese citizens.43 
Buttiġieġ goes on to make a rather pertinent comment on how EU accession has 
increased the value of Maltese citizenship: 
Following Malta’s accession to the European Union in 2004, not only have the Maltese 
diaspora regained their legal ties to their or their ancestors’ homeland but they may 
now also partake of the benefits of European citizenship.44 
There are two instances where the acquisition of citizenship is not tied to clear criteria 
and a space for arbitrariness on how the granting citizenship is opened. The first is the 
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 Eugene Buttiġieġ, European Union Democracy Observatory, European University Institute, Florence, 2010, 
<http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Malta.pdf>, (accessed 22 July 2011). 
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 While before 1 August 1989 only the foreign wife of a Maltese man was eligible for citizenship by marriage. 
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 Eugene Buttiġieġ, ‘Country Report: Malta’, 2010, p.17. 
44
 Idem. 
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acquisition of Maltese citizenship through marriage, and the second is naturalisation 
without marriage or descendant ties. In both cases, the final decision is at the sole 
discretion of the Minister. In the case of the latter, granting of citizenship should 
balance ‘the public interest’. Indeed, article 6(2)(a) states that no person shall be 
entitled to be registered as a citizen of Malta in virtue of this article unless ‘the 
Minister is satisfied that the grant of citizenship to such person is not contrary to the 
public interest’. The criteria are listed in article 10, which is reproduced below: 
10. (1) An alien or a stateless person, being a person of full age and capacity, on 
making application therefore to the Minister in the prescribed manner, may be  
granted a certificate of naturalisation as a citizen of Malta if he satisfies the Minister:   
(a) that he has resided in Malta throughout the period of twelve months immediately 
preceding the date of application; and  
(b) that, during the six years immediately preceding the said period of twelve months, 
he has resided in Malta for periods amounting in the aggregate to not less than four 
years; and 
(c) that he has an adequate knowledge of the Maltese or the English language; and 
(d) that he is of good character; and 
(e) that he would be a suitable citizen of Malta. 
 
An official document, issued by the Department for Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs 
and published on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website to assist people in applying for 
citizenship acquisition, fails to mention these discretionary elements altogether.45 
Citizenship acquisition 
A cursory look at the European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship gives an 
idea of how many people have acquired Maltese citizenship since 1991: 
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Table 2: Eudo Citizenship Statistics: Total Acquisitions - Malta46 
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 See Department For Citizenship & Expatriate Affairs, ‘Acquisition Of Maltese Citizenship By Naturalisation’, 
<http://www.foreign.gov.mt/Library/Cit/CEA3-NAT.pdf>, 2010, (accessed 22 March 2011). 
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 European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, 'EUDO Citizenship Statistics', <http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/stat/index.php?stype=1&coun=Malta>, 2008, (accessed 23 August 2011).   
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From the 2,817 persons who gained Maltese citizenship between 2004 and 2008, it is 
reported that over 2,000 became Maltese citizens either by marriage or from birth to a 
Maltese parent.47 
Since 2004, over 1,000 men and women married foreigners, who later went on to 
become Maltese citizens after five years of marriage. The top three countries of origin 
of foreign wives who gained citizenship were Britain (157), Australia (83) and Russia 
(55). While the top three countries of origin of husbands who gained citizenship were 
Britain (107), Australia (78), Italy (56) and Libya (49).48 
Amendments to the Maltese Citizenship Act which came into force on 1 August 2007 
made it possible for all persons of Maltese descent to obtain Maltese citizenship by 
registration. A direct line of descent is a requisite. Therefore the parents or 
grandparents of the applicant who are direct descendents and still alive also have to 
make applications for citizenship since the direct line of descent is a criteria for 
acquiring citizenship. The registration procedure may take place at any Maltese 
embassy or consulate, or the citizenship and expat department in Malta. Residence in 
Malta is not even required. In the first two years, 190 adult foreigners and 67 minors 
have claimed citizenship through Maltese descent after citizenship laws changed in 
2007.49 Those claiming Maltese descent were from Australia (121) and Great Britain 
(31), the United States (19), South Africa (18) and France (17). These numbers are 
expected to increase significantly. 
This partly explains why Maltese citizenship acquisition is on the rise, when the overall 
EU citizenship acquisition is minimally but slowly decreasing. Malta records a total of 
474 citizenship acquisition in 2006, 553 in 2007 and 644 in 2008; whereas the EU 
average is showing a decrease from 735,928 in 2006, 707,107 in 2007 and 695,875 in 
2008.50 
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 James Debono, ‘Who wants to be Maltese?’, MaltaToday, 16 August 2009. 
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 Idem. 
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 Idem. 
50
 Fabio Sartori, ‘Acquisitions of citizenship slightly declining in the EU’, Population and Social Conditions: Eurostat 
Statistics in Focus 36/2010, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-10-036/EN/KS-SF-10-036-
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Between 2004 and 2008 only 353 foreign residents living and working in Malta – with 
no ties by marriage or parentage – were given Maltese citizenship. This was considered 
a small number and led the local journalist James Debono to report that: ‘Few people 
get citizenship in Malta unless they marry a Maltese person or have a Maltese parent.’ 
51 
The highest number of naturalised Maltese from one country is 51 and they are from 
the UK. As seen in the previous section, the Citizenship Act specifies that one is 
‘eligible’ to apply after five years of residency, but gives no indication of the criteria 
used to assess such applications and leaves the decision in the hands of the Minister in 
charge. This has bred allegations of discrimination. In addition, it appears that 
citizenship acquisition by naturalisation of this kind happens only after many years of 
residence. An indication comes from the same article in a local newspaper: 
MaltaToday is informed that applications are only given a favourable consideration to 
persons who have resided in Malta for more than 18 years. Maltese-born children of 
non-naturalised foreigners are still treated as foreigners and are even asked to pay for 
university fees. Neither do these foreigners, some of which have lived in Malta for 
more than a decade, qualify for a Maltese pension. Persons applying for naturalisation 
also need two sponsors, one of whom must be an MP, a judge, a magistrate, a parish 
priest, a doctor, a lawyer, a notary public or an officer in the army, civil service or 
police.52 
3.2.6 International adoptions 
The Demographic Review of 2009 reports that out of 520 adoptions, 378 were 
international adoptions. The top four countries for international adoptions between 
2001 and 2009 were Russia, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Romania. The rest of the adoptions 
during this period were from 20 other countries.53 
During my fieldwork, practitioners mentioned that some teenage unaccompanied 
irregular migrants were adopted. However, these are not mentioned in an otherwise 
exhaustive report on unaccompanied minors published by EMN Malta.54 In addition, 
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 James Debono, ‘Who wants to be Maltese?’, 2009. 
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 National Statistics Office, Demographic Review - 2009, 2010, p. 89 (See Table 6.1). 
54
 Charles Pace, James Carabott, Andrea Dibben & Elaine Micallef, eds. Unaccompanied Minors in Malta: Their 
Numbers and the Policies and Arrangements for their Reception, Return and Integration, European Migration 
Network, Malta, 2009. 
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no mention of this occurrence is made in Victor Martinelli’s report on asylum seeking 
children in education in Malta either.55 No further information was found. 
3.3 Reception, detention and asylum: A statistical overview  
3.3.1 Irregular immigration in Malta prior to 2002 
A common assumption, reported in most official documents, that irregular migration 
only started in Malta in 2002, is not entirely precise. Up to the year 2000, Malta 
received approximately 50-60 migrants per year coming mostly through North Africa 
and generally claiming asylum upon arrival. These figures do not include EU citizens 
and returnees.56  
There have occasionally been episodes of influx of migrants: for example in 1972 when 
hundreds of Ugandan Asians expelled by Idi Amin arrived in Malta and were 
temporarily hosted in Tigne’ Barracks, Sliema.57  
Between 300 and 600 people arrived from Iraq in 1992.  They managed to obtain 
temporary visas to Malta.58 This was around the time of the first Gulf War (1990-1991). 
They were later resettled in Canada, Sweden and Norway.59 In a document sent by the 
Director of Multilateral Affairs on behalf of the Government of Malta to the UNHCR, it 
is found that there was yet another unprecedented influx of Iraqis into Malta in 1992 
totalling some 900 persons. Resettlement departures from Malta took place during 
1993 in a limited number for the US, Canada and Australia.60 
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 Victor Martinelli, ‘Responding to the needs of the asylum-seeking child in the Maltese education system: Some 
proposals’, in The Family, Law, Religion and Society Civil Society Project report, ed, P. Xuereb, European 
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 Katia Amore, ‘Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Malta’, POLITIS – a European research project, 
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 Idem. 
59
 Katia Amore, ‘Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Malta’, 2005. 
60
 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘Malta: Information on what rights the government of Malta would 
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90 
Chapter 3 
Another group of immigrants that arrived in the early 1990s were from the former 
Yugoslavia. After the crisis of 1999, a further group of Kosovar Albanians arrived.61 
In January 1993, the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Malta was set up in response to the 
arrivals of these asylum seekers who numbered up to a few hundreds. The following 
quote from the Jesuits in Malta website gives an idea of the dearth of services for 
asylum seekers in 1993: 
With no national structures in place, the tiny office set out to address some of the 
pressing needs with the help of friends and volunteers. Initially, JRS Malta worked 
mostly with asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection in the 
community, providing legal assistance, pastoral care, psycho-social and material 
support. 62 
The absence of an infrastructure and basic services is reported by the Council of 
Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
(CPT) in three reports published in 1990, 1995 and 2001. The conditions for immigrants 
in detention at the Police Headquarters in Floriana and the Ta’ Kandja Police Complex 
are described as overall appalling. In addition, in 1995 the CPT reports that no 
improvements had been made in the time gap between the two reports. In reaction to 
this, the 1995 report proposed various recommendations of ‘immediate measures’ 
which it stated ought to be implemented ‘as a matter of urgency’. 63 Six years later, in 
2001, the CPT highlights that hardly any action had been taken in the six years 
between the 1995 report and the 2001 report. It reiterated that the conditions in the 
same detention centre were below acceptable human rights standards.64 This shows 
that in spite of low numbers, irregular immigration before 2002 was already an area 
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 Katia Amore,’ Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Malta’, 2005.   
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 Jesuits in Malta, ‘Our Work’, What we do – Jesuits in Malta, 
<http://www.jesuit.org.mt/content.aspx?id=225263>, 2011, (accessed 26 Mar 2011). 
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 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report 
to the Maltese Government on the visit to Malta carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of 
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 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report 
to the Maltese Government on the Visit to Malta carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of 
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Suffice it to say that, on 15 May 2001, a miserable situation scarcely different from the one observed in 1995 (cf. 
paragraphs 19 to 22 of CPT/Inf (96) 25) was found to prevail: premises - particularly the sanitary facilities - 
characterised by filth and disrepair, as well as an utter absence of purposeful activities for detainees whose stays at 
the complex could range from a few days to periods longer than two years.’ 
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whereby the Government was reluctant to follow recommendations made by 
international bodies to fulfil its human rights obligations. 
This state of affairs replicates a trend in the Mediterranean which distinguishes the 
irregular migration flows of the 1990s with contemporary ones. First, irregular 
migration flows in the 1990s were homogeneous – coming from one or two countries, 
unlike contemporary migration flows which comprise many different nationalities. 
Secondly, there was a further diversity in these mixed nationality flows as they 
increasingly included both asylum-seekers and other immigrants moving together, 
partly but not only, brought about by the post 9/11 restrictions on legal routes.  
In 2001, Amore reports that 2,204 people were refused permission to enter the 
country and about 60 immigrants arrived in Malta irregularly.65 No more information 
was found. 
The contemporary patterns of irregular migration started in March 2002, when a boat 
carrying 208 migrants drifted into Xlendi Bay in Gozo (see further down for a 
description of the event). This period – the context for this thesis – is radically different 
from the pre-2002 period due to a) the sudden increase in numbers; b) the mode of 
arrival; c) the diversity of, as well as the countries of origin, of the immigrants; d) the 
new obligations (set in law) that Malta had undertaken as part of the EU acquis. 
3.3.2 Irregular migrant: Procedural trajectory and rights 
When a boat reaches Malta, the police are informed and are deployed to register the 
immigrants upon arrival. The police register the immigrants’ personal details including 
name, country of origin, and age. The immigrants’ personal belongings are collected in 
separate bags and deposited at the Police Headquarters (immigrants are given a 
receipt for their money). 
On site, a medical team of nurses and medical doctors who are on call provide first 
emergency care and examine every immigrant individually in order to determine if the 
person can be transferred directly to one of the detention centres or needs immediate 
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medical care in hospital. At this stage, immigrants are not assessed for possible 
medical vulnerabilities or chronic diseases. 
All immigrants are then taken to one of the migrant detention centres on the island. At 
the detention centres they are given their registration number and given a bed. Since 
the year 2008 they have been given a booklet published by the Ministry for Justice and 
Home Affairs (MJHA) explaining their basic rights and obligations. They are also given 
soap, a towel and some other material for their personal hygiene. Immigrants inside 
detention centres are accommodated in large rooms, warehouses and sometimes 
tents. They make use of shared showers and toilets. Cleaning inside the centres is the 
responsibility of the immigrants themselves. 
Immigrants do not have much access to any means of communication or news. All 
places of detention have more than one telephone point for the exclusive use of 
immigrants. The Government claims that immigrants are given phone cards on a 
regular basis and are allowed to receive unlimited phone calls.66 In practice, phone 
cards are given according to migrant inflows. Five-euro phone cards, as is generally 
given, are often not enough to make international calls. Furthermore, since incoming 
calls are managed through a central office, it has not always been easy to get the 
connection through to the detention centre. 
A few televisions are installed in the centres generally transmitting the basic Maltese 
and Italian channels. There is no internet access or computers. Immigrants are allowed 
outside in adjacent grounds for one hour a day to exercise. 
Irrespective of whether immigrants apply for asylum or not, they remain in detention. 
Detained immigrants who do not apply for asylum are kept in detention for up to 18 
months (according to the January 2005 government policy). When released in the 
community, they are registered and given temporary residence permits, but remain 
subject to deportation following the issue of a Removal Order. Unaccompanied minors 
and vulnerable individuals are released from detention as a matter of policy 
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Asylum seekers in detention centres may register themselves as such with the Refugee 
Commissioner by filling the ‘Preliminary Questionnaire’. This form is presented to them 
together with the relevant information regarding their right to apply for international 
protection. As from 2008, the Office of the Refugee Commissioner (RefCom) has taken 
a number of measures to assist immigrants who would like to apply for asylum. The 
Preliminary Questionnaire is made available in a number of languages and personnel 
from RefCom provide information to third country nationals about the asylum 
procedure, informing them of their rights and obligations during the entire process. 
Asylum applicants are assisted by interpreters provided by the RefCom to fill in the 
Preliminary Questionnaire adequately.67 
The vast majority of irregular immigrants apply for asylum. They are released if their 
asylum application has been successful, or after 12 months, if a final decision has not 
yet been taken. The majority of first asylum interviews are done only around 9 to 12 
months after arrival. This means that most asylum seekers are in reality released after 
around 10 to 12 months from detention.68 Asylum-seekers go through the whole 
process of applying for asylum, which includes meeting a legal aid lawyer (provided 
only at appeals stage), trying to obtain evidence to support their asylum claim and 
attending the interview at RefCom whilst staying at the detention centre. 
Irregular immigrants can be granted one of the following statuses, which denote 
different levels of protection:  
Asylum seeker 
An asylum seeker is any third country national who has submitted his application for 
asylum and is pending a decision by the Refugee Commissioner or the Refugee Appeals 
Board. 
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Refugee 
A person granted refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention in Malta is 
entitled to the following rights according to article 14 of  Legal Notice 243 of 2008: (a) 
to remain in Malta with freedom of movement, (b) to be granted, as soon as possible, 
personal documents, including a residence permit for a period of three years, which 
shall be renewable; (c) to be given a Convention Travel Document entitling him/her to 
leave and return to Malta without the need of a visa (unless he/she is in custody 
awaiting judicial proceedings for the commission of a criminal offence, or is serving a 
term of imprisonment); (d) to have access to employment, social welfare, appropriate 
accommodation, integration programs, state education and training, and (e) to receive 
state medical care especially in the case of vulnerable groups of persons. Dependent 
members of the family of a person granted refugee status, if they are in Malta at the 
time of the decision or if they join him in Malta, enjoy the same rights and benefits as 
the refugee. 
Subsidiary protection 
The subsidiary protection status was introduced in 2008 by Legal Notice 243 of 2008 
‘Procedural Standards in Examining Applications for Refugee Status Regulations’ which 
transposed EU Council Directive 2004/83 EC ‘On minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted’ into Maltese Legislation. Previously the Refugees Act provided for 
temporary humanitarian protection, defined as special leave to remain in Malta for 
those persons who could not have returned safely to their country of origin. 
Subsidiary protection is given when an asylum seeker does not satisfy all the 
conditions for refugee status, but would still face a real risk of suffering serious harm 
should he be returned to his country of origin. According to the Refugees Act (article 
17 (1)), the Commissioner shall continue to make this recommendation even in cases 
where the real risk of suffering serious harm arises after a decision not to grant 
subsidiary protection has been taken. 
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According to article 14 (1) (b) of Legal Notice 243 of 2008, a person enjoying subsidiary 
protection shall be entitled (a) to remain in Malta with freedom of movement and to 
be granted personal documents, including a residence permit for a period of one year, 
which shall be renewable; (b) to be provided with documents which enable him to 
travel especially when serious humanitarian reasons arise that require his presence in 
another state (unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise 
require); (c)  to have access to employment, subject to labour market considerations, 
core social welfare benefits, appropriate accommodation, integration programs, state 
education and training, and to receive core state medical care, especially in the case of 
vulnerable groups of persons. Dependent members of the family of a person granted 
subsidiary protection, if they are in Malta at the time of decision, enjoy the same rights 
and benefits as the person enjoying subsidiary protection status.69 
3.3.3 A note on statistics and datasets 
This brief note serves to highlight the problems and limitations of statistics and 
datasets in the field of immigration. These observations are included particularly 
because Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 make ample use of statistics. The dominant view 
of the lack of pertinent statistics in this field is that put forward by Amore who says 
that this stems from the fact that irregular migration is still a new phenomenon.70 
Since 2008 and 2009, the period during which I undertook my fieldwork, there has 
been an attempt at more systematic collection by the NSO, which is tasked with 
feeding Eurostat with national data. Data, however, is not shared willingly, let alone 
systematically, between agencies. This has largely to do with the securitisation of the 
field and the fact that it involves in part illegal activity. However, when one views the 
array of authorities involved, this does not really come as a surprise since these are 
authorities who traditionally are unwilling to share information (for example, to name 
just a few: the AFM, the Police Forces, the MJHA, and welfare organisations). Just to 
give an example, at a EMN – Malta conference I attended in 2008, a set of statistics on 
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the number of irregular immigrants in Malta presented by the AFM and those of the 
Immigration Police varied widely, leading a monopoly of questions and concerns 
regarding statistics at every stage of the conference. This is a huge limitation to 
analysis. In addition, the risk of duplication of numbers, especially if collective numbers 
of receivers of different benefits are put together, is great. 
Another problem stems from flawed design of data collection: based on 
misconceptions, or an inadequate awareness of the complexities in the field. For 
example, the number of immigrants living in open centres is often given as the sum 
total of irregular immigrants in Malta who are not in detention. This is incorrect since 
there are also immigrants living in the community in rented apartments. At times, 
figures of immigrants receiving some sort of social benefit are also included, but even 
this is problematic because immigrants without any claim to benefits would not be 
included. Another issue is that those immigrants who travel overseas on a travel 
document, and return back to Malta are not always included. In brief, even if there 
were reliable statistics of foreigners in Malta on temporary residence permits who 
have entered irregularly, this would not be the real number at any given time. (Note: 
even the Census and other data collecting systems have their own limitations, maybe 
to a lesser degree) 
Another thing to keep in mind is that official agencies dealing with immigration assume 
citizenship (generally used interchangeably with ‘nationality’) to be the one that the 
immigrant claims upon arrival, even if this is not supported by documentation. This 
could be problematic when one considers that some immigrants are refused asylum on 
the basis that there is not enough evidence, or that the evidence runs counter, to their 
claimed citizenship. 
Anyone who tries to make sense of the overall picture will find that statistics are 
problematic. During my fieldwork, none of the authorities I was in touch with ever 
questioned their statistics, even though they were aware that statistics varied across 
agencies. This shows an unwillingness to grasp the bigger picture which has huge 
ramifications on policy development. In an article on 18 March 2009 by Henry Frendo, 
who occupies the dual role of Chairperson of a Refugee Appeals Board and is a full 
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time academic, mentions some of these problems.71 Frendo’s article was a response to 
a previous article by Martin Scicluna, then government advisor on migration issues, in 
which Scicluna claims to give a picture of irregular migration in Malta using various 
statistical data.72 In general, information on primary sources and how data is gathered 
is very difficult to access and this invariably conditions the reliability of data and 
explains the inconsistency of data from one institution to another. This poses 
substantial limitations to the data on irregular migration, including that presented in 
this Chapter. 
3.3.4 Mode of arrival and migrant routes  
The vast majority of irregular immigrants arrive by boat, or are intercepted at sea. 
There are also a few who are found to be residing illegally. The following is a map 
charting possible routes that migrants take, which brings out the complexity and 
length of these routes: 
 
Figure 7: Key Facts: Africa to Europe migration73 
According to interviews reported in the press, immigrants are generally charged 
between 600 US Dollars and 900 US Dollars to travel from Libya to Italy, which is their 
                                                          
71
 Henry Frendo, ‘Immigrants, statistics, policies’, The Times of Malta, 18 March 2009.  
72
 Martin Scicluna, ‘Immigration: The facts’, The Times of Malta, 7 March 2009. 
73
 BBC News Europe, ‘Key Facts: Africa to Europe migration’, BBC New 2 July 2007, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6228236.stm>, 2007, (accessed 26 March 2011). 
98 
Chapter 3 
usual destination.74 There appear to be different arrangements for their boat journey. 
Some immigrants claim that they had a driver on their boat. Others, with the help of a 
map, attempt to steer the boat themselves. The boats, or dinghies, are small and 
cannot transport big groups as seen in the figures in the table below. They are 
generally not seaworthy, which explains, together with the fact that they are always 
overcrowded, why many encounter problems once out at sea. 
At times, larger boats arrive, as was the case in the first three months of 2009 when 
three boats carrying a total of 651 immigrants arrived in Malta. Interviewed for a local 
newspaper, Colonel Emanuel Mallia of the AFM dismissed this as an ‘accident’ and 
explained that larger boats are usually directed towards Lampedusa and sometimes 
Sicily. Moreover, and on the whole, larger boats tend to be more sturdy and 
seaworthy, encounter fewer problems at sea and are therefore less likely to require 
assistance and be brought into Malta.75 
Boat arrivals reached a peak in 2008 with 84 boat arrivals and 2,775 people on board 
in total. This can be seen in the table below: 
 
Table 3: Boats arriving in Malta with irregular immigrants: 2002-200976 
The frequency of boat arrivals per month is high and generally peaks in the summer 
months when the sea is less rough. The following table is a breakdown per month of 
arrivals between March 2008 and December 2008. It gives an idea of the frequency of 
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boat arrivals, the total number of people on the boats and the sex and age distribution. 
In July 2008 alone, there were 22 landings. There were no landings in January and 
February. 
 
Table 4: Overview of the landings per month (March – December) in 200877 
In addition, there are a group of immigrants who are caught residing illegally in Malta. 
The NSO numbered the total of third country nationals residing illegally in Malta and 
subject to an obligation to leave, at 3,013 in 2008.78 In this year, the total number of 
arrivals by boat was of 2,775. This means that 238 persons were third country 
nationals (non-EU) who had overstayed their tourist visa, or residence permit. The 
report goes on to say that 1.0 per cent of third country nationals residing illegally were  
European, 2.0 per cent were Asian and 97.0 per cent were African. Apart from the 
European nationals, this means that there were a considerable number of Africans 
apprehended by immigration authorities who did not arrive by boat. Similarly, NSO 
reports that 87.0 per cent of overstayers were male, which suggests that the sex 
balance is likely to have followed a similar pattern. 
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3.3.5 Irregular migrant arrivals 
Since 2002, irregular migrant arrivals have been more or less consistent, reaching a 
peak in 2008 with 2,775 immigrants as seen in the Table below: 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1,686 502 1,388 1,822 1,780 1,702 2,775 1,475 
Figure 8: Irregular entry in Malta: 2002 -200979 
The years 2009 and 2010 show a decrease in arrivals which has been unofficially 
attributed to the 2008 bi-lateral treaty between Libya and Italy, entitled the Libya-Italy 
Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation. This treaty included a repatriation 
agreement and a patrol by mixed crews of the Libyan coastline, as well as land border 
satellite surveillance.80 In 2010 there were only 57 arrivals, which meant that by the 
beginning of 2011 all detainees could be accommodated in the migrant centre at Ħal 
Safi.81 It is not clear how arrivals will be impacted by the suspension of this treaty due 
to the civil war in Libya in 2011.82 
3.3.6 Nationalities of irregular migrants 
The ethnic diversity of irregular migration flows is typical of what the migrationist 
Stephen Vertovec has called the modern phenomenon of the ‘superdiversity’ of 
irregular immigrant flows.83 From January 2000 to August 2008, irregular immigrants 
arrived from 47 different countries.84 The table below gives a clear picture of the 
distribution by country of origin: 
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  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals 
Afghanistan             1   0 1 
Algeria     1   2 1 9 1 1 15 
Bangladesh     20   5       0 25 
Benin           3 2 5 10 20 
B.Faso         2 4 19 21 11 57 
Botswana     1           0 1 
Burundi           1     0 1 
Cameroon     7 2 2   3   6 20 
Chad     13 2 1 16 13 5 9 59 
Congo     54 47 109 3 7 3 1 224 
Djibouti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egypt 8   307 198 208 381 312 4 12 1430 
Eritrea     334 1 199 372 368 211 98 1583 
Ethiopia     63   53 99 143 107 22 487 
Gabon                 3 3 
Gambia     4       1 22 34 61 
Ghana     115   2 24 85 84 127 437 
Guinea     4 1     4 19 27 55 
G.Bissau         1   2 8 5 16 
India     1 4 8 4 1   4 22 
Iraq     144   9 36 7 2 0 198 
Iv.Coast     5 28 53 75 58 162 156 537 
Kenya                 1 1 
Kurdistan     31       1   0 32 
Lebanon     2     1     0 3 
Liberia     73 4 10 29 5 7 5 133 
Libya 1   1           1 3 
Mali     7 1 1 2 40 123 185 359 
Mauritania     2       2 1 1 6 
Morocco 2 1 89 12 1 23 158 2 0 288 
Niger         1 41 40 32 33 147 
Nigeria     49   4 45 55 136 125 414 
Pakistan     20 59 41   1 2 0 123 
Palestine     17 4 67 44 4 3 1 140 
Pap.N.Guinea             1   0 1 
Polisaria         1       0 1 
Senegal       1     2 19 8 30 
Sierra Leone     10   3 11 15 7 1 47 
Somalia     249 86 533 146 311 613 1266 3204 
S. Africa     1       1   0 2 
Sri Lanka                 0 0 
Sudan   56 25 42 64 420 67 46 42 762 
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Syria     11       1 1 0 13 
Tanzania             1   0 1 
Togo     2   2 18 22 44 26 114 
Tunisia 13   24 10 6 23 17 12 1 106 
Zimbabwe             1   1 2 
Total 24 57 1686 502 1388 1822 1780 1702 2223 11184 
Table 5: Illegal immigrants with country of origin, 2000-200885 
3.3.7 Legal framework for irregular immigrants and asylum seekers 
The treatment and procedures which irregular migrants and asylum seekers go 
through are regulated by national laws, most of which are transposed EU Directives. 
Significantly, UNHCR notes that Malta's application to join the EU appears to have 
been the primary reason for establishing national legislation on asylum and for the 
lifting of the previous limitations.86 
Under the Immigration Act of 1970,87 all prohibited immigrants issued with a removal 
order are placed in detention until they can be removed from Malta (article 5 and 14 
of the Immigration Act).88 The Immigration Act regulates matters related to entry, visa 
regime and border control, as well as the granting of temporary and permanent 
residence permits and the granting of permission for foreigners to work in Malta. In 
2002, Malta decriminalised the entrance without leave of its territory, but kept in place 
the detainment of all migrants upon arrival. 
Malta ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention on 17 June 1971 and the 1967 Additional 
Protocol on 15 September 1971. Malta acceded to the 1951 Convention with a 
declaration of geographical limitation. This reservation was expressly maintained upon 
acceding to the 1967 Protocol in spite of the fact that one of the main intentions of the 
1967 was to remove the geographic as well as the temporal limits of the 1951 
Convention. This meant that nationals from any country outside Europe would not 
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qualify in Malta as refugees under the relevant provisions of the Convention. In a 
response in 1996 to a query by UNHCR on Iraqi nationals the Maltese Government, 
reiterated this and stated that any concession which Malta ‘decides to give beyond the 
formal commitment arising by virtue of this declaration is purely discretionary’. 89 As a 
consequence of the geographical limitation, refugees recognised as such by the 
UNHCR Branch Office Rome were in need of a resettlement solution since they were 
neither authorized to work, nor to settle in Malta.90 The geographical limitation was 
lifted on 1 October 2001 when the Refugee Act entered into force.91 All remaining 
reservations, by the time of accession to the EU, were lifted. 
The Refugee Act of 2001 establishes national provisions and procedures for asylum 
seekers and refugees. The Refugee Act incorporates the obligations that Malta 
assumed when it signed up to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. It 
provides that individuals who have been recognised as Mandate refugees and those 
who are given humanitarian protection are granted a residence permit and a work 
permit when requested. The Refugee Act also set up the Office of the Refugee 
Commissioner, which meant that Malta started carrying out the refugee status 
determination procedure. Article 25A of the same Act states that appeals against 
removal and deportation orders can be made to the Immigration Appeals board. 
Release may be granted where the length of detention is considered unreasonable and 
deportation is considered unlikely.92 
In November 2001, the Maltese Government adopted the Social Security Order which 
meant that for the first time the provisions of the Social Security Act also started 
applying to refugees (previously all foreigners were excluded).93 
The Dublin II Regulation had a direct impact on Malta. It was adopted in 2003, one year 
before EU enlargement. The Dublin II Regulation was set up to determine which EU 
Member State was responsible for examining the application of an asylum seeker 
seeking international protection under the Geneva Convention and the EU 
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Qualification Directive. One of the principal aims of the Dublin Regulation was to 
prevent asylum-seekers from submitting applications in multiple Member States, and 
also to curtail states from shuttling asylum-seekers from one state to another. This 
system has however put a lot of pressure on Malta and other border Member States. 
The Maltese Government had lobbied, unsuccessfully, for derogation from the Dublin 
II regulation.94 
In February 2005, the Ministries for Justice and Home Affairs, and Family and Social 
Solidarity, issued a Policy document entitled ‘Irregular Immigrants, Refugees and 
Integration’. This Policy Document reiterated the need for the detention of all irregular 
immigrants: ‘In the interest of national security and public order they are still kept in 
detention until their claim to their country of origin and other submissions are 
examined and verified.’95 The Policy Document stipulates a policy of administrative 
detention with a maximum length of 18 months for irregular immigrants. Asylum 
seekers are however released after 12 months as the Regulations enacted in terms of 
the Refugee Act state that every asylum seeker (namely all those who have been either 
accepted as refugees or whose case is still pending or processed for an appeal) should 
be granted access to the labour market after 12 months. A significant development in 
the same policy document states that vulnerable individuals ‘by virtue of their age 
and/or physical condition’ will be exempt from detention and accommodated in 
alternative centres.96 
Malta is responsible for the implementation of EU Directives that directly impact on 
the treatment and procedures with regards to irregular immigrants and other third 
country nationals. The first, Council Directive 2003/9/EC on minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers, was transposed in 2005 with an amendment to the 
Refugees Act by Legal Notice 320 ‘Reception of Asylum Seekers (Minimum Standards) 
Regulations, 2005’.97 The aim of this Directive is to ensure that asylum seekers have a 
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dignified standard of living and that comparable living conditions are afforded to them 
in all Member States. This Directive also limits asylum applicants’ secondary 
movements.98 
In 2005, another amendment to the Refugees Act was published as Legal Notice 131, 
‘Temporary Protection for Displaced Persons (Minimum Standards) Regulations’, in 
order to transpose EU Directives 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons.99 The aim of 
this Directive is to harmonise temporary protection for displaced persons in cases of 
mass influx on the basis of solidarity between Member States. The Directive envisages 
a number of obligations towards beneficiaries of temporary protection. These include: 
a residence permit for the entire duration of the stay (article 8), access to employment 
(article 12), access to suitable accommodation (article 13), access to education for 
minors (article 14) as well as the possibility of family reunification (article 15). The 
temporary protection mechanism established by the Directive has not been used yet. 
The transposition of Council Directive 2003/109/EC, on the status of long-term 
resident third-country nationals, was effected in 2006 with Legal Notice 278 of 2006 
(Status of Long-term Residents (Third Country Nationals) Regulations, 2006).100 This 
Directive grants additional rights to non-EU nationals residing legally and continuously 
for five years in the territory of a Member State. Some immigrants are excluded from 
its scope because their situation is precarious or because they are resident on a short-
term basis (refugees, asylum seekers awaiting a decision on their status, seasonal 
workers or workers posted for the purpose of providing cross-border services, persons 
who have been granted temporary protection or a subsidiary form of protection, 
persons residing in order to pursue studies or vocational training) 
In 2007, Council Directive 2003/86/EC, which deals with family reunification, was also 
transposed into Maltese law with Legal Notice 150 of 2007 (Family Reunification 
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Regulations).101 The rationale behind this Directive is to facilitate the integration of 
third country nationals through the promotion of family life. This Directive, however, 
explicitly excludes asylum seekers, and persons residing on grounds of temporary or 
subsidiary protection. It is only refugees that have a right to apply for family 
reunification. The more favourable conditions proposed by the Directive have not been 
incorporated into the Legal Notice, meaning that refugees must fulfil all of the criteria 
like any other third country national. 
In 2008, Legal Notice 243 of 2008 ‘Procedural Standards in Examining Applications for 
Refugee Status Regulations’ transposed Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum 
standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals. This Directive sets 
out a common definition of who is a refugee and who is otherwise entitled to 
international protection. It also sets minimum standards for the entitlements of those 
who qualify for asylum status. 
3.3.8 Migrant reception or detention centres 
In 2009, there were three migrant detention centres on the main island – Lyster 
Barracks, Ta’ Kandja, and Safi Barracks.102 These centres, previously run by the Police 
and AFM, are run by the Detention Services (DS), a department falling under the 
responsibility of the MJHA. It is made up of personnel seconded from the Police Force 
and the AFM under one command (a further description of the role of the DS is given 
in 2.4.1). At the end of December 2009, they had an estimated capacity of 1,900.103 If 
additional space is needed, migrants can also be detained in correctional facilities and 
police headquarters are established by the authorities.104   
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 The total annual expense incurred to manage irregular migration in 2007 (not limited 
to the expenses incurred by the DS) was €12,956,802. When €1,357,189 capital 
expenses are added, the total expense for 2007 amounts to €14,313,991.105 
3.3.9 Statistics concerning asylum applicants and status granted 
UNHCR reports that 84.0 per cent of people arriving by sea in Malta between 2002 and 
2010 have sought asylum.106 In the last years, UNHCR has consistently ranked Malta 
high on the world list of asylum applications per inhabitants. Between 2004 and 2008 
Malta together with Cyprus were ranked first in the world. 107 
From January 2002 until December 2009, RefCom concluded 10, 361 cases. Of these, 
232 were granted refugee status, 5,677 were granted humanitarian/subsidiary 
protection, 4,452 were rejected.108 That means that refugee and 
humanitarian/subsidiary status were given to around 57.0 per cent of all applicants. 
Eurostat reports, that among EU Member States, Malta had the highest rates of 
refugee recognition (this includes humanitarian protection and subsidiary protection) 
in the first instance in 2009. 
The following chart shows the applications by citizenship of asylum seekers in 2008. 
Typical of other years, the largest group of asylum applicants was from Somalia, and 
the vast majority were Africans from the sub-Saharan region. 
                                                          
105
 Maltese Parliamentary Question, ‘Dħul ta' Immigranti Illegali’, 2008. 
106
 UNHCR News, ‘UNHCR urges EU and FRONTEX to ensure access to asylum procedures,  amid sharp drop in 
arrivals via the Mediterranean’, Press Release, 10 December 2010. 
107
 UNHCR, ‘Asylum level and trends in industrialised countries - 2008’, <http://www.unhcr.org/49c796572.html>, 
2009, (accessed 20 July 2011), p. 8. 
108
 Office of the Refugee Commissioner, Annual Report, 2010, p. 4. 
108 
Chapter 3 
 
Table 6: Applications by Citizenship: 2008109 
3.3.10 Deportations and Assisted Voluntary Returns (AVR) 
According to Immigration Police statistics, in 2009, there were 1,691 persons subject to 
an obligation to leave. Of these, 530 returned to a Third Country (a non-EU country).110 
The breakdown by continent is shown in the table hereunder. 
Number of deportations among those with an obligation to leave for 2009 
Country Europe Africa America Asia Unspecified 
Obligation to leave 47 1422 2 145 5 
Actually left 
31 
(66.0%) 
416 
(29.3%) 
2 
(100.0%) 
81 
(55.9%) N/A 
Table 7: Number of deportations among those with an obligation to leave for 2009111 
The Maltese Police Force indicate that there is an increasing number of rejected 
asylum applicants liable to be deported who cannot be deported for a variety reasons, 
notably, lack of ID documents. In practice, Maltese authorities issue a removal order 
together with a suspension of deportation. 
Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programmes are one of the core strategies employed 
by the Government to relieve the burden of the number of migrants in Malta in as cost 
effective way as possible, while ensuring that this is done in a humane and dignified 
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way. This is mentioned in the February 2005 Policy Document which states that for 
those irregular immigrants not eligible for refugee or humanitarian protection, 
voluntary return will always be preferred to forced return.112 In spite of this, the 
political and legal framework surrounding assisted return remains rather scant and 
Maltese legislation makes no reference to assisted return per se. Only an indirect 
reference is made to this in the Immigration Act. In 2011, Legal Notice 81 of 2011 
transposed Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals.113 
From 2004, there have been four AVR projects implemented and specifically targeted 
towards rejected asylum seekers who lack a basis for legal stay, mainly from Sub-
Saharan Africa. 114 The first AVR project in Malta was implemented by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) in 2006. Funded under the ERF II 2005, the objective 
of the project was to introduce the schemes necessary for establishing and offering 
AVR. The project itself resulted in returning one Somali man.115 Notwithstanding this, 
the project was positively assessed since for the first time AVR had been introduced as 
an option. Upon completion of this project, the Government continued to offer ad-hoc 
assistance to enable a small number of migrants to return home voluntarily. 116 
The second was the DAR - Comprehensive Return Programme Including Re-Integration 
Financing Programme project funded by the EU Return programme, was developed by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta (Lead Partner) in collaboration with the 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), SOS Malta and Med 
Europe (Italy). The project commenced in August 2007 and was concluded in May 
2009. The main objective of the DAR project was to contribute to the development of a 
comprehensive voluntary return programme with special emphasis on reintegration. 
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The DAR programme (which included two phases – Dar I and Dar II) assisted 170 
people to return.117 
The project RESTART, funded under the Return Fund 2008-2013, commenced in 
January 2009 and aimed to provide assisted voluntary return to up to 25 migrants.  In 
addition, the project aimed to support the efforts of the Maltese authorities to 
improve its integrated return management by facilitating voluntary return and 
sustainable reintegration for migrants in need of return assistance.118 
Finally, IRRiCO is another project which does not implement AVR in itself, but 
facilitates the improvement of return and reintegration measures. It is an 18-month 
IOM project financed by the EU Return Fund. The project aims to gather and 
consolidate return and reintegration information on countries of origin, in order to 
provide migrants considering the AVR option to return home with reliable and up-to-
date information on issues such as education, health care, housing, employment 
possibilities, transportation and social security.119 
The following table gives an idea of the numbers involved and the breakdown by 
project: 
 
Table 8: Assisted returnees by AVR scheme 2005-2009 (August 09) – Frequency Distribution 
by status 120 
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3.4 In the community 
3.4.1 Migrant accommodation following release from detention 
Following release from detention, migrants are accommodated in open centres which 
fall under the administrative arm of Agency for the Welfare of Asylum-Seekers (AWAS). 
Open centres aim at providing temporary lodging before immigrants can move out into 
independent accommodation in the community, return home, or are resettled. It is the 
Government’s position that the centres should not be considered as permanent 
residences but merely as a transition space for people between detention and their 
durable solutions.121 In practice, the majority of migrants remain in open centres.  
There are 11 open centres, which host different target groups. NSO reports that in 
December 2008, there were 1,895 persons residing in open centres and other 
institutional households. 122 Those open centres catering for vulnerable groups are very 
small. To get an idea, a table from ‘Housing Asylum Seekers report’ which categorises 
the open centres into three categories (large, medium-sized and small), has been 
reproduced below. 
 
Table 9: Provision of accommodation for irregular migrants123 
The conditions of the open centres vary greatly. The small centres, or homes, enjoy 
very good conditions and generally round-the-clock support of residential officers and 
care workers. The two medium sized centres run by the Malta Emigrants’ Commission 
(MEC), which is the Church Commission responsible for migrants, enjoy consistent 
standards and also receive additional support from the community or other Church-
based organisations. 
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The conditions in the large centres are not good. The ‘best’ out of the three large 
centres is the Marsa Open Centre, which due to its central location (close to Valletta 
and major bus routes) also unofficially doubles up as a community centre. It is a 
converted old school. Bedrooms are equipped with a number of bunk beds all stacked 
close to each other and each migrant is given a small locker to keep his/her personal 
belongings. Showers and toilets are communal, and are characterised by overflowing 
showers and a strong stench which can be smelt from outside. They are clearly not 
cleaned often enough for the large numbers using them. The Marsa Open Centre was 
initially set up to cater for a few hundreds, but as the pressure of arrivals mounted, the 
number of residents grew up to 800. This Open Centre is located in a notorious area 
associated with prostitution and criminal activity. 
The Ħal Far Hangar and the Ħal Far Tent Village are located close to each other, in an 
uninhabited part of the island in the midst of fields. They are not well connected by 
public transport. As can be deduced from the names of these Open Centres, the 
former is a converted hangar which used to store planes, whereas the latter consists of 
a group of large army tents (usually housing twenty migrants each). The Ħal Far Open 
Centre and Ħal Far Reception Centre have been described by the Council of Europe 
Human Rights Commissioner as ‘clearly sub-standard’ and inappropriate 
accommodation, even for a few months.124 The conditions in these centres are not 
conducive to facilitating the integration of immigrants into the Maltese community 
since they pose problems for job searching, education and general contact with the 
Maltese. 
3.4.2 Social benefits and health care 
Irregular immigrants receive social benefits in accordance with the asylum status they 
have been granted. The following table is reproduced from the Advocacy Network on 
Destitute Forced Migrants (ANDES) report: 
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Table 10: Benefits’ provision for irregular migrants125 
Health care entitlements are dependent on the status enjoyed by the immigrant. 
Refugees are entitled to general healthcare similar to that enjoyed by citizens, which is 
both comprehensive and free. People with subsidiary protection are entitled to ‘core 
care’. None of these terms are however defined. No migrant health policy is currently 
in place which outlines these entitlements. In practice, some people have been 
granted full access to healthcare, others have been refused.126 
3.4.3 Job opportunities and entry into the labour market 
Work permits are issued to various categories of migrants depending on their status. 
Refugees and people with temporary humanitarian or subsidiary protection are issued 
work permits in their own name. This is valid for a maximum of one year, which is 
renewable upon application.127 
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Asylum seekers and rejected asylum seekers, on the other hand, can receive work 
permits but this is applied for and issued to their employer and not in their own name. 
In practice, this means that it is more difficult for them to change jobs. Permits are 
issued for a maximum validity period of six months in the case of asylum seekers and 
three months in the case of rejected asylum seekers. Both are renewable upon 
application. Only recognised refugees are entitled to be on the unemployment register 
and receive unemployment benefits.  
There is little information about the integration of third country nationals into the 
Maltese labour market. 
3.4.4 Unaccompanied minors and children 
The Refugee Act defines ‘unaccompanied minor’ as a person below the age of eighteen 
who arrives in Malta unaccompanied by an adult responsible for them whether by law 
or by custom, and for as long as they are not taken into the care of such a person. This 
includes minors who enter Malta accompanied but whose status changes to 
unaccompanied. The 2005 Government’s Policy Document identifies the vulnerability 
of unaccompanied minors and attempts to address it by means of various legal and 
practical measures, such as the Care Order Act, fast release from detention, 
appointment of a legal guardian, the inception of Residential Homes, and various 
integration practices. 
In practice, although the February 2005 Policy Document states that unaccompanied 
minors and vulnerable individuals are not to be detained, the assessment procedure 
takes some time.  They are only released from detention once their identity has been 
ascertained, their vulnerability or age has been assessed, and medical clearance is 
issued. There is no time limit set in the national policy, but in practice, often under the 
pretext that there is no space within open centres or because the assessments take 
longer than expected, such release takes place after a few weeks from their arrival.128 
The Reception Regulations stipulate that where the provisions on reception conditions 
are applied to minors, the primary considerations shall be ‘the best interests of the 
child’. 
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In the case of minors they undergo age assessment, which consists of the bone density 
test and an interview. Vulnerable individuals also undergo an assessment. The most 
difficult stage is generally identification of vulnerability which, in many cases, may be 
hidden. Although not designated by the authorities, JRS, who maintain a regular 
presence in detention centres, refer vulnerable individuals to AWAS, the Agency 
entrusted with vulnerability assessment. 
Unaccompanied minors are placed in the children’s home, Dar is-Sliem. Accompanied 
children and their mothers, are generally placed in Dar il-Liedna, which houses only 
migrant women and their children; or in one of the flats owned by the MEC. 
Regarding placement, the Reception Regulations provide that accompanied minors 
shall be lodged with their parents or the adults responsible for them by law or by 
custom. In practice, however, in assessing the family link, responsibility by custom is 
not always acknowledged by the authorities resulting in the splitting of an alleged 
family. Finally, the Reception Regulations stipulate that an unaccompanied minor aged 
sixteen years or over may be placed in accommodation centres for adult asylum 
seekers. 
Regarding education, Maltese laws provide that minor asylum seekers or children of 
asylum seekers shall have access to education on equal grounds as Maltese nationals 
for so long as an expulsion measure against them or their parents is not enforced. Such 
access shall not be postponed for more than three months from their date of 
application of asylum and thereafter extended to one year for specific education. State 
schools in Malta are free of charge to Maltese citizens and foreigners alike and children 
are not required to take any tests for entry into these schools. 
Most migrants can enter post-secondary education (including University) on the basis 
of the maturity clause, which exempts them from needing any qualifications to enter. 
Furthermore, fees for asylum seekers are generally waivered.129 
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Table 11: Unaccompanied minors, claiming and accepted130 
As from 2002 until 2008, a total of 1,197 unaccompanied minors’ status claims were 
investigated. Of these, 223 (18.6 per cent of claimants) were accepted. In 2008, 400 
out of 2,223 asylum claimants (out of 2700 immigrants) claimed to be unaccompanied 
minors. Of these, 28 (7.0 per cent of the claimants) were accepted to be so.131 
At least two ‘Parliamentary Questions’ (PQ) have requested the Minister for data on 
children of irregular immigrants. One asked for the number of children of illegal 
immigrants registered as having only one parent, that is, where the father is unknown. 
The Minister replied that that kind of information is not collected.132 The second PQ 
asked whether statistics are collected on the number of births to irregular immigrants. 
The Minister responsible explained that data is collected for the overall number of 
births in Malta, but this is not disaggregated to include irregular immigrants.133 
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3.5 Structures and services available 
3.5.1 State entities 
Armed Forces of Malta: Search and Rescue 
The AFM operates the Malta Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC), which is 
internationally recognised as the SAR Point of Contact in Malta, but also deploys 
maritime and air assets on a daily basis to respond to a variety of cases. Resources 
available are not enough for the huge area the RCC is responsible for. This has led the 
AFM to seek international liaisons and collaborate in multi-national operations.134 
Police Force: Immigration Section 
The Malta Police Immigration Section is responsible for border activities. It is 
responsible for border control at the airport, seaport, freeport and yacht marinas. It is 
also responsible for liaising with other authorities on issues related to third country 
nationals, initial asylum screening at points of entry, field and enforcement of 
immigration breaches, liaison with Consular Offices, repatriation arrangements, 
organisation of repatriation flights and other duties related to immigration and illegal 
immigration.135 
Detention Service: Administration of detention centres 
Detention centres, previously run by the Police and the AFM, are now under the 
management of the DS. The DS was set up in August 2005 and entrusted with the tasks 
of holding in custody persons attempting to enter or staying illegally on the Maltese 
islands and providing all services necessary for accommodating them, while ensuring 
EU and international obligations and standards are met.136 The role of the DS is to 
maintain security at the migrant detention centres and to provide adequate 
accommodation; the necessary toilet and shower facilities; food; clothing; a hygienic 
and safe environment; access to medical care; access to the Commissioner for 
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Refugees for asylum processing; access to non-governmental organisations; and access 
to means of contacting home or country representatives. 
The DS employs 50 members of the AFM and Police Force (who are on secondment) 
and 176 temporary officers.137 During 2009, the DS needed €3.9 million for the running 
of the detention centres, which was taken out of the MJHA Budget. The DS are also 
supported by the budget allocated to the AFM.138  
Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs: National policy 
The MJHA is responsible for illegal immigration, asylum and border control issues. In 
the field of asylum, the Office of the Refugee Commissioner, and the Refugee Appeals 
Board, and the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers (AWAS) fall under this 
Ministry’s portfolio. 
Immigration Appeals Board 
The Immigration Appeals Board is a decision making body or tribunal set up by virtue 
of the Immigration Act. It is composed of a single chamber having three members, one 
of whom is required to have a legal background and acts as a Chairman. The Board has 
the power to hear and determine appeals in relation to detention and removal orders. 
Office of the Refugee Commissioner 
This Office was established as an independent body in the year 2002 by virtue of the 
Refugees Act whereby responsibility for refugee determination passed from UNHCR to 
this entity. The Office of the Refugee Commissioner’s main responsibility is to receive, 
process and determine applications for asylum, as stipulated by the Refugees Act, 
amended in July 2008, and Legal Notice 243 of 2008 (Procedural Standards in 
Examining Applications for Refugee Status Regulations). This Office is also bound by 
the obligations assumed by Malta under the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the 
status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, as well as its obligations under Council 
Directive 2004/83/EC, Council Directive 2005/85/EC and the Dublin Regulation. 
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Refugee Appeals Board 
The Refugee Appeals Board is the decision-making authority established by the 
Refugees Act to receive and determine appeals lodged against a negative decision of 
the Refugee Commissioner. The Board is composed of two separate chambers. Each 
Chamber has a Chairman and two other members. 
Free legal aid is provided at the appeals stage. The provision of this service is organised 
by the Third Country Nationals Unit under the direct responsibility of the MJHA. 
Asylum seekers have access to free legal assistance and counselling during the appeals 
stage within asylum procedure. 
Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers: Welfare, benefits, and housing 
AWAS and its functions were established by Legal Notice 205 of 2009. It replaced the 
Organisation for the Welfare and Integration of Asylum Seekers which had been set up 
in June 2007 to respond to the ever growing needs of asylum seekers and protected 
persons in particular vis-à-vis accommodation, social welfare and integration. 
AWAS is entrusted with the implementation of the Government’s obligations and 
offers professional social welfare services in specialised areas; providing support to 
asylum seekers and protected persons generally in the context of open centres, 
assistance with accessing community services and providing the basic tools to enable 
participation in society of persons under protection involving training, financial 
support and links with education and employment. AWAS is also responsible for the 
social welfare situation of closed centres. AWAS also caters for the needs of vulnerable 
persons and is responsible for the identification and support of unaccompanied 
children in the asylum procedure. AWAS manages directly or through contractual 
arrangements most Open Centres. 
The definition of ‘integration’ for AWAS is not a conventional one. It includes 
resettlement and relocation outside Malta. In addition, it has been acknowledged by 
the director of the Agency that detention centres could only support some pre-
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integration measures, whilst integration measures ended at the open centre stage.139 
The director of AWAS has been reported as saying that over the past eight years, 
AWAS provided a service to some 13,000 immigrants. 140 
3.5.2 Local non-governmental organisations 
Local NGOs contribute by giving legal assistance, humanitarian assistance, language 
training, housing, research, advocacy and supporting immigrants. The main NGOs 
active in this field are: the JRS, the Malta Emigrants Commission (MEC) and the Red 
Cross. Other organisations include the Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice, Integra 
Foundation, Migrant Rights Network, People for Change Foundation. 
Non-governmental organisations, particularly the JRS and to a lesser extent the Red 
Cross, thus play a crucial role. The JRS Malta offers legal aid and other forms of support 
for migrants’ asylum cases (like, for example, sending emails, receiving emails or faxes 
with basic documentation or testimonies, and providing telephone cards), a social 
work service and spiritual support. The Red Cross supplies clothes and other basic 
personal hygiene amenities. Both organisations are privately funded and do not 
receive funds, or deliver services, on behalf of the Government. 
3.5.3 International Organisations 
International organisations present in Malta are UNHCR, International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), Médecins sans Frontières (MSF). They collaborate with the 
Government, offer services and/or run projects. 
3.6 Key incidents 
This section gives a snapshot of five different incidents which, in more ways than one, 
help to give an idea of the complexity of the phenomenon for Malta and Maltese 
society. 
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3.6.1 March 2002: First major landing of irregular immigrants at 
Xlendi 
In March 2002, a boat carrying 208 immigrants drifted into a bay in the second and 
smaller island of Gozo. The immigrants made it to the bay unnoticed but were 
immediately reported by a number of tourists. This first group was made up of 128 
men, 42 women and 38 children coming from Eritrea, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Morocco and Iraq.141 The Police Force and the AFM immediately made it to the spot to 
control the situation. 
The novelty of the incident was captured in the media reports, which generally 
highlighted the difficulties of the authorities to deal with the situation in the absence 
of clear procedures, and the kindness of the locals, the Gozitans. This is clearly seen in 
the following excerpt from an article entitled ‘Driven by despair’: 
The ongoing tragedy of clandestine migration in the Mediterranean, which we read and 
hear about so often, especially in neighbouring Italy, hit us home last Monday with the 
arrival of 208 illegal immigrants packed on a 13-metre fishing boat. It had apparently 
run out of fuel before drifting into Xlendi Bay in Gozo... The police, Armed Forces and 
Red Cross volunteers did an excellent job, considering that this was the largest number 
of clandestine immigrants to land on our shores at one time - at least since the arrival 
of the Albanians about 10 years ago... Many Gozitans rushed to the scene carrying 
food, water and blankets in yet another display of hospitality and solidarity for which 
these islands are renowned.142 
The reception by the locals and tone of the media articles lies in stark opposition to 
that of a few months later when more boats had arrived and irregular immigration had 
become highly politicised. 
3.6.2 September 2002: Eritrean deportation 
A few months after the ‘first’ boat arrived, the now infamous Eritrean incident took 
place. This incident is of crucial importance because it attracted the attention of the 
international human rights movement, primarily, but not only, by means of the 
condemnation by Amnesty International (AI). Between 30 September and 3 October 
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2002, up to 223 Eritreans (out of 400 new arrivals from March 2002) were forcibly 
deported by Malta. They were immediately arrested upon their arrival in Asmara, 
taken to a military camp, and detained incommunicado. AI, in a public statement, 
brought this to the attention of the Government and asked for action on the following 
three points: a) an assessment of the safety of deportees to Eritrea; b) ensuring that 
excessive force was not used during forcible deportation operations; c) an 
investigation into the alleged claim by some Eritreans that they wanted to apply for 
asylum when faced with the prospect of deportation, but were denied the possibility 
of application.143 These allegations were challenged by the Government. However, the 
Government’s response proved of little importance to the larger development of 
events and by the time of the publication of the inquiry, Malta’s actions concerning the 
treatment of irregular immigrants were being closely monitored by international 
organisations. 
The Eritrean incident is important, firstly, because the Maltese Government was 
brought to international scrutiny. Following the huge international media attention 
that this incident brought about, other human rights entities also came to investigate 
the situation of irregular immigrants in Malta. Secondly, the way the Government 
diplomatically handled the situation, its highly charged and confrontational reactions 
to AI and subsequent criticism from other organisations on the Eritrean incident, 
evolved into a pattern which is now typical of any criticism on activity in this area. This 
defensive approach, in international circles, is often deemed unprofessional and 
undiplomatic. 
3.6.3 January 2005: Ħal Safi beating 
The incidents that took place at the Ħal Safi detention centre on 13 January 2005 were 
probably the most shocking mass case of violence that took place in the last decade. 
Immigrants housed in B Block held a demonstration to protest the conditions of their 
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detention centre, the length of their detention and the lack of information about the 
progress of their applications for refugee status and humanitarian protection. 144 
One hour after the start of the demonstration a large number of soldiers in law-
enforcement gear took up position around the demonstrators. When the 
demonstrators refused to return quietly to their barracks, an order was given to force 
them back inside. The soldiers charged them and violently put down the 
demonstration. Some of the soldiers were reported as having uttered racist slurs in 
encouraging their colleagues to beat the detainees.145 
In the mayhem that ensued, 26 foreigners were injured and had to be taken to hospital 
for examination and treatment, 12 of them being kept in hospital for more than a day 
because of the severity of their injuries. Concussion, injuries to lower and upper limbs, 
and multiple fractures were found. Two soldiers were likewise taken to hospital, found 
to be suffering from light injuries and were released on the day.146 
The incidents took place in full view of the soldiers’ superiors and of the media, who 
reported the incidents extensively. Maltese society and the immigrants themselves 
were shocked at what was an apparent manifestation of hatred. The following photos 
appearing in The Times of Malta show six–seven soldiers surrounding an immigrant 
already on the floor who is being wildly beaten up by a soldier: 
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Figure 9: Immigrants beaten in peaceful protest at Safi Barracks, January 2005147 
Reactions were immediate. AI,148 UNHCR,149 as well as various local organisations 
called for a prompt, impartial and thorough investigation into allegations that 
excessive force was used. Several MPs also raised the incidents in Parliament.150 
Four days after the events, on 17 January 2005, the Prime Minister expressed shock at 
the photographs of soldiers striking migrants. He appointed a retired judge, 
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Franco Depasquale, to conduct a public enquiry into the events.151 This inquiry had to 
examine all the circumstances leading to the use of force, establish whether the use of 
force was justified and whether it was proportionate, and make recommendations. 
Although the decision was welcomed, the Green Party lamented the fact that no 
magisterial inquiry in the normal course of criminal justice was being carried out which 
would indicate criminal responsibility and described this as a dereliction of duty on the 
part of magistrates.152 
On 12 December 2005, the Maltese Government published Mr Depasquale’s 97-page 
report. It concluded that the order to use force so that the immigrants would return 
indoors was justified but that the force applied by several soldiers ‘was exaggerated 
and out of proportion in the circumstances.’ The report clearly identifies one soldier 
for undue violence, having hit an immigrant with a truncheon when the immigrant was 
on the ground and under the control of other soldiers. The board of inquiry 
recommended that the soldier's superiors re-examine the way he conducted himself. 
There were other culprits whom it was not possible to identify. The report also 
suggested that the Government should pay for the special medical care needed by the 
one immigrant. Among the causes of the violent episode, Mr Depasquale’s report 
mentions that the soldiers were ill-trained in dealing with situations of that kind, the 
lack of clear orders, and a degree of disorganisation.153 The judge held that the 
rebellion was in no way tied to animosity between the army and the detainees. This 
contradicted reports by NGO officials, who held that some soldiers were blaming their 
poor working conditions at the centres on the migrants. 
The report’s publication, 11 months after the events, and the content of the report 
met with both approval and criticism from national and international organisations 
and triggered debate in Maltese society. The delay in its conclusion was also the 
subject of widespread criticism, with some claiming that this would dilute the effect of 
its findings. Political leaders also cited the inquiry in refusing to comment on the 
incidents. The Prime Minister was criticised for appointing a retired judge to 
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investigate the beatings when he could have resorted to the Ombudsman. The law 
setting up the Office of the Ombudsman allows the Prime Minister to ask the 
parliamentary official to investigate particular cases of maladministration and breach 
of human rights. With an administrative set-up already in place and the necessary 
funds at his disposal, the Ombudsman could have probably speeded up proceedings.154 
The scope of the report, and in particular the need to justify government policy on 
immigrant detention and its length on return procedures were much commented 
upon. The report was criticized on the way it describes migrants or on the 
responsibility put on NGOs, media and even UNHCR regarding the events.  The Council 
of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner called on the Maltese authorities to take 
administrative measures as speedily as possible, prosecute those already identified as 
responsible for the use of excessive violence and conduct a thorough investigation 
with the view to persecuting any additional culprits which have not yet been identified. 
In addition, training and supervision of members of the AFM in dealing with detention 
of foreigners, had to be provided by the authorities.155  Certain aspects of the report 
were denounced by various organisations. In particular, the judge held that individuals 
who visited the detainees provoked the protest by telling them that, had they been in 
another country, they would not have been detained. He also regretted comments by 
a UNHCR representative following the incidents. He described the protest as ‘certainly 
neither peaceful nor legitimate.’ More controversially, the judge went beyond his 
terms of reference in supporting the detention policy and the ban on media entering 
the detention centres. 
3.6.4 2005: Racism and the rise of the right-wing 
Irregular immigration provided a platform for the development of extreme right-wing 
political parties and movements in Malta. In 2005, there was a marked increase in hate 
speech against immigrants and racist attacks on immigrants. This coincided with the 
rise of two right-wing political parties – Imperium Europa, which was founded in 2000 
and the Alleanza Nazzjonali Republikana (ANR), which was founded in 2005. Mass 
meetings were held by both parties. Considerable online activity on websites and 
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YouTube videos were regularly seen, leading European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI) to comment that these instances of incitement to racial hatred 
posted on the Internet on sites connected with extreme right-wing movements and 
groups, had not been prosecuted.156 
Following the January 2005 beating, Norman Lowell, a fascist militant heading an 
organisation called Imperium Europa, called a national manifestation in Safi, where the 
incidents took place, in support of the AFM. About 200 persons gathered to hear 
Lowell saying that immigrants constituted a ‘sanitary, cultural and genetic’ threat and 
that we had to ‘annihilate the black coal.’ Banners were displayed with the words ‘To 
AFM: Well done boys’ and ‘Ratio: 2 Maltese babies born, 1 African invades.’ Lowell 
praised the armed forces and called the crowd in front of him ‘the new iron 
soldiers’.157 Amongst those present there were a number of soldiers in civilian clothes 
(to hide their identity), relatives of soldiers and young people all dressed in black, as 
well as two local councillors from Safi and Valletta.158 Both were eventually made to 
resign after it was revealed that they had also been active on far-right websites.159 
Later on in the year, Lowell’s movement, Imperium Europa, began a campaign against 
illegal immigrants, distributing flyers in Valletta and speaking to people in a locality 
where there was an Open Centre and in which residents had complained about the 
presence of immigrants.160  
The 2005 European Network Against Racism (ENAR) report lists a number of violent 
racial attacks that happened that year. In May, a Somali man was stopped by a woman 
in the street and then approached by a man who proceeded to stab him and kick him 
in the face. Before leaving, he took the victim’s mobile phone and diary. He was 
arraigned in court a few days later and charged with the attack. In June, four Eritreans 
were surrounded by a group of between eight and ten young men who punched them 
repeatedly in the face, whereas in another incident an Eritrean was attacked by four 
men who also robbed his mobile phone and the Lm200 (€460) salary that he had just 
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collected. In June, posters were put up and fixed to lamp posts in three localities by 
unknown far right activists. These posters read, ‘Let’s defend our country’ and ‘No to 
the invasion of clandestines’. The posters were removed by the police on the same 
day. In July, flyers were left at the Ħal Far Open Centre reading: ‘Illegal Immigrants 
bummers we don’t want you in Malta. Get out or we will start killing you. K.K.K.’ These 
words were printed between two lines depicting skulls and bones. In another locality, 
the same group dumped thousands of leaflets in the main street saying that ‘the 
hunting season on land and on the sea’ for illegal immigrants was open all year round. 
They also said ‘Stop immigration’ and carried the hallmark ‘KKK’, skulls and bones. 161 
In October 2005, during a demonstration against illegal immigration organised by the 
newly formed right wing group the ANR, inflammatory remarks were also abundant. 
The ANR’s top official said that releasing migrants would present a danger to Maltese 
people of a ‘social, moral and medicinal nature’ and that ‘we just don't want to 
become the toilet of the Mediterranean.’ Just as the march started, demonstrators 
were confronted by a small group of anti-racism activists, including a priest, who were 
subjected to insults and violence at the hands of some demonstrators. After the event, 
the media took comments from those present, which in most cases clearly showed a 
profound dislike of immigrants in general or of blacks in particular. Norman Lowell was 
also present at the activity, although ANR officials denied any connection to his group. 
The ANR stood out for the resources that seemed to be at its disposal. In particular, 
the demonstration was publicised via a billboard campaign which, given the cost, 
pointed to considerable financing.162 
After the demonstration, it was reported that in the bus terminus about ten young 
commuters began harassing the six to eight immigrants on the bus. While the majority 
of those present were visibly upset, others greeted the taunts with outbursts of 
laughter. The immigrants remained silent although they were obviously agitated. At 
one point, as one of them was getting off the bus, he turned to two immigrants seated 
                                                          
161
 Idem. 
162
 Idem. 
129 
Chapter 3 
at the front and told them, ‘Niggers go home.’ Others pounded loudly on the side of 
the bus where the immigrants were seated as they got off. 163 
Far-right militants also turned up at activities organised by NGOs working with 
refugees, evidently to intimidate and provoke those present, mainly by taking 
pictures.164 This was intimidating since various Maltese were also being targeted at the 
time. These included individuals and organisations who worked against racism and for 
the protection of the rights of immigrants, including those who publicly exposed and 
denounced racist attitudes in Maltese society.165 
In the 2004 elections for Malta’s European Parliament representatives, Norman Lowell, 
an independent candidate of extreme right and neo-nazi views managed to gather 
over 1,600 votes, a feat hitherto unheard of in Malta’s bi-partisan political system.166 
In 2008, Normal Lowell ran for the general elections on two districts garnering 84 votes 
on the first count. Following the elections, the party was not as militant or visible, but 
Imperium Europa’s website http://www.imperium-europa.org/index.asp and 
www.vivamalta.org are still active and updated regularly. 
3.6.5 March 2009: Pinar incident 
Malta’s international obligations within the SAR area have become an object of 
diplomatic tension with Italy to such a degree that the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister 
Franco Frattini has insisted that Malta give up its SAR area. This proposal was put 
forward following one such diplomatic incident known as the ‘Pinar incident‘. This was 
just one in a series of disputes, and followed another internationally much publicised 
incident in 2007 when migrants were left hanging on a tuna pen. 
On 16 April 2009, the RCC in Malta was informed that there was a small boat at risk of 
sinking 45 nautical miles away from Lampedusa. Following normal procedures, Malta 
contacted a Turkish cargo ship, MV Pinar E, which was closest to the location and the 
MV Pinar E rescued the immigrants. A few hours later, the MV Pinar E informed the 
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RCC that there was another boat with immigrants heading towards it. The RCC told the 
master of the MV PINAR E that according to international law, if the immigrants were 
in danger, the merchant ship was obliged to offer the necessary assistance and to take 
the rescued people to the closest port. The MV Pinar E ended up with 154 immigrants 
on board. According to the PINAR’s captain, there were 154 people rescued, amongst 
whom there was a pregnant woman, 25 injured people, of whom seven required 
urgent medical treatment, and a corpse. There were also some cases of fractures.167 
The ship was prevented from reaching either a Maltese or an Italian port because 
neither country would accept responsibility for the people rescued. Italy’s 
interpretation of the concept of ‘safe port’ in international maritime law differed from 
the Maltese interpretation as it included the capacity of the ‘port’ to process and 
manage the people saved – Lampedusa, according to Italy, did not have this capacity. 
The individuals were left stranded for four days without adequate food and water, and 
forced to sleep on the deck of the ship. Between Friday 17 and Sunday 19 April, Italian 
medical staff went on board the vessel to give the required treatment.  A 15 year old 
girl, and two other persons were taken to a medical centre in Lampedusa, while Italian 
ships supplied the MV PINAR E with food and water for the immigrants and the crew. 
 In the meantime, the ship had anchored 17 miles to the South of Lampedusa. The 
migrants were eventually allowed to disembark at Porto Empedocle, Southern Italy, on 
20 April. 
The Pinar incident drew international condemnation and accusations from Italy that 
Malta was unable to handle the illegal immigration problem effectively. The 
Government of Malta however ruled out the possibility of shrinking Malta’s SAR 
area.168 
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3.7 Conclusion 
Overall, the picture that emerges is that of a very small country attempting to manage 
a phenomenon for which it is unprepared. The irony is that a global phenomenon with 
root causes which are far bigger than anything a small country like Malta can address, 
hits Malta proportionally harder than bigger and more powerful countries. This 
constitutes the thrust of the message that the Government of Malta is conveying to 
the international community. Irregular migrants in this picture clearly emerge as 
powerless actors caught in a complex sea of global-local contentions. The focus on a 
local case study should not obscure this reality. 
On a local level, the statistics and facts presented in this Chapter, at times, seem to 
indicate discernible patterns of development. They do also however convey stories of a 
different nature which portray a contradictory picture. Certainly, this is the case when 
one views irregular migration from a human rights point of view. In some regards, 
irregular migration in Malta is very good: for example, the fact that Malta is the 
country which in the first instance gives protection to the largest number of refugees. 
On the other hand, there are distinct areas which show appalling practices. This can be 
seen in the lengthy and mandatory detention policy for all immigrants, including 
asylum seekers, and the sub-standard conditions of detention centres, which places 
Malta unequivocally on a human rights black list. Questions which arise from this 
Chapter are: Why has there been so much development in the legal infrastructure and 
not on the conditions of detention? Why are the conditions in the open centres getting 
progressively worse when patterns clearly indicate that irregular migration will 
continue? These questions will be addressed in the subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 4: ‘Less than human’: Why dignity is at the 
core of human rights 
4.1 Introduction 
While endless discussions were underway between professional bodies, like human 
rights organisations, the law courts and the Government on whether migrant policies 
were in line with human rights or not, immigrants in migrant detention centres were 
going through a desperate existence. Some just could not take it and escaped. Others 
needed psychiatric treatment and were admitted only to be segregated in the Irregular 
Immigrants’ Ward at Mount Carmel Hospital described as the ward with the worst 
living conditions.1 Altogether life in the overcrowded rundown centres was terrible. 
The confined space with chicken wire all around drove even the strongest characters 
into a disillusioned apathy after a few months. Detention became a profoundly 
dehumanising experience for immigrants, which as the following Moroccan immigrant 
comments, leaves an indelible mark on the migrants: 
Detention has never left me. I was treated like a dog, but I also became a dog, an 
animal. And when you become an animal once, you are ashamed for life.2 
This Chapter shows that the displacement of the concept of human dignity from the 
core of human rights produces very different practices of human rights. Detention 
serves to exemplify the division between two main schools of thought – exemplified in 
this Chapter by the Government and NGOs – which produce different interpretations 
of human rights. It is proposed that the ill-treatment of immigrants in detention 
centres is not restricted to detention but is symptomatic of the way irregular 
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immigrants are perceived in Malta. In addition detention centres are, not least due to 
their confined space, the space in which dehumanising processes are most shockingly 
visible. 
The concept of human dignity is very powerful and can be clearly seen as the main 
motivation for NGO workers. Indeed their analysis of the practices of detention is that 
they are only possible because immigrants are perceived as ‘less than human’. The 
following quote, shrouded in a spirit of indignation, illustrates this. It is from one of my 
interviews held with an NGO worker: 
When I speak to people who are taking decisions about migrants at different levels, 
mostly my contact is about detention issues, I can’t help concluding that in addition to 
one massive stereotyping – all liars, all abusers – there’s also, somehow, they are 
perceived as less than human, and that is why, even talking about rights is almost – you 
are almost being ‘qisu wiċċek tost’ [ungrateful] that you are talking about rights. But if I 
truly believe that he’s a human being how can I ever imply that he shouldn’t be talking 
about rights, that he should be grateful for what he gets. If I believe that he’s as human 
as me, with as much rights as me, why would I lock him up and in those conditions?3 
This Chapter will show that ultimately it is precisely this perception of immigrants as 
‘less than human’ that has made migrant detention a possible reality. Migrant 
detention in Malta is referred to as a phenomenon, because the policy and conditions 
of detention are the singular most observable occurrence that conditions the lives and 
well being of irregular migrants in Malta. It also has a direct influence on the asylum 
seeking process, since irregular immigrants who apply for asylum go through the whole 
process and if necessary, the appeal, whilst living in these detention centres. I shall 
argue that the Government is not embracing a human rights approach by allowing a 
situation which has become dehumanising. The policy of detention is a short-sighted 
approach and one which is not protective of Maltese society, because there is a direct 
and significant ‘spillover’ in creating an institution which encourages dehumanising 
practices.  
This Chapter shows that the respect for human dignity should underlie all 
governmental efforts to enact human rights based policy. The first section will briefly 
outline two paradigms of human rights which differ on the importance given to the 
                                                          
3
 L, Personal Interview - NGO worker, 11 January 2009. 
134 
Chapter 4 
role of human dignity. I will make a case for retaining human dignity at the core of the 
human rights movement. The second section will show these two paradigms in 
practice by describing the Maltese scenario in which the Government and NGOs have 
made contrasting claims on whether there has been a violation of the human rights of 
irregular immigrants. This has produced a ‘human rights stalemate’ in Malta. The third 
section uses the concept of human dignity as an analytical lens to look at the situation 
of migrant detention, which is the most contentious issue in the irregular immigration 
field. The question of whether the enactment and practice of migrant detention in 
Malta is morally acceptable will be asked and answered. It will be argued that the 
catastrophic effects of detention on migrant detainees, who are treated and become 
‘less than human’ show that the Government, and the human rights paradigm it 
locates itself within, are problematic. Migrant detention is a clear example of a direct 
affront to human dignity, and as such, poses an unsurpassable barrier to the nurturing 
of a human rights culture. 
4.2 The ‘human’ in human rights: The case for human dignity 
Is there any need to ‘make a case for human dignity’? To the extent that human rights 
theorists expose different understandings of the function that the concept of human 
dignity plays in the human rights movement, there is. Although differences might 
appear subtle, I argue that the issue of human dignity within human rights philosophy 
is so fundamental that it has created two very distinct movements. The implications in 
practice are radical and explain why situations which are not conducive to ensuring 
respect for the human dignity of immigrants do paradoxically receive support from 
some parts of the human rights system. 
What is understood by human dignity in contemporary times?4 The philosopher Oliver 
Sensen sums up the contemporary conception of dignity as: 
Today dignity is widely conceived of as an inherent value property on the basis of which 
one can claim rights from others: one has rights because of one’s intrinsic and objective 
preciousness. In justifying human rights, the good (dignity) is prior to a principle stating 
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what is right; and human rights as entitlements – which are justified by the good – are 
prior to the duties of the agent.5 
This definition arises out of the usage of human dignity in UN documents where it is 
clearly stated that human dignity is the justification for human rights. For example: 
‘Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person...’6 
Human dignity is at the core of the modern human rights philosophy and movement.7 
The concept of human dignity occupies a functionally important role within human 
rights because it is the bridge, or as the philosopher Jurgen Habermas refers to it, the 
‘conceptual hinge’ on which modern human rights was constructed on, a link between 
neo-Kantian morality and positive law.8 Habermas describes this moral-legal nature of 
human rights in the following quote: 
Because the moral promise of equal respect for everybody is supposed to be cashed 
out in legal currency, human rights exhibit a Janus face turned simultaneously to 
morality and to law. Notwithstanding their exclusively moral content, they have the 
form of enforceable subjective rights that grant specific liberties and claims. They are 
designed to be spelled out in concrete terms through democratic legislation, to be 
specified from case to case in adjudication, and to be enforced in cases of violation. 
Thus, human rights circumscribe precisely that part (and only part) of morality which 
can be translated into the medium of coercive law and become political reality in the 
robust shape of effective civil rights.9 
Only this internal connection between human dignity and human rights gives rise to the 
explosive fusion of moral contents with coercive law as the medium in which the 
construction of just political orders must be performed.10 
In a nutshell, although human dignity can be described without reference to human 
rights, the prominence and significance of human dignity in contemporary settings is 
intrinsically tied to the modern human rights movement. This new human rights 
paradigm has made human rights the easiest way to make claims for human dignity. 
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What kind of different ‘understandings’ can arise from such a simple explanation? A 
debate described by Mary Ann Glendon that occurred during the negotiations of the 
UDHR serves to highlight the two different positions I have mentioned with regard to 
the concept of human dignity. The following is the excerpt from Glendon’s book of the 
proceedings of the discussion on article 1 - ‘All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ - which took a total of six days to get 
through the Third Committee: 
...C.T. Te Water [the South African representative] produced a brief show of solidarity 
among the rest of the delegates when he moved to replace ‘dignity and rights’ with 
‘fundamental rights and freedoms.’ […] Nor, he insisted, was there any universal 
standard of dignity. Te Water’s motion ‘so electrified the meeting,’ Humprey wrote, 
that everyone there, including Mrs Roosevelt and Pavlov, ‘united in protest.’ Malik 
reminded Te Water that the word dignity had been inserted in the UN Charter on the 
suggestion of Field Marshal Jan Smuts, who had led the South African delegation to the 
San Francisco conference. The next day Te Water stated that he wished to clarify his 
government’s position: The Declaration ought to be devoted to statements of 
fundamental rights, and since ‘dignity’ was not a ‘right,’ South Africa questioned the 
advisability of the reference to ‘dignity’ in article 1. 
Mrs Roosevelt, when her turn came, said that the word dignity had been considered 
carefully by the Human Rights Commission, which had included it in order to emphasize 
that every human being is worthy of respect. In the scheme of the Declaration, Article 1 
did not refer to specific rights because it was meant to explain why human beings have 
rights to begin with. 11 
The central role of human dignity to human rights was not negotiable in spite of Te 
Water’s, and his supporters’, evident resistance. On the other hand, the behaviour of 
Mrs Roosevelt and Malik by refusing to enter into a discussion on the concept of 
human dignity itself, would suggest an assumption on behalf of the drafters of the un-
negotiable role of human dignity.  This Chapter supports this assumption on the basis 
that it is the concept of human dignity that gives a moral bearing to the human rights 
movement, making it a truly humanist movement. When human dignity loses its place 
at the core, human rights become just another set of discussed and agreed to 
standards between states. 
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Secondly, Te Water’s point that there was no ‘universal standard’ of dignity is still a 
point of contestation today. By distinguishing the function of ‘human’ as a word and 
‘human’ in human rights, Douzinas demonstrates how human dignity could be 
endowed with universality while remaining open to different nuances in meaning. The 
former he argues can be seen as an empty signifier which can be endowed with any 
number of meanings. The latter however (which amounts to what I refer to as human 
dignity) should be seen as a floating signifier. Endowed as it is with symbolic capital, 
the boundaries of meanings it could encompass, are set. Douzinas’ argument is 
reproduced hereunder: 
...one can argue that the ‘man’ of the rights of man or, the ‘human’ of human rights 
functions as a floating signifier. As a signifier, it is just a word, a discursive element that 
is not automatically or necessarily linked to any particular signified or meaning. On the 
contrary, the word ‘human’ is empty of all meaning and can be attached to an infinite 
number of signifieds. As a result, it cannot be fully and finally pinned down to any 
particular conception, because it transcends and overdetermines them all. But the 
‘humanity’ of human rights is not just an empty signifier; it carries an enormous 
symbolic capital, a surplus of value and dignity endowed by the Revolutions and the 
Declarations and augmented by every new struggle for the recognition and protection 
of human rights. This symbolic excess turns the ‘human’ into a floating signifier, into 
something that combatants in political, social, and legal struggles want to co-opt to 
their cause, and explains its importance for political campaigns.12 
Te Water’s proposal to limit the scope of human dignity to that of an inspirational 
concept by leaving it only in the Preamble, would have closed the opportunity to use 
human dignity in a ‘normative’ way. If human dignity is seen as the ‘human’ in human 
rights, or as that benchmark of behaviour and actions which are morally unacceptable, 
below which humanity is at risk – then human dignity can be viewed as a normative 
concept. It is not clear if the drafters had this in mind, however the inclusion of human 
dignity as an article in its own right makes sense when seen in this light. In fact, the 
term a ‘violation of human dignity’ has been used officially in the 1993 Vienna 
Conference on Human Rights to describe extreme situations in which human rights are 
not upheld. It was enshrined in article 25 of the Vienna Declaration which states that, 
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The World Declaration on Human Rights of 1993, affirms that extreme poverty and 
social exclusion constitute a violation of human dignity...13 
Human dignity is a ‘normative’ principle of a particular type since as a floating signifier 
it can only be endowed with meaning within a particular setting. In extreme situations 
the concept of human dignity can be a useful analytical tool to help us understand if 
and what irreducible standards have been surpassed in a given situation. Putting it in 
another way, human dignity can be seen as that which allows what is unacceptable to 
emerge. It is about giving a voice to the vulnerable and victims, those who need it 
most. As Jeff Malpas and Norelle Lickiss say: 
...the voices of all of those for whom the loss of dignity constitutes a real and 
immediate threat—the voices, for instance, of asylum seekers in leaky boats or in 
detention centres, persons in situations of destitution, individuals whose lives and 
communities have been uprooted by the cataclysms of nature, those in captivity, those 
on death row, women trafficked as commodities, mothers watching children dying of 
hunger, abused child soldiers, those who are the victims of malice or culpable 
ineptitude, those deemed disposable or unworthy of life, those whose powerlessness 
leaves them prey to the strong.... Dignity remains a vital and significant concept if for 
no other reason than that it directs our attention to just these voices, insisting that 
they be heard, that they be recognized and that they be responded to.14 
In brief, the negotiations of the UDHR reveal a schism between two groups: those for 
whom human dignity was nothing more than an inspirational concept, and those who 
envisaged that apart from the inspirational qualities the concept must also carry a 
functional and normative value. As a normative concept it could also be used to 
benchmark treatments which are morally unacceptable, and as will be seen later on, 
the application of human dignity as a benchmark to migrant detention in Malta yields a 
clear message that the practice is morally unacceptable.  Before that however, the 
following section will look at the two schools of thought in practice – what 
understandings of human rights do they yield? And what are the implications of these 
understandings of human rights in practice? 
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4.3 The Government vs NGOs: Where are human rights? 
In light of the previous section, and the evidence of the dehumanising effects of 
detention it is surprising to see that two clear and distinct human rights discourses 
have developed within the immigration field in Malta. On the one hand, there are 
various international and local organisations claiming a violation of human rights on 
various fronts and calling for a removal of the blanket detention policy of all migrants, 
in particular asylum seekers. On the other hand, the Government by positing an 
interpretation of human rights law claims that detention does not constitute a 
violation of human rights. The latter is reinforced by the Maltese law courts and to 
some degree by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). These two discourses 
can be seen as the result of the two theoretical paradigms discussed above. 
The position of non-state actors: a human rights discourse 
This discourse is closest to the UDHR original drafters ‘paradigm’ in which the concept 
of human dignity was understood as being functionally important. The UDHR paradigm 
yields a strictly person-centred approach where situations are scrutinised and judged 
according to the effects it has on individuals.  Independent and non-governmental 
organisations are the main producers of this discourse. 
Non-state actors’ criticism of Malta’s detention policy has been forceful. The most 
common critique found in these reports focuses on the deprivation of liberty of nearly 
all irregular immigrants and the alleged arbitrariness of detention as well as the fact 
that the positive developments that have been implemented are not set in law, and so 
can easily be changed or repealed. An example of this can be found in a Press Release 
issued by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention which panned the whole 
system and openly stated that: 
The detention regime [that] immigrants in an irregular situation are subjected to, falls 
far short of international human rights law.15 
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Another series of complaints that have been generated by human rights organisations 
are those regarding the conditions of detention. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention expresses shock at the abysmal conditions in detention centres. The 
conditions of detention are: 
...appalling to the extent that the health, including the mental health, of the detainees 
is affected. This situation, in turn, affects their ability to properly understand their 
rights and to follow the legal proceedings related to them...The sub-standard closed 
centres of Safi and Lyster Barracks are overcrowded. At Lyster Barracks, families are not 
separated from men, women, including pregnant and nursing mothers, and children, 
including unaccompanied minors. Although the Government applies a fast track 
procedure for the release of vulnerable groups in administrative detention, the 
procedures may take several months and be in vain for those who are considered a 
health risk. Many dwell in tents and the Working Group notes with serious concern that 
59 inmates do not even find a place to sleep in these tents at present.16  
The conditions inside the migrant detention centres, despite various positive 
developments over the years, have for long now been criticised on the following 
points: 
a. The (almost) permanent overcrowding; 
b. An almost complete lack of privacy (both in sleeping/living areas and in 
showers etc); 
c. No separation of female from male immigrants; 
d. No protection from abuse from staff or other immigrants, especially for female 
immigrants; 
e. Unhygienic conditions;17 
f. Difficulties accessing basic healthcare;18 
g. Mental health considerations;19 
h. The denial of information about rights as potential asylum seekers.20 
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The same reports cited above also included a series of recommendations and 
proposals to the Government to help in addressing the issues highlighted above. These 
recommendations were various and range from minimising the length of detention to 
the least possible period, to improving the conditions inside detention centres, 
speeding up the asylum review and empowering immigrants by way of access to legal 
channels. The same reports have often documented developments in the field: 
legislation, infrastructure, conditions within detention centres, and access to health. 
Notwithstanding this, the overall situation still falls short of required standards as seen 
in Section 4.4 of this Chapter, and has also been highlighted by the aforementioned 
report Becoming Vulnerable in Detention. 
In brief, the overall message is clear: the policy and practice of detention falls below 
acceptable standards as it is inhumane. According to these non-state actors, the 
current practice of detention of all irregular immigrants, including asylum seekers, 
constitutes a violation of human rights. In addition, the conditions of detention in 
themselves need to be ameliorated. 
The position of the Government: another (and contradictory) human rights discourse 
This discourse is the one adopted primarily by the Government and law courts. It is 
closer to ‘Te Waters’ approach in that human rights are perceived from a state-centric 
point of view, and give less centrality to the concept of human dignity. More 
importance is thus given to a positivistic interpretation of human rights law and state 
interests. 
The Government of Malta defends its practices and policies by taking a legalistic stand 
to show that it is not violating international human rights standards. Bringing to the 
case the particular issues of the country’s size, population density and the inability to 
manage or provide any long-term solutions to irregular migrants, the Government 
argues that its actions are within the country’s capacity and it is therefore living up to 
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its international obligations. The position of the Government is clear and has been 
consistent throughout the years: Malta cannot cope with the enormity (or potential 
enormity) of irregular immigration and therefore needs to implement a mandatory 
policy of detention to manage the situation. This rationale underpins national laws, 
and it therefore does not come as a complete surprise that law court judgements have 
not ruled against any aspects of detention. The following excerpt from the Prime 
Minister’s address to the United Nations General Assembly is a good example of 
Malta’s stance: 
. . . the small size of Malta, our financial and human resources make it extremely 
difficult to cope with such a huge number of these unfortunate people to be 
accommodated in Malta . . . Notwithstanding the severe difficulties faced by Malta, we 
continue to honour our international obligations vis-à-vis genuine refugees and persons 
qualifying for humanitarian protection. Malta has featured as one of the countries, in 
proportion to its size and population, with the highest number of awards to asylum-
seekers...For years we have insisted on measures of international solidarity, beginning 
with effective action at EU level...Malta has always dealt with these situations with 
great responsibility, humanity and benevolence paying due respect to every human 
being without exception and will continue to do so. At the same time, the problem of 
illegal immigration is an international phenomenon driven by external factors which 
cannot always be prevented or even mitigated by the countries affected by this 
problem. . . . My Government hopes that other countries would come forward to assist 
in alleviating the burden which Malta carries – a burden so acutely disproportionate to 
Malta’s population, land size and population density.21 
The Government’s position on the detention policy has been widely supported by the 
local Maltese courts. For example, the following three cases - two asylum seekers and 
one rejected asylum seeker - invoked article 409A of the Criminal Code.22  This article 
provides any detainee with the possibility of applying to the Magistrate’s Court to 
challenge the lawfulness of detention. If the court chooses to release the applicant, the 
Attorney General may apply for the person’s re-arrest if he is of the opinion that the 
continued arrest was founded on any provision of the code or any other law.23 All 
three cases were rejected as the Court held that since the Immigration Act authorises 
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detention and imposes no limit on the amount of time an immigrant may spend in 
detention, such detention is lawful. According to the Court, the scope of article 409A 
does not include an examination of circumstances of the lawfulness of detention, such 
as, if the detention itself violates the individual’s fundamental human rights. 
Other attempts challenged the lawfulness of detention in terms of article 34 of the 
Constitution of Malta (which is also article 5 of the ECHR) which protects from arbitrary 
arrest or detention. In Essa Maneh et. v. Commissioner of Police, the Court justified 
detention on the basis of national security concerns as the Court highlighted the need 
to ‘avoid a flood of ‘irregular’ people running around in Malta’.24 In the interpretation 
of the law, overall, the local judges and magistrates have reproduced, and thus further 
legitimised, the Government’s line of argument. 
There has been one exception in the case of Barboush v. Commissioner of Police. Karim 
Barboush, an Iraqi asylum-seeker, had been detained for fourteen months. On 25th 
October 2004 Magistrate Vella ruled that, although it was understandable that an 
illegal immigrant would be detained on arrival at Malta, the detention of Barboush 
went beyond the limits of what was considered reasonable and lawful. The Act 
stipulates that applications for refugee status were to be dealt with as quickly as 
possible and within a relatively reasonable time.25 It is worth reproducing a few 
questions Magistrate Vella poses when reading out the sentence: 
How could one accept that a person, with fundamental human rights like anybody else, 
is held in detention for 14 months when there is no disposition in the law that requests 
the arrest? How could one accept that the Board of Appeal, that determines refugee 
status, was not composed for months so that applicants were left waiting in detention 
for nothing...The court feels that 14 months was not a short or reasonable time in the 
circumstances. The court understands and appreciates the efforts and limited 
resources with which the authorities work and is in no way condemning anyone's 
actions but the fact is that situations where a person is denied his freedom arbitrarily 
and unreasonably cannot be accepted.26 
                                                          
24
 Essa Maneh et. v. Commissioner of Police, Civil Court, First Hall, 16 Dec 2009. 
25
 Claudia Calleja ‘Asylum seeker’s release contested...again’, The Times of Malta, 5 Nov 2004. 
26
 Claudia Calleja, ‘Asylum seeker's detention ruled illegal’, The Times of Malta, 3 Nov 2004. 
144 
Chapter 4 
Are we to expect that these people, who have fundamental human rights like 
everybody else, should remain in detention until someone remembers to constitute the 
Board of Appeal, hear the applicants' case and decide it?27 
Magistrate Vella’s person-centred approach contrasts sharply with the state-centric 
approach undertaken by the Government and the rigid positivistic interpretation of the 
law by the Courts. His comments, rightly so, make us question the fairness of the 
phenomenon of detention. Three issues are brought out in his argumentation: a) that 
the lack of resources and lack of administration do not constitute ‘reasonable’ and so 
the Government is not acting within its legal right (Immigration Act) to detain people 
arbitrarily; b) the change of status of the immigrant to an asylum seeker, needs to be 
taken into consideration; c) freedom is a fundamental human rights, and a person 
cannot be kept in detention due to maladministration issues.  Magistrate Vella’s ruling 
was revoked by the Criminal Court on procedural grounds and it was ordered that the 
case be heard again. This is typical of an approach in which human dignity is not the 
primary consideration. 
In brief, the position adopted by the Government and largely reinforced by the law 
courts is dictated by a strict interpretation of human rights law. The end result is 
radically opposed to that undertaken by non-state actors who claim, as seen above, 
that violations of human rights of irregular immigrants are ongoing. This also has 
significantly different implications on the state which is primarily responsible for 
safeguarding the human rights of all people within its territory. Non-state actors claim 
that the state should be held accountable. Whereas the Government’s arguments, 
supported by the law courts, absolve the state from any responsibility of a human 
rights violation for a situation that it claims it is not equipped to handle. 
On the one hand one can say that the human rights system is ‘working’, and has made 
a difference by calling the Government to account for the ill-treatment of irregular 
immigrants in Malta. On the other hand, it can be equally argued that in spite of the 
activity spurred by the human rights system, it has not been effective enough because 
irregular immigrants in Malta have been and are still being subjected to a 
dehumanising experience. Ironically the ‘ineffectiveness’ is justified by an iron wall of 
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international human rights law and its interpretation. The paradox is that both camps 
have usurped the moral high ground of human rights to put forward contrasting 
claims. Both camps cannot be right, because they hold opposing views. This situation 
has increasingly become, not only a difficult situation for irregular immigrants and the 
Government to manage, but a peculiar human rights conundrum or stalemate. The 
following section will focus on the practice of detention using the concept of human 
dignity as an analytical lens and a normative tool. 
4.4 Dehumanising detention: The reality of a ‘less than human’ space 
challenges the Government’s position 
Migrant detention in Malta is officially a policy embarked on by the Government to 
manage the administrative aspects of irregular migration: from asylum applications, to 
health checks, to removals. It is an indirect result of the enactment of several EU laws 
and regulations which are part of the EU acquis (as seen in Chapter 3). These laws have 
served to bring Malta’s legal framework in line with international human rights 
standards and ironically, as this Chapter seeks to show, are intended to provide greater 
protection to asylum seekers. In practice, the phenomenon of detention in Malta is a 
complex institutional set up designed to facilitate the removal of people without a 
permit to stay and accommodate those immigrants whose removal order is 
suspended, pending a decision on their asylum application. Immigrants emerge from 
this experience claiming that they feel ‘less than human’. Detaining people for a short 
and reasonable period of time in decent conditions for administrative reasons might 
be considered justifiable. The dehumanising practices that arise as a consequence of 
detention are however much more difficult to justify and, this Chapter argues, are 
unacceptable. 
What is the effect of detention on immigrants? During my fieldwork, I wanted to 
understand how immigrants articulated their experience of detention. In a way I also 
wanted some reassurance that I was not projecting my own horror and shock at the 
ongoing practices and policy of detention. I asked an Eritrean immigrant during one of 
our conversations, what he felt was the worst thing about detention. Having just spent 
months reviewing human rights reports on migrant detention in Malta, part of me was 
146 
Chapter 4 
expecting: the overcrowding, the food - which everyone complains about, or the stinky 
toilets getting blocked every other day, or the unhygienic showers. Following a 
pregnant moment of silence, which I can now recognise as typical however long after 
their release from detention you ask immigrants about their experience, he replied: 
It isn’t easy to be in a situation that kills the internal soul.28 
This is what I set out to understand in an attempt to make sense of the two 
contradictory discourses of human rights used by the Government and NGOs. Using 
the concept of human dignity as a lens, I ask: in what way is detention in Malta a 
situation that ‘kills the internal soul’? A Congolese immigrant, who spent over 18 
months in detention and failed his asylum application, sheds some more light onto 
answering this question. He described his experience of detention in Malta, making the 
characteristic (also seen in the opening quote of this Chapter) allegory to animals, as 
‘dehumanising’. He says: 
Detention dehumanizes the human being. The detainee is reduced to the state of an 
animal. One wakes up, eats, sleeps, wakes up...as in a stable. What is the difference 
between cows in a stable and an inmate at Safi Barracks? The cow sleeps, the inmate 
sleeps, the cow is fed, the inmate is fed, the cow goes out for a few minutes under the 
supervision of its master, the detainee also goes out into the courtyard for a few 
minutes, under the surveillance of the soldiers... 29 
The sense of emptiness and loss of meaning shows part of the pain of going through a 
dehumanising experience. The gravity of the experience is expressed by the continual 
invocation of God. An often heard phrase among West Africans is: ‘it is only by the 
Grace of God that we can get over/forget detention’.30 The same Congolese migrant 
expresses his wish that the Maltese understand that migrants’ suffering starts before 
detention and it is compassion that they seek on their arrival to Malta. It is interesting 
to note that the Congolese migrant chooses to present detention as an issue of justice. 
Justice here is used in the broader sense of ‘fairness’, but it also alludes to a common 
perception by immigrants that detention is a ‘punishment’. He says: 
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The victims of this detention have no other consolation except for their tears. All these 
people who were abused, bullied and maltreated, and all those who continue to be 
abused, bullied and maltreated because they fled their respective countries are the 
forgotten members of our society. They escaped from the frying pan into the fire. To 
experience the bullying misery of detention, one must have been there and lived 
through it. It's like I said one day to the judge who was in charge of the enquiry 
regarding the suppression of the demonstrations carried out by detainees in Safi 
Barracks: ‘Coming to Malta, we committed the same stupid mistake as the crocodile 
who was walking in the bush one day, when he suddenly saw that it was going to rain, 
so he rushed into the river to escape the rain. We were trying to escape abuse and 
violations of human rights, but in Malta we found out that these were not milder here 
than in our countries! And the big question will always remain unanswered: Should we 
really have fled?’31 
This explains why the effects on the detainees is not simply one of frustration at the 
bad conditions, or lack of liberty, but a delivery of subjugation and humiliation which 
all together converge into a dehumanising experience. The following is a quote from 
my own field notes which helps to shed light on how I arrived to this conclusion: 
I learnt more about the effects of detention on two separate occasions when I met with 
the managers of the Ħal Far Open Centre and the Marsa Open Centre. Both gave me a 
tour of the centres they were responsible for. I noticed that as they were taking me 
around both took on a ‘monitoring’ role; and their gaze would linger on any activity 
between migrants in the centre, no doubt registering who was befriending whom, and 
so on. In almost identical automatic gestures, both continuously drew my attention and 
commented non-stop on new residents. These migrants, just released from detention, 
walked with their heads bent, huddled in groups and when not looking furtively over 
their shoulders they had a sheepish, almost empty fixed gaze. To show me how ‘slow’ 
the new immigrants were, one of the managers in a joking, almost jeering move, 
shouted at the top of his voice ‘Good morning!’ to a group of three new Nigerian 
migrants. The reaction was immediate, their bodies tensed, they looked back almost 
defiantly but expressionless, and walked away. The other manager, in a similar gesture, 
moved quickly towards a group where he had spotted new residents. He extended his 
hand with a smile and a good morning. The reaction again was telling: the Eritrean 
immigrant took a quick step back, bending his head, awkwardly staring at the 
manager’s extended hand. Not before stealing a quick look up to check if the gesture 
was friendly did he slowly extend his hand back. As we left the group, the manager 
under his breath told me, in a concerned tone: ‘It will take time...‘freedom’ doesn’t 
automatically come with release from detention...freedom comes when they manage 
to work detention out of their system.’ 32 
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The effects of detention on immigrants are also the subject of a Europe-wide report 
entitled Becoming Vulnerable in Detention. As can be gleaned from the title, the report 
investigates immigrants’ vulnerability in detention. The country report on Malta 
concludes that there a number of factors, related to or resulting from, their detention 
in Malta which are at the root of a marked deterioration in immigrants’ physical and 
mental health/well-being. These are: complaints from detained immigrants of 
increased stress, frustration, loss of appetite, sleeping problems and feelings of 
powerlessness. Significantly the causes identified, which are often aggravated by past 
traumas experienced in their country of origin or on the journey to Malta, are various: 
the fact that they are deprived of their liberty, the lack of information about their 
situation, their inability to do anything about their situation, the poor conditions in 
detention, incommunicado with family and friends and the lack of possibilities to 
engage in gainful activities.33 
One of the more apparent manifestations of inhuman treatment is in the infrequent, 
but regular occurrences of physical violence. The most public example of this is the 
incident described in Chapter 3 whereby immigrants were beaten up during a peaceful 
demonstration at Safi Barracks. But taunting and bullying by a few soldiers was 
commonplace and rarely went punished. Violence on immigrants by other immigrants, 
at times the result of mental health problems but also due to the lack of security in the 
centres, were regular occurrences. In one incident during my fieldwork, following a 
dispute, an immigrant poured hot water from the water boiler onto another immigrant 
while he was asleep on his mattress on the ground at night. The aggressor was given a 
warning and moved to another centre. A few years back, an Egyptian immigrant was 
brutally murdered by another immigrant. This time it happened in the afternoon while 
he was sleeping in the room he shared with another 15 detainees. The aggressor used 
iron bedposts to smash his head. The site of the crime splattered in large quantities of 
blood could not be cleaned until the evidence was collected. This was an additional 
trauma for the other detainees as it meant that the dried blood remained there for 
around a week. 
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The dehumanising experience affects greatly NGO workers and soldiers too. In a way it 
is detention’s ‘collateral damage’. For the few NGO workers, who have a permit to 
enter detention centres, the deterioration of immigrants inside detention and the 
feelings of helplessness, are often exhausting experiences. The lack of understanding 
from other Maltese adds to their frustration. Detention is hardly visible, a fact brought 
about partly by a policy not to allow media representatives inside detention centres. 
This policy was very slightly relaxed from 2008. Amidst these frustrations, an NGO 
worker still complains that it is not enough and goes on to describe her experience of 
detention: 
I think that somehow it’s one thing to read a write-up in a newspaper and see some 
photos, you know. Somehow it’s so different to actually go inside: to sit there and smell 
that horrible fetted air, slight smell of drains, to be in that crowded environment, with 
beds all on each other and all those people all vying for attention, all – ‘please, please 
help me’, ‘you must listen to my story’, ‘mine is the worst’... All individuals 
literally...That is something you can’t really get through media coverage. I think that the 
full horror of detention is difficult to portray, but I do think that if there was more 
openness and we had journalists who were willing to go inside and speak to people, it 
could make some difference.34 
The immigrants are not alone in viewing detention as a punishment. Although the 
criminalisation of illegal entry was removed from Maltese laws in 2002, it was clear to 
me that in spite of rhetoric and official documents stating otherwise, it was still the 
dominant mentality amongst policy makers.35 During my fieldwork, I once found 
myself in the midst of a group conversation with various Ministry (including other 
associated agencies) officials in a canteen. This came at a time when I had had a series 
of conversations with them about the administrative necessity of detention centres. 
Detention was always presented in businesslike and managerial terms - establishing 
identity, health checks, processing asylum claims – all for the good of Maltese society 
and immigrants themselves. The following conversation showed me that the processes 
entailed in the phenomenon of detention were not as apolitical as they appear on the 
surface. 
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Out of the blue, one of the guys asked: What was my ‘problem’ with detention? Heads 
turned to listen to my reply, making it clear that this was something that they had been 
discussing before, in relation to me. I decided to be tactical and avoid being 
controversial, without being dishonest since I suspected that they were less interested 
in my reply, but had something to tell me. So I made reference to an incident which 
involved violence against immigrants in the community and said that my concern lies 
with the effects that detention might have on immigrants’ integration and Maltese 
attitudes towards immigrants. They were quick to respond. The problem is that these 
people will find gullible souls (I am not sure if this was a direct reference to me) or 
vulnerable people like prostitutes and older unmarried women amongst the Maltese 
and start making their way ‘in’. They went on to explain to me that once the Maltese 
start ‘mixing’ with immigrants, that’s when the big problems will begin – detention 
ensures that this situation is kept under control. That is what we have to avoid at all 
costs. Detention is needed, because the immigrants need to know that ‘we mean 
business’. That law and order is valued in Malta and those who break the rules get 
punished.36 
This is a completely different version to what I had been given before. It strongly 
suggests that the practice of subjugation and humiliation is not unintentional but is the 
manifestation of evil and deeply entrenched beliefs. The root causes of the 
administrative mayhem and the irrational policies surrounding detention is a form of 
structural violence found in underlying social forces like racism and social inequality. 
The most serious is that of ‘humane inequality’, considering people as ‘less than 
human’ which manifests itself as a lack of respect for human dignity. In brief, looking at 
detention through the lens of human dignity shows us that basic irreducible standards 
have been surpassed. The lack of freedom and ‘appalling’ conditions reported by 
human rights organisations have made possible the creation of a space where 
dehumanising practices are commonplace and immigrants are reduced to mere 
existence, ‘less than human’. 
In further support of the notion that deep underlying social forces are manifest in 
detention practices is the shame of people working within the system when they 
realise that they have stopped resisting the system. Nurturing a perception that 
immigrants are really ‘less than human’ may be what allows the system to continue 
operating. But this same perception may be rather difficult to keep in place for those 
                                                          
36
 Field notes. 
151 
Chapter 4 
people, like NGO workers and some detention officers, who are in direct contact with 
the immigrants: 
You have all the ugliness of humankind that could possibly happen, is happening there. 
And somewhere along the line we came to accept it. I think it really hit me towards the 
end of last year, 2008, when I actually said to my staff, somewhere along the line we’ve 
stopped trying to fight this, we’ve accepted it.37 
This is the kind of situation that human rights set out to change and eradicate from 
society. A situation in which ‘the ugliness of humankind’ is present ought to be the 
kind of situation in which the human rights machinery sets to work! This is the proof 
that the position adopted by the Government must be flawed. 
Human dignity points to two major shortcomings which have lead to the human rights 
failure to protect irregular migrants in Malta. The first, the Government policy on 
detention does not place human dignity at the centre of its efforts. This is because the 
Government embraces a flawed understanding of human rights which is over-legalised 
and positivistic, and therefore fails to identify, let alone address its root causes. Human 
rights considerations ought to start from the situation on the ground – how are people 
being treated? What does this experience mean for them? Instead the Government 
has chosen the legalistic route which is essentially an impersonal choice and a top-
down approach both of which are not human rights based approaches. Reminiscent of 
the approach of Te Waters, it is an approach which not only lacks depth but in practice 
derails human rights from what it set out to achieve. It is understandable that the 
Government seeks to manage irregular migration in a way which fits with the national 
scenario. This should not, however, be done at the expense of the human rights of 
irregular migrants. In brief, the Government is right in its endeavours to seek long term 
solutions to irregular migration, but this should not mean that human rights can be 
foregone in detention. 
4.5 Towards a human rights culture 
My analysis strongly suggests that at the root of the human rights conundrum – which 
has restrained the potential of human rights to bring about positive change for 
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immigrants - are different understandings and paradigms of human rights. As seen in 
the first section, the role afforded to the concept of human dignity lends to the 
construction of different paradigms of human rights, which is subsequently seen in 
different practices. Human rights can only deliver respect for human dignity if the 
‘right’ paradigm of human rights is used. 
Human rights discourses that fail to retain human dignity at their core are intrinsically 
flawed. Detention in Malta is an example of an incongruous situation whereby human 
rights, conceived with the ‘inherent dignity’ of every human being, in practice are 
indirectly supporting a situation which has dehumanising effects. The production and 
reproduction of ‘human rights’ by the different discourses has fashioned the dominant 
interpretation put forward by the Government which establishes that no human rights 
are being violated even if the treatment of immigrants in detention is morally 
unacceptable. This is the result of deeply embedded social forces which the human 
rights movement has a mandate to change. Looking at detention through the concept 
of human dignity, gives us the boldness to denounce the practice as morally 
unacceptable, and to assert that any interpretation of human rights which supports it 
(or does not consider it a violation of human rights) is flawed. 
The phenomenon and practices of detention in Malta are morally unacceptable. In this 
case, the Government of Malta and the law courts need to reform their flawed 
understanding of human rights. The Government’s policies in this field should be 
person-centred and ensure that the treatment of immigrants does not fall below 
acceptable standards. It is within the framework that Malta cannot always offer 
opportunities and life choices for migrants, that the Government must sustain its 
efforts at building international solidarity and finding long term solutions. Locally, the 
first step towards achieving change in the treatment of irregular immigrants is a review 
of the whole system of detention. In parallel to this, immigrants should be empowered 
to speak out – in various ways, through legal channels, media and so on – and to be in 
a position to challenge their situation in an independent court, thus ensuring the 
implementation of the rule of law. 
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The Government would do well to heed the advice of human rights organisations 
which appear to uphold a much closer understanding of the proper paradigm of 
human rights. The recommendations put forward by human rights organisations are 
generally clear and succinct, and attempt to take into consideration local particularities 
in the interest of the host population. The implementation of recommendations by 
human rights organisation all depends on the political will of the Government. 
Detention needs to be kept to the barest minimum, since in practice it is difficult to 
envisage an institution which intrinsically deprives people of their liberty to be 
humane. In addition, as demonstrated in this Chapter, detention creates a space 
where there is a huge risk of manifestations as well as constructions of systemic or 
structural violence. 
The importance of human rights organisations – national human rights institutions, 
local and international non-governmental organisations, intergovernmental 
organisations and treaty-based monitoring bodies – cannot be highlighted enough. 
Overall, their approach theoretically shows effort at retaining human dignity at the 
core of their activity. Evidence of this is the general thrust of their recommendations 
which can be overall classified as concerned with protecting immigrants and 
empowering them. Of equal importance human rights organisations feed debates and 
discussions in the public sphere with informed material using a human rights 
approach. In addition, human rights organisations have played a crucial role in 
highlighting the plight of irregular immigrants. Without their contribution and the 
media interest they generated, one could cautiously conclude that the conditions of 
irregular immigrants in Malta would have been much worse. 
Human rights education is key to addressing the root causes of undignified treatment 
and in particular the perception of immigrants as ‘less than human’. Such human rights 
education in relation to migration needs to target different groups, starting from 
ministry officials, detention officers, professionals working in the field as well as 
Maltese society at large. The changes that human rights organisations propose are 
important but the social forces producing structural violence will still be there. One 
could have the most modern and up-to-date detention centres, but if immigrants are 
perceived as ‘less than human’, that will be reflected in everyday practices. As the 
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Eritrean immigrants mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, drove so powerfully 
home, the death of the ‘internal soul’, the desperation, the ‘horror’ of detention are 
not brought about by the overcrowding, the cold food, or the lack of access to lawyers, 
but by the fact that nobody seems to care. 
Finally the need for a human rights culture is paramount. It is only the popular 
internalisation of human rights principles which can bring about the necessary social 
change in which the current practice of detention would not be possible. The above 
recommendations would be a step towards this, although the nurturing of a human 
rights culture, as this study argues, requires action at other levels too. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The creation and maintenance of detention, as a direct action by the state, which is 
devoid of respect for human dignity is evidence of a flawed understanding of the 
modern human rights doctrine. These violations of human rights cut to the core of 
human rights by putting into question the very concept of human dignity which from 
the construction of the modern human rights movement has unquestionably been at 
the heart of human rights.  Using the concept of human dignity as a lens to critically 
assess a situation, helps to gets us back on track. It takes the analysis back on focus – 
to the person, the human being. Without such focus it is very easy to get lost in issues 
of fairness, legalities, and political interests. The real focus is the person and that is 
why I refer to the concept of human dignity as the ‘human’ in human rights. 
The lack of understanding of the role of human dignity and its role in grounding human 
rights philosophy, is possibly the biggest indication that human rights is on the wrong 
track, and that as Douzinas commented contemporary societies may be heading 
towards the ‘end of human rights’. On the same lines but with less pessimism, 
Habermas aptly likens the concept of human dignity to a seismograph.38 Just like a 
seismograph records tremors, and seismic waves, and acts as a warning to the coming 
of earthquakes, the concept of human dignity serves to warn us that laws, policies, 
actions are not prioritising and respecting human beings. The phenomenon of 
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detention in Malta is one such example which should be taken as a warning of a great 
malaise. It is allowed to happen because immigrants are perceived as ‘less than 
human’. 
The importance of the ‘ethnographically visible’ to understanding situations like the 
ones described here is made evident by this Chapter. The anthropologist Paul Farmer 
explains it thus: 
I will argue here that keeping the material in focus is one way to avoid undue 
romanticism in accomplishing this task. An honest account of who wins, who loses, and 
what weapons are used is an important safeguard against the romantic illusions of 
those who, like us, are usually shielded from the sharp edges of structural violence. I 
find it helpful to think of the ‘materiality of the social,’ a term that underlines my 
conviction that social life in general and structural violence in particular will not be 
understood without a deeply materialist approach to whatever surfaces in the 
participant-observer’s field of vision—the ethnographically visible.39 
Without registering the ‘ethnographically visible’, the ‘horrors of detention’, it would 
have been impossible to progress in this debate since human rights reports and the 
Government’s arguments were proposing two different truths, informed by two 
different human rights paradigms. 
This is why international human rights organisations have been right in focusing on the 
detention policy and the conditions within detention. It shows that their priorities are 
right. Detention is indicative of a grave problem with regards to human rights, and a 
major obstacle to the fostering of a human rights culture. Clearly, the removal of the 
detention policy, which is indeed a pressing issue, would be a huge step ahead but 
would not solve the problem of ill-treatment of irregular immigrants. Various other 
problems which could not be developed in this Chapter will be developed and 
discussed in the subsequent chapters. Dehumanising centres like migrant detention 
centres serve as a barrier to human rights culture. This is because they become 
generators of dehumanising practices. This should be as much a concern of the 
international community, as of the society of the host country. 
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Chapter 5: ‘Human rights for the Maltese first’: Why a 
cosmopolitan orientation is needed 
5.1 Introduction  
In its simplest form, cosmopolitanism is best captured by Diogenes the Cynic’s self-
identification in classical Greek times as a ‘citizen of the world’. From this reactionary 
stance to the dominant political culture of the time in which a man identified himself 
first and foremost as a citizen of a polis or city, cosmopolitanism has come a long way. 
An increasingly popular school of thought now understands the cosmopolitan agenda 
to be not anti-partial but intrinsically accommodating of partialities like different 
identities and nationalities. Despite the development of myriad conceptual forms of 
cosmopolitanism, it remains grounded in the notion of one global moral community. It 
is precisely the lack of this notion that has been identified as posing problems for the 
internalisation of human rights in Malta. As the following typical comment by an NGO 
worker illustrates: 
The idea that Somali, Maltese and Greeks are part of the same community is very 
remote...this is very closed-minded.1 
Echoing a common contemporary conceptualisation, the philosopher Kwame Appiah 
describes cosmopolitanism as providing the framework that builds on the powerful ties 
that connect people across religions, cultures and nations. Cosmopolitanism challenges 
particular understandings of the world that construct barriers between people. Appiah 
says that there are two intertwining strands in the notion of cosmopolitanism: 
One is the idea that we have obligations to others, obligations that stretch beyond 
those to whom we are related by the ties of kith and kind, or even the more formal ties 
of a shared citizenship. The other is that we take seriously the value not just of human 
life but of particular human lives, which means taking an interest in the practices and 
beliefs that lend them significance.2 
The importance of cosmopolitanism, and therefore the adoption of a cosmopolitan 
approach, for human rights has not been the focus of much academic discussion. This 
                                                          
1
 F, Personal Interview - NGO worker, 15 December 2008. 
2
 Kwame A. Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, Allen Lane, London, 2006, p. xv. 
157 
Chapter 5 
might stem from the fact that ‘cosmopolitanism’ is never directly mentioned in human 
rights law, though it could also partly be due to the fact that the academic interest in 
cosmopolitanism, by and large, was only re-ignited in the late 1990s. Interestingly, a 
search for the understanding of cosmopolitanism within the human rights framework 
yields as much about cosmopolitanism as about nationalism. Human rights are best 
seen, in Nash’s words, as ‘intermestic’: 
The cultural politics  in which human rights activists are engaged to realised human 
rights in practice from within states is ‘cosmopolitanism-from-below...using intermestic 
human rights in the national context, they aim to persuade state officials of the 
government and judiciary, but also, through the mediated public, the ordinary people, 
the votes and taxpayers in whose name state officials act, to think and act as global 
citizens with rights and responsibilities towards individual human beings regardless of 
nationality.3 
A complex picture emerges out of Maltese society’s cultural history of 
cosmopolitanism, one which is intimately related to ideas of nation, state-building as 
well as incoming and outgoing migration and contact with foreigners. On the one 
hand, since the time of the Order of St John, there has been constant and significant 
contact with foreigners. The Maltese historian Carmel Cassar describes Malta during 
the period of the Order as a ‘cosmopolitan hub’ due to the continuous presence of 
large numbers of foreigners with whom the Maltese engaged regularly. This was also a 
time when the Maltese elite enjoyed increased political autonomy. On the other hand, 
it would seem that during colonial times, Malta lost that ‘cosmopolitan edge’ due to 
the subservient role that was imposed on the Maltese by the colonisers. In addition, 
the island’s function as a fortress for the British Empire meant that for security reasons 
Maltese autonomy, of the empowering kind that was enjoyed under the Knights, had 
to be limited. Maltese people’s contact with foreigners was still retained, however, as 
imperial migratory flows were very much a reality, but to a lesser extent and different 
in nature. However the cosmopolitan idea of being part of a larger, global whole 
appears to have been slowly eroded. 
Malta emerged from the British colonial experience insecure, insular and inward-
looking. The responsibilities that came with sovereignty needed a fair degree of 
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allegiance, loyalty and patriotism which were not self-evident at the time of Malta’s 
independence. Little did it seem to matter that after centuries of occupation, the 
Maltese could finally put their ‘national’ interest first, in the absence of a clear 
‘national’ identity. The creation of a nation takes time, with some scholars like 
sociologist Godfrey Baldacchino, only identifying signs of a nascent nationalism in 
Malta in this last decade. Moreover, sporadic attempts at nation-building after 
independence have selectively ignored the contribution of foreigners to the formation 
of the Maltese state and society. The imaginary detachment from ‘others’, fuelled by 
insularity, led to the creation of a selective and exclusive nationalism which in turn led 
to a selective and exclusive understanding of moral obligations towards ‘others’. 
This cultural history sheds light on the adoption and contemporary use of human rights 
in Malta. The clearest example is the widespread use of the maxim ‘Human rights for 
the Maltese first’, one of the most commonly used sayings that came up during my 
fieldwork. Many referred to it as a ‘proverb’ and although I have not found any 
evidence of its use in the past, it is considered and treated as such – a traditional piece 
of wisdom. The resonance it carries is significant because it exposes the dominant 
cultural political outlook which shows a lack of accommodation of cosmopolitan norms 
by national culture. It shows the dominant and ethnocentric understanding of human 
rights. This is an inherent contradiction since it incorrectly implies that human rights 
can be prioritised according to a person’s nationality, ignoring the universalistic and 
non-discriminatory foundations of human rights. The fact that the contradiction goes 
largely unnoticed and to make matters worse is used by people intent on showing 
their ‘support’ for what they understand as human rights, exposes a misconception of 
human rights. 
This Chapter will explore cosmopolitanism by discussing three aspects identified as 
important to understand the kind of cosmopolitanism needed for human rights: the 
definition of a partial cosmopolitanism, the coexistence of cosmopolitanism with 
nationalism, and the Kantian right to hospitality. Using these insights, the next section 
will shed light on some reasons why the Maltese passively negate their moral 
obligations towards irregular immigrants. This will be done by looking at three 
elements: first the cultural exposition that the Maltese have had to foreigners in the 
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past;4 second, the separate processes of nation-building and statehood both of which 
were thrust onto the Maltese with independence without having yet reached a point 
of convergence, which suddenly found a vent with irregular migration in the 2000s; 
and third, the relationship with the EU, which one might have been led to believe 
would present greater opportunities for an appreciation and adoption of cosmopolitan 
norms, while it has had the opposite effect. The final section will propose generic 
action that needs to be undertaken by the global community, the Government and 
non-governmental organisations to steer Maltese society towards the cosmopolitan 
approach necessary for a human rights culture. 
5.2 Cosmopolitanism underpins human rights 
There is not one single definition of cosmopolitanism. In its most minimal form 
however, cosmopolitanism is a political orientation built on the conception that all 
human beings are members of one global community, an ‘imaginary’ community that 
should be nurtured. By questioning assumptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, cosmopolitans are 
able to transcend differences and to morally include the ‘Other’.5 In practice, a 
cosmopolitan view requires primarily, a belief in universal values, that one's moral 
obligations are directed to all human beings, and that political arrangements should 
faithfully reflect this universal moral obligation. 
The construction of an imaginary community – comprised of even people in 
geographically distant countries who do not know each other but share moral 
connections - might sound unrealistic but is not an exercise exclusive to 
cosmopolitanism. The world’s religions, various interest groups and nation-states 
operate in the same way. The idea of an ‘imaginary community’ was specifically coined 
by the anthropologist Benedict Anderson to describe a nation through which ‘in the 
minds of each [member] lives the image of their communion’.6 The nation is described 
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by Andersen as ‘...an imagined political community, imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign’.7 
A cosmopolitan community is a different kind of community to a national community 
not least because of its sheer magnitude, as well as its inclusionary qualities. However 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism are primarily distinguished by the various forms of 
delimitation, borders and boundaries which are an intrinsic part of the make-up of 
nations, together with the powerful concept of sovereignty. It is along this nexus that 
tensions arise and the continual renegotiation of the two political orientations needs 
to take place. 
The cosmopolitan vision which underlies human rights has three characteristics which 
will be discussed in this Chapter. The first is the presentation of cosmopolitanism and 
its co-existence with other ‘partialities’. The second is the partiality of nationalism and 
the conflicting moral obligations it could present from a human rights point of view. 
The third is the Kantian right to hospitality essential for the cosmopolitan architecture 
of the global order.  
5.2.1 Human rights ‘partial cosmopolitan’ philosophy 
The cosmopolitan orientation of human rights arises out of their anthropocentric focus 
and humanistic approach which is the foundation of the moral global community. The 
understanding of cosmopolitanism within human rights goes beyond a global or 
political order. It specifically alludes to a political culture built on what Douzinas has 
persuasively argued derives out of a ‘cosmopolitan ontology’: 
Each cosmos is a point of ekstasis, of opening up and moving away, of being outside 
ourselves in our exposure to and sharing with others, immortals in our mortality, 
symbolically finite but imaginatively infinite; existence, our only essence. The other as a 
singular, unique finite being puts me in touch with infinite otherness. In this ontology, 
community is not the common belonging of communitarianism, a common essence 
given by history, tradition, the spirit of the nation. Cosmos is being together with one 
another, ourselves as others, being selves through otherness.8 
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Before addressing partialities, nation-states and inter-state relations, cosmopolitanism 
must be seen as grounding human rights in such an existential humanist philosophy. 
Cosmopolitanism, therefore, is just as much about the relationship and recognition of 
the ‘Other’ as it is about ‘Ourself’. Cosmopolitanism is about nurturing an attitude or a 
disposition. The migrationists Steven Vertovec and Robert Cohen describe the 
cosmopolitan as a person: 
...who develops ‘habits of mind and life’ through which he or she can end up anywhere 
in the world and be ‘in the same relation of familiarity and strangeness’ to the local 
culture, and by the same token ‘feel partially adjusted everywhere’. Such an outlook or 
disposition is largely acquired through experience, especially travel. It entails not only 
respect and enjoyment of cultural difference, but also a concomitant sense of 
‘globality’ or global belonging that can be integrated into everyday life practices.9 
Notwithstanding this, as pointed out before, Diogenes’ reply might have been 
motivated less by the ‘cosmos’ and was more a reaction against the particularity, or 
rather the partiality expected towards one’s city-state.10 In contrast to this anti-partial 
understanding of cosmopolitanism, Appiah recalls his father’s understanding of 
layered cosmopolitanism. His father ‘never saw a conflict between local partialities and 
a universal morality – being part of the place you were and a part of the broader 
human community’.11 
A cosmopolitan’s scope of tolerance of others must be wide and broad, and not 
limited.12 Anti-partial cosmopolitans, Appiah warns, risk becoming exclusive and 
radical by failing to view partiality as an anthropological reality. To address this, Appiah 
proposes what he calls a ‘partial cosmopolitanism’: 
And the one thought that cosmopolitans share is that no local loyalty can ever justify 
forgetting that each human being has responsibilities to every other. Fortunately, we 
need take sides neither with the nationalist who abandons all foreigners nor with the 
hard-core cosmopolitan who regards her friends and fellow citizens with icy 
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impartiality. The position worth defending might be called (in both senses) a partial 
cosmopolitanism.13 
Although a rigid essentialist definition of cosmopolitanism which at its most radical 
disregards partialities, is unfeasible and unrealistic, a nuanced definition of 
cosmopolitanism informed by praxis which includes partialities, is preferable in 
modern societies. It is this nuanced perspective of cosmopolitanism that the UDHR 
puts forward by juxtaposing the idea of a global community built on ‘sameness’ with a 
respect for ‘differences’ – religious, cultural, nationality, and so on. The ‘sameness’ and 
‘difference’ shows an anthropological sensitivity to human beings and human 
behaviour. The human rights movement promotes universal standards but not 
sameness, making a cosmopolitan orientation necessary in dealings with other people. 
The political theorist Andrew Dobson, by using the example of the parable of ‘The 
Good Samaritan’ who assists a stranger with whom he had no connection, argues that 
cosmopolitanism requires empathy or some form of association which creates enough 
of a sense of obligation for people to act upon.14 Similarly, Appiah says 
cosmopolitanism involves the capacity to identify with others in different groups, 
cultures or nations, and a ‘narrative imagination’ that helps to understand and 
empathise with others. Appiah explains it as such: 
Cosmopolitanism shouldn’t be seen as some exalted attainment: it begins with the 
simple idea that in the human community as in national communities, we need to 
develop habits of coexistence: conversation in its older meaning, of living together, 
association.15 
On the same lines, Nussbaum argues that cosmopolitanism can also lead to greater 
reflexive self-understanding which is needed in the contemporary world in which the 
co-existence of diverse cultures is increasingly a reality.16 Human rights philosophy 
could be seen as one requiring a partial cosmopolitanism, which accepts differences by 
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renegotiating boundaries and encompassing a sensitivity to the principle that common 
aims are differently realised in different circumstances.17  
5.2.2 Renegotiating partial cosmopolitanism and nationalism 
Cosmopolitanism requires a sense of moral obligations towards ‘Others’ which 
includes citizens of other countries and people of different cultures. By encompassing 
all human beings, it opens avenues for obligations which could compete with those 
traditionally expected by the nation-state. Partial cosmopolitanism, by being open to 
renegotiation, should be open to this. In this way nationalism can be a constitutive 
part of cosmopolitanism and best seen as part of the logical continuum that links the 
person with the global community. However, nationalism’s association with the 
powerful notion of sovereign states also presents unique challenges to partial 
cosmopolitanism. In addition, nationalism in the form of the nation-state, unlike 
religious groups or interest groups, is a protagonist in international society.  
Although the contemporary dominant view of nationalism would not concur, 
nationalism has at times been invoked as an essential component of cosmopolitanism. 
One of the foremost champions of this view is the 19th century Italian nationalist 
Giuseppe Mazzini who believed that national sentiment was essential to leverage 
universal sentiment towards a just world. His argument is based on the assumption 
that the bonds that can be produced by a global community are weaker than those 
produced by a national community. They should, however, be enough to create a 
sense of obligation and respect for the humanity of the other. The scholars Stefano 
Recchia and Nadia Urbinati show that Mazzini’s nationalist thought was intrinsically 
cosmopolitan.18 Indeed in this political vision nations not only had to grant civil and 
political rights to all its citizens but education had to consist of a combined ethos of 
republican duties and international brotherhood.19 For Mazzini a nation could 
accomplish its own mission only if its actions were in line with the universal ‘law of 
                                                          
17
 Idem. 
18
 Stefano Recchia & Nadia Urbinati, ‘Introduction’ in A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings on 
Democracy, Nation Building and International Relations, eds. G. Mazzini, S. Ricchia, N. Urbinati, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2009, p. 13. 
19
 Idem. 
164 
Chapter 5 
Humanity’. This, Recchia and Urbinati point out, make his nationalist political vision 
very similar to Kant’s cosmopolitan one20: 
...for Mazzini, any legitimate patriotic pursuit always needs to be limited by reference 
to a universal maxim that bears some striking resemblance to Kant’s categorical 
imperative: ‘Always ask yourselves...: If what I am now doing were done by all men, 
would it be beneficial or harmful to Humanity? And if your conscience tells you it would 
be harmful, desist from acting; desist even though it might seem that an immediate 
advantage to your country...would be the result.’21 
Therefore just as people negotiate various loyalties and identities simultaneously in 
everyday life, they should also be able to uphold and accommodate partial, national 
and cosmopolitan identities. The problem arises when any of these identities come 
into conflict with one another. The solution can either be a denunciation of one of the 
identities, or a renegotiation of one of the identities. In a similar way, cosmopolitanism 
and nationalism could either annihilate the other or accommodate each other through 
a process of renegotiation of their boundaries and definitions. 
This challenge comes, not so much in the promotion of partial nationalistic moral 
obligations, but in those conflict areas between cosmopolitan and national obligations 
in which renegotiation is not considered. This can be seen when nationalism is 
constructed, in a radical way as selective and exclusive. I am not referring to 
‘nationalism’ in the literal sense of the word, as a partiality towards one’s ethnic group, 
nor am I referring to the role and function of the state to administer the territorially-
defined community and manage international relations. The latter is necessary for a 
cosmopolitanism which accommodates human rights, as will be seen in the next 
section. What I am referring to as a challenge for cosmopolitanism and potentially 
problematic is the ideology of ‘nationalism’ as the combination of the forces of the 
‘ethnos’ and the ‘demos’ in nation-states. 
One can argue, at this stage, that the same potentially conflicting processes are 
present in any other imagined group with the potential to mobilise. Any partial, 
delimited group can potentially furnish opportunities for conflicting obligations. There 
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is however a fundamental difference between religious groups, cultural groups, 
interest groups and nations: this is the bond between nationalism and ‘states’.  
Nationalism, since the American and French Revolutions has played an intrinsic role in 
the creation of the notion of the nation-state and the development of modern states. 
Benhabib demonstrates that sovereign states wield considerable power in the 
construction of the global order. Sovereign states, she asserts, ‘often nurture and 
guide the very transformations which curtail or limit their powers’.22 Indeed, the 
human rights system is an example of this: it is created and enacted by states primarily 
to protect people from states, it curtails states’ own powers but entrusts the same 
states with the implementation of human rights. Human rights are part of a global 
order which bestows a unique and powerful role to the nation-state. Therefore, 
accepting partiality to the nation-state could possibly constitute far greater conflicts of 
interest than any other particular group due to its ubiquitous power. 
Nationalism can easily be instrumentalised by states which are typically preoccupied 
with demarcating borders, boundaries, insiders and outsiders. Exclusive nationalism is 
therefore inward-looking and essentialist. The political scientist Anthony Marx 
discusses the dangers of exclusive nationalism: 
...nationalism has been constructed exclusively, not according to fixed categories but 
instead demarcated by emergent states seeking to manage diversity by manipulating 
and reinforcing difference.23 
What is clear is that the process of (re)negotiation happening between 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism is a tension best seen as continually in flux. It would 
be wrong to assume that exclusive and harmful nationalism is passé. Indeed, Michael 
Billing has persuasively argued that nationalism, even when invisible, retains a latent 
presence because it is part of the motor of state formation. He calls this ‘banal 
nationalism’ which is the investment into retaining visible symbols of latent 
nationalism which can at the call of a group/s suddenly become meaningful enough to 
mobilise. 
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Modern nation-states, as Benhabib observes, are constructed on the social solidarity of 
an ethnos, which is a ‘community bound together by the power of shared fate, 
memories, solidarity and belonging’.24 Renegotiating the boundaries between the 
demos and the ethnos is the first step towards reconstituting the nation in 
universalistic terms.25 The scholar of constitutional law Robert Post comments: 
The ethnos endows the legal construction of the state with intangible unity of 
nationhood. In contrast to the a demos, which possesses boundaries that can be 
stipulated and manipulated by positive law, an ethnos ‘does not permit free entry and 
exit’. For this reason, Benhabib regards the national solidarity of the ethnos as 
essentially contradicting the universalist ethical principles to which she is otherwise 
committed.26 
The incongruity between universalist principles and nationalist ones, as illustrated by 
Benhabib above, are what the partial cosmopolitanism that imbues human rights seeks 
to address. This ‘new form of cosmopolitanism’, which he claims has been gaining 
popularity since the second half of the 1990s, the historian David Hollinger describes 
as such: 
The new cosmopolitanism begins by trying to keep in single focus at all times both a 
universalist insight that a nationalist tend to deny, and a nationalist insight that 
universalists tend to deny. The universalist insight, which drives Nussbaum and her 
non-modified comrades, is that even the least blood-intensive and least chauvinistic of 
national solidarities threaten to inhibit any transnational project strong enough to 
serve the interests of a wider human population. The nationalist insight, which 
communitarians grasp better than some liberals do, is that the primal need for 
belonging is poorly satisfied by solidarities large enough to act effectively on challenges 
that are global in scope. This is the contradiction – the contradiction between the 
needs of the ethnos and the needs of the species – that the new cosmopolitanism 
faces, rather than ignores.27 
The relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism is conditioned by the 
overwhelming power of state sovereignty, which is a commanding player in the 
international community as well as the human rights system. The form of 
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cosmopolitanism promoted by human rights presents cosmopolitanism as an end of 
the continuum between the person and the global community. It is on this continuum 
that nationalism should be located. This lesson is driven home by the Mazzinian 
argument that a national community can involve a sentiment or affective relationships 
which are generally more difficult to achieve in a cosmopolitan community. The bonds 
formed in a cosmopolitan community, albeit weaker than in a national one, ought to 
be sufficient to help create a sense of dignity. Forms of nationalism which are selective 
or exclusive do not, however, fit in this paradigm, and moreover hinder the adoption 
of cosmopolitan norms like human rights. 
5.2.3 The Kantian cosmopolitan right to hospitality 
Apart from being an existential, cultural or political ideology cosmopolitanism is also 
an ordering principle of global society, of which human rights is an intrinsic part. 
Indeed it is Kant’s vision of federal cosmopolitanism which above all informs the 
creation of the modern human rights vision. As Robert Fine has pointed out, Kant 
‘recognised that no sooner were the rights of man articulated than they entered into 
conflict with the national organisation of political communities that underwrote their 
existence.’ This is what led Kant to seek a concrete realisation of the universality of the 
rights of man, and what motivated the transition to the modern human rights 
movement.  
Kant’s cosmopolitan vision of a world order was one organised into a voluntary 
federation of ‘bounded communities’, or states, with porous borders regulated by the 
cosmopolitan right to hospitality. In Perpetual Peace Kant argues that true and world-
wide peace can be constructed when the following three conditions are met. The first 
entails that states are organized internally according to republican principles. The 
second condition is that states are organized externally in a voluntary association for 
the sake of keeping peace. And the third condition is ‘the right to hospitality’, that is, 
that the state not only respects the human rights of its citizens but also of foreigners.28 
The following is a detailed description of the right to hospitality by Kant: 
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This right to hospitality, however – that is to say, the privilege of strangers arriving on 
foreign soil – does not amount to more than what is implied in a permission to make an 
attempt at intercourse with the original inhabitants. In this way far distant territories 
may enter into peaceful relations with one another. These relations may at last come 
under the public control of law, and thus the human race may be brought nearer the 
realization of a cosmopolitan constitution... We are speaking here, as in previous 
articles, not of philanthropy, but of right; and in this sphere hospitality signifies the 
claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be treated by its owner without 
hostility. The latter may send him away again if this can be done without causing his 
death; but, so long as he conducts himself peaceably, he must not be treated as an 
enemy. It is not a right to be treated as a guest to which the stranger can lay claim – a 
special friendly compact on his behalf would be required to make him for a given time 
an actual inmate – but he has a right of visitation. This right to present themselves to 
society belongs to all mankind in virtue of our common right of possession of the 
surface of the earth on which, as it is a globe, cannot be infinitely scattered, and must 
in the end reconcile ourselves to existence side by side: at the same time, originally no 
individual had more right than another to live in any one particular spot.29 
In brief therefore, the ‘right to hospitality’ includes the following four characteristics 
which guide the obligations that states have towards aliens on their territory: a) it is 
limited to friendly intentions as this will result in peoples engaging with each other; b) 
it is not a charitable enterprise, since it is based on the premise that the ownership of 
‘territory’ by a state is false, the earth belongs to all; c) strangers should not be treated 
with hostility; and d) strangers have the right to visitation but further agreements 
would need to be made for the right to settle. 
The right to hospitality, albeit limited, is critical to Kantian cosmopolitanism because it 
is the systemic vent that regulates the porosity of the borders necessary for a 
cosmopolitan order. The right to hospitality in addition guides discussions on 
immigration and on what reciprocal moral obligations people have towards each 
other. What role do foreigners or ‘aliens’ occupy within a democratic nation-state? 
What claims could they make within the Kantian cosmopolitan framework? As 
Benhabib has pointed out, it is not clear what degree of obligations towards ‘aliens’ 
Kant would have supported. The principle of the right to hospitality is however critical 
for discussions on the rights of immigrants, as Nussbaum points out: 
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...protections for the rights of immigrants are necessary. Patriotism always risks veering 
into xenophobia, and xenophobia often takes new immigrant groups as its targets. In 
addition to protections for minorities who already enjoy citizens’ rights, a purified 
patriotism needs to be advanced in conjunction with firm protections for the rights of 
legal immigrants who are not (or not yet) citizens, and decent arrangements for illegal 
immigrants.30 
The right to hospitality regulates solidarity with strangers. Using the same 
cosmopolitan logic however, such solidarity is extended also beyond the territorially 
bound state. Kantians like Benhabib are reluctant to extend their discussion beyond 
the state, but cosmopolitanism’s existential thrust indisputably nurtures the notion of 
solidarity. Within this framework states have certain obligations towards ‘alien others’ 
on their territory, and other obligations, of a different nature but still necessary, to 
‘others’ outside their territory. 
In the next section, using the above discussions as guidance, Maltese cultural history 
and cosmopolitan approach will be analysed to shed light on the contemporary 
reception of irregular immigrants in Malta. 
5.3 ‘Human rights for the Maltese first’: An account of cosmopolitanism in 
Malta 
Taking my cue from the customary phrase ‘Human rights for the Maltese first’, 
repeated in a quasi-proverbial way in discussions about both legal and illegal 
immigration, this section explores cosmopolitanism in Malta.31 This popular maxim 
refers to the common perception held by the Maltese that there is a moral superiority 
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of duties to compatriots over and above duties owed to non-nationals. ‘Human rights 
for the Maltese first’ or ‘Human rights għall-Maltin l-ewwel’ is a strong leitmotif whose 
recurrence was not limited to one group of people. As an expression, it would typically 
come out as a retort to my introduction of the term ‘human rights’ to a conversation 
on some aspect of irregular migration. It was generally presented in a semi-righteous 
tone in order to convey the message: ‘you ought to know where your primary 
obligation lies’. Its wide acceptance and acclaim during my fieldwork indicated that this 
rationale could underlie political and public consciousness in Malta. Whilst this is in 
part understandable: migrants as foreigners, unlike the Maltese, are not members of 
the polity and therefore might be subject to differentiated treatment. This rationale 
becomes harmful when the differentiated treatment attacks basic tenets of human 
dignity, that is, human rights. It points to a lack of a cosmopolitan approach and 
becomes a significant barrier deterring the respect of human rights of ‘foreigners’ in 
Malta. Indeed my own fieldwork and interviews have yielded a similar concern with 
the lack of a cosmopolitan approach. A government agency employee reiterates this, 
and to explain, focuses on the exclusively and selectively ethnocentric, and that is, 
fundamentally misconceived, view of human rights: 
It’s as though the absorption of the discourse of human rights has been selectively 
digested. Human rights exist – but for the Maltese and for those who are like the 
Maltese.32 
This comment does not only demonstrate a lack of internalisation and appreciation of 
human rights, but also a mistaken conception that human rights can be, and are, 
selective and exclusive. What appears to be missing is a cosmopolitan political culture, 
which at its core has the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political 
affiliation, nationality, legal status and so on, belong (or at least can belong) to a single 
community, and that this community should be cultivated.  
This section will show how the Maltese people have come to the understanding that 
‘Human rights [are] for the Maltese first’ by looking at the social and cultural history of 
the Maltese. Questions that will be asked will reflect the three categories that are 
constitutive of the understanding of cosmopolitanism which underpins human rights: 
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a) how has Maltese society’s relationship with foreigners over the years impacted on 
cosmopolitanism in Malta?; b) what does the dominant form of nationalism adopted 
by the Maltese say about cosmopolitan orientations?; c) how has EU membership 
influenced cosmopolitanism in Malta? 
5.3.1 Maltese society’s relationship with foreigners 
The 259 years (1530 – 1799) under the Order of the Knights of St John and the 162 
(1802-1964) years under British colonial rule were very different periods in Maltese 
history. These left a huge impact on the formation of the Maltese state and society, 
not least from a cosmopolitan point of view, because they influenced the political 
culture and conditioned emigration and immigration. 
Of great significance is that the first mention of cosmopolitanism in Malta is during the 
time of the Knights between 1530 and 1799. One of the most powerful political 
organizations in the late Middle Ages was the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, the 
Knights Hospitallers, whose ranks were filled by scions of the richest aristocratic 
families of Europe.33 Cassar demonstrates that the Knights made Malta a high profile 
cosmopolitan hub.34 This was consolidated with the building of the capital city Valletta 
which attracted foreigners and Maltese but was mainly brought about by the nature of 
the Order of St. John which in itself had, uniquely for its time, a cosmopolitan make-
up. The religious and military Order with a mandate which was supranational or ethnic, 
since they were charged with the protection of the Holy Land and provided care for 
poor, sick or injured pilgrims. It was internally organised on the basis of nationality, 
with the Knights being placed under one of the following eight Langues (Tongues): 
Aragon, Auverne, Castile, England (with Scotland and Ireland), France, Germany, Italy 
and Provence35 In addition, the Order’s cultural and economic presence attracted 
peoples (not only European), providing greater scope for the Maltese to interact with 
foreigners. 
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Cassar also relates how Malta benefited from a continual in-flow of people, particularly 
after the 1565 Great Siege. Migration in early modern times became a staple feature of 
life in the Mediterranean, facilitated and supported by the increased urbanisation and 
mix of ethnic groups in cities.  The demographic trends of sixteenth century Malta 
between 1524 and 1590 show an approximate net population increase of about 50 per 
cent, from 20,000 to 30,000. This was brought about by the presence of the Knights 
and their dependents, and a steady in-flow of immigrants attracted by rapid 
urbanisation. This happened in spite of a rapid demographic decrease with the arrival 
of the Order which lead to many Maltese losses in various battles like the Djerba 
debacle of 1560, the tragedy of de Saint Clemens in 1570 and the 1565 Great Siege. In 
addition, fear of a return of a larger Ottoman Armada lead to an exodus of Maltese 
people from the island usually to neighbouring Sicily. According to Antonio Bosio, the 
Order’s historian who wrote Dell’istoria della sacra religione, these emigrants were 
from Maltese leading families, including the noblest and the wealthiest.36 This outward 
trend continued into the 17th century spurred particularly by the 1592-1593 plague 
and food shortages. Grand Master Garzes in 1600 recorded that in the previous four 
years, 2,000 Maltese had left the island due to food shortages. This was 1/5th of the 
Maltese population, which Cassar comments was a situation which the Government 
could ill-afford. Efforts to sustain immigration at this stage were therefore crucial to 
maintain manpower. All this would suggest that the social impact must have been 
considerable. Cassar points out the important function of immigration for the Order: 
Immigrants were, above all, a source of supply to meet the Harbour’s labour demands. 
This mechanism enabled the Order to maintain its vast construction programmes, and 
to man and fit its fleet.37 
Cassar also narrates how large-scale immigration was a necessity due to the 
demographic make-up of the island: 
...a large island community, with a high infant mortality rate, could only be sustained by 
large scale migration, thanks to the ever-expanding trade and business activities 
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brought about as a by-product of the cosmopolitan environment created by the Knights 
Hospitallers.38 
The huge activity in the Harbour area left its impact on the rural areas of Malta since 
people, as well as goods, travelled between villages and towns. Villagers returning 
back from towns took with them some influences, habits and tastes and Cassar notes 
that a demonstration of this is the new style of village churches that emerged in the 
early seventeenth century.39 Official urban attitudes to immigration were ambivalent 
and although it was understood that without the flow of new blood the towns would 
have declined, a number of restrictions kept control on the inflow of new settlers to 
the Harbour towns while continuing to entice peasants from the surrounding 
countryside. Many immigrants came to the island as slaves captured during raids in 
North Africa. However, Cassar notes that slaves were relatively free to mix with all 
strata of Maltese and resident society and were even allowed to take part time jobs to 
earn money for their redemption. Interestingly, some of these slaves got integrated 
into Maltese society through conversion to Christianity and local marriages. 
This era, under the rule of the Order of St John, also coincides with the first roots, or 
construction, of a Maltese political identity.40 The Professor of Law and President 
Emeritus of Malta, Guido De Marco sums up the predominant and over-zealous 
nationalistic narrative in Malta: 
...existing since when we were a Roman municipium, realising itself in the uprising 
against Monroy under Spanish domination, asserting itself as a sovereign entity with 
the Order of St. John, realising itself in revolt and victory over the French occupation 
between 1798 and 1800; the Maltese then aimed at national independence under the 
protection of Great Britain, only to be dispossessed by the imposition of colonial rule by 
the ‘protecting power’ putting an end of ‘Melitensium amor’ and substituting thereto 
military occupation by cession.41 
Overall, this turn of events found fertile ground among the Maltese elite who, even 
prior to the Order’s arrival, had already been exposed through residence and studies 
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to European ‘high culture’. By 1799, when the Order was forced out of the Islands, 
Maltese society had undergone a massive social, political and economic upheaval. The 
deliberate role of the Maltese in contriving with the French to overthrow the Order 
demonstrates that the Maltese did not succumb peacefully to a secondary political 
role, but that they took a lot from their interaction with the Order and ultimately used 
it in their own interest. 
The Dichiarazione dei Diritti degli Abitanti di Malta e Gozo (Declaration of Rights of the 
Inhabitants of Malta and Gozo) of 1802, drafted for the British colonisers is another 
example of the political and educated characteristics of the Maltese elite. Chief Justice 
Emeritus Joseph Said Pullicino, in a paper outlining the history of human rights in 
Malta, marks the Dichiarazione as a demonstration of the Maltese commitment to the 
Constitution as an inviolable charter.42 The Maltese, he states in a triumphant tone, 
just out of a short but tyrannical French rule, had embraced the philosophy of rights. 
Said Pullicino however holds an over-legalistic understanding of ‘rights’, and in 
contrast I would argue that the Dichiarazione says more about the way power relations 
were perceived and constructed by the Maltese than about the development of a legal 
culture based on ‘human rights’. This notwithstanding however, the Dichiarazione 
signalled a watershed between the enjoyment of relative self-autonomy of the 
Maltese under the Order to oppression under the British which gradually lead to a 
militant stance borne out of a lack of engagement and respect. 
The relationship of the Maltese with the British started on shaky premises and empty 
promises. It was only in the 20th century when the sensitive global political situation 
and the need for loyalty to the Empire was crucial, that the British considered giving 
the Maltese some autonomy. The British, like the French, had entered Malta ‘as 
friends, to establish themselves as masters’.43 The Maltese delegation which had 
sought the help of the British to overthrow the French, was under the impression that 
Malta would be assigned the special status of a protectorate and therefore that the 
Maltese would be virtually autonomous. The Maltese thus sought to differentiate 
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themselves from the other colonies from the start. However, one of the first things the 
British did, when they took over the islands, was dissolve the Maltese Congress. This 
action carried significant political and economic repercussions for the Maltese. It was a 
powerfully symbolic way of asserting dominance by putting the Maltese elite down. 
This quick unfolding of events illustrates both the Maltese high perception of 
themselves in sharp contrast  to the insignificant value they seemed to have to the 
British Empire.44 
Colonialism undid quite a lot of what had been achieved in terms of political 
emancipation. With the focus on the faltering political relations with the British, the 
Maltese resorted to constructing a national narrative borne out of suppression. This 
inward-looking stance worked against any cosmopolitan approach that had been 
adopted before. Two significant changes served to enhance this process of de-
cosmopolitanisation and the concurrent rise of nationalist ideas: a) socio-economic 
changes and geopolitical influences; and b) the relationship with the colonisers and the 
construction of a colonial identity. 
By the turn of the 20th century Malta’s economy had already started taking the form of 
a fortress economy. Mallia-Milanes asserts that changes to the economic and social 
structures of Malta, following the revolution of 1798, were slow and protracted. This 
happened:  
...because the British had not come to Malta, as they had done in India, in search of 
markets, but to gain a strategic and military advantage over their rivals.45  
Malta had by then become a hub for business related to the Empire. The dockyards in 
particular were very well known. Notwithstanding the amount of wealth this was 
probably generating, the relationship with the colonisers remained essentially a 
conflictual one. Frendo’s analysis of the refusal to delegate power to the Maltese, an 
issue which would have long-term implications in the nationalist movement, was 
intrinsically tied to Britain’s view of Malta as a fortress and not as an ordinary colony: 
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The conflict between civil rights and military needs was at the heart of Maltese politics: 
every time the Maltese petitioners invoked the ‘Melitensium Amor’ argument – the 
idea that Malta had been freely ceded to Britain by the Maltese – the British reiterated 
the fortress formula, the strategic value of Malta made it unlikely that it could be 
treated like an ordinary colony. Mistrust was fomented on both sides because of this 
preoccupation...46 
The inward-looking trait of the Maltese mentioned earlier, by this time had taken root 
and gradually gave way to nationalistic aspirations.47 In the 1870s, the Maltese 
Congress, made up of Maltese elite and nobility, which had gained a lot of autonomy 
under the Knights (and had been dissolved immediately by the British) was finally 
reconstituted, albeit with much lesser powers. At around this time a number of anti-
colonialists and nationalists, strongly influenced by the unification of Italy, started 
contributing to a nationalistic movement. The colonialists were very much aware that 
the Maltese Italianate leanings could post a threat to their management. In addition, it 
was also a time when there was an increasing recognition of the importance of Malta 
for the Empire. Following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1870 and the unifications of 
Italy and Germany, Malta’s strategic value, as Winston Churchill said, grew into, ‘one of 
the master keys of the British Empire’ during the first half of the 20th century and the 
Second World War. However, in an ironic twist, the experience of the Maltese 
population became more negative as the colonial management became increasingly 
dictatorial. Frendo writes: 
Gradually the nature of colonial government also changed from a relatively easy going 
routine into a businesslike, intrusive, more authoritarian rule.48 
By independence in 1964, following the two World Wars, there were serious doubts 
whether the economy could support a sovereign state. Maltese society under British 
rule was mismanaged and neglected, and no long terms plans for economic 
regeneration were put in place. Frendo eloquently put it: 
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...misgovernment was inevitable because generals usually had little knowledge of 
representative institutions and civil affairs: the head of government was often not the 
man in charge of running the country.49 
The development of the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ in Malta appears to have been formed 
under two distinct influences. On the other hand, the ‘nation’ or ‘ethnos’ can trace its 
roots to the cosmopolitan era of the Knights of St. John when the Maltese political 
elite enjoyed a good degree of self-governance and autonomy. On the other hand, the 
idea of ‘statehood’ and ‘independence’ emerged from a colonial period characterised 
by oppression and severe losses in terms of self-governance. This has had an effect on 
the contemporary national identity leading to an ambivalent relationship with 
foreigners and the development of an insular nationalism. These socio-political 
developments run counter to a cosmopolitan culture and could be seen as informing 
the nationalist sentiments that recently re-surfaced in discussions on irregular 
immigration. 
5.3.2 Nationalism, insularity and independence 
The manifestation of nationalism reached a peak right after the Second World War. 
The anthropologists Jon Mitchell and Gary Armstrong in their research on nationalism 
in Malta identified three football matches which show the development of nationalism 
in this period. The first was a match of the Maltese football team against the Yugoslavs 
of Hadjuk Split on the 25th March 1945. The British ‘God Save the Queen’ was played 
for the Maltese team before the game, in spite of an officially adopted Maltese 
national anthem (adopted in 1941 but written and first performed in the 1920s). 
Armstrong and Mitchell comment thus: 
The perversity of this, particularly following four years of intense Maltese suffering and 
hardship, was recognised by the crowd, which protested...Midway through the British 
anthem, the crowd spontaneously launched into L-Innu Malti [the Maltese anthem]...50 
The second match mentioned was the first international match that Malta played 
against Austria in 1957. In a reflection of the political climate of the time when the 
Malta Labour Party (MLP) had only just narrowly lost a referendum in which they had 
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proposed Malta’s integration into the United Kingdom, the team did not enjoy 
unanimous support. Mitchell and Armstrong go on to describe yet another match, 
which saw ‘a form of nationalism manifested’. This was a 1971 World Cup qualifier 
against England. It attracted around 30,000 people and was the largest ever 
attendance for a match at the Empire Stadium in Gżira. Comments in the British media 
before the game proclaiming that the England side should not be troubled by ‘a team 
of waiters’, infuriated the Maltese, who came up with a chant for the game; ‘We are 
the waiters, you are the bastards.’ The British military authorities still on the island 
confined all service personnel to barracks during and after the match, fearing disorder. 
These incidents are significant because they are rare – both in Malta’s past and 
present. 
The political shift to independence appears to have led to a rigid and exclusive 
nationalism. The effects of an exclusive nationalism on a society physically and 
geographically already prone to insularity, was huge. This ‘insular nationalism’ was 
deliberately nurtured by Maltese politicians who had to make the significant shift from 
‘middlemen’, representatives of the Maltese population to an outside occupier to 
‘leaders’ and convince the masses. Nationalist activity when selective and exclusive, as 
seen earlier, does not leave space for cosmopolitan ideals and therefore it is safe to 
conclude that during the period when the idea of Malta as an independent state was 
being formed, the cosmopolitan outlook was severely lacking. The focus was totally 
inwards and directly linked with keeping the nationalistic momentum that had been 
achieved just prior to Independence, to nurture a sense of heightened cultural self-
esteem and ensure consistent political participation. This was no easy task at a time 
when Malta’s economy was still very poor but it also brought to the fore a related 
issue, that of national identity. Speaking about this period, Frendo comments: 
...the self-identity question ‘what is Malta?’ needs to be all the more seriously and 
meaningfully addressed culturally, historically and politically, just as it needs and 
deserves to be more widely recognised and appreciated.51 
The historical background of emigration is an important part of Malta’s political and 
cultural fabric, and intimately tied to the country’s national identity and state-building 
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endeavours. The period of massive and rapid outflow migration took place during the 
post-war period between 1945 and 1979 when the total of emigrants numbered 
140,000.52 The Government managed mass emigration programmes mainly to 
Australia, Canada and the UK. This followed a pattern common with the other 
Southern Mediterranean countries which quickly became countries of emigration in 
the post-war era.53 The ‘safety valve’, as this outflow migration was aptly labelled by Fr 
Lawrence E. Attard, an authority on Maltese emigratory movements and a returned 
emigrant himself, differed to the other south European states, in scale and intensity 
when compared to the actual population of Malta. Consequently this had a larger 
cultural impact on Malta, one which, it could be argued, had a considerable influence 
on the Maltese perception of migration. Gradually though, with increasingly stable 
economic development, emigration became a thing of the past. In 1991, the newly re-
established Department of Labour and Social Services was re-constructed without the 
Emigration Division, which had previously been responsible for emigration policy and 
research, signalling that emigration policy was no longer a government policy – 
prompting Attard to mark it as ‘the end of an epoch’.54 
Large-scale emigration served to sustain the sense of insularity amongst the Maltese 
left behind. Moreover the fact that the destination countries were so far away meant 
that if the emigrants were absorbing cosmopolitan influences from new host countries, 
little if any was reaching the population left on the islands. It was only in the late 
1980s, with better economic prospects and a newly achieved political stability, that 
return migration became a significant phenomenon. With this backdrop the Nationalist 
Party (PN) took office in 1987 and started working towards EU membership by 
liberalising the economy and steering the country back to Western allegiance. The PN 
built a narrative of modernisation and Europeanisation, a narrative which is strong in 
Malta for various reasons not least due to their long stay in government.55 
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On the 1st May 2004 Malta together with another nine countries joined the EU 
becoming the smallest and southern-most Member State of the EU. In the accession 
period, considerable structural and economic reform had to take place resulting in the 
ratification of the acquis in 2003. Long-standing fears over sustainability seemed to 
have been definitely buried. Accession to the EU was also seen as a way out of 
insularity, as the Eurobarometer author Robert Micallef comments: 
For most Maltese, the EU mostly means freedom to travel, study and work, as well as a 
stronger say in the world. This reflects the wish to overcome some of the drawbacks of 
living on a small island state through EU membership.56 
One would have expected EU accession to have a cosmopolitan influence on Malta. 
The debates were dominated by the similarity of ‘Maltese’ and ‘European’ identities, 
and many made recourse to various cultural and historical arguments to show how the 
Maltese are ‘historically’ and ‘culturally’ European. Carmel Attard, a former director of 
the Malta Information Centre, interestingly marks the beginning of the relationship 
between Malta and the EU to 1964 ‘immediately’ after independence. In his paper he 
charts the laborious trajectory that Malta followed to gain membership into the EU, 
claiming that: 
...the entry of Malta in the EU marks the culmination of the best relations that the 
island has had over the past three decades or so.57 
In spite of this, the post-independence, and as Frendo calls it the ‘self–identity’ 
question, surfaced again in the years leading to EU accession. The intensification of the 
identity debate brought to the surface a new and sharp sense of a selective 
nationalism. As the scholar on European Politics Michelle Cini points out in her 
concluding observations on the EU Referendum in Malta: 
...the referendum was also about understandings of Malta’s identity as a European 
and/or Mediterranean state...it is a factor which pervades all others. It is perhaps 
difficult to treat this as a source (or cause) of the referendum outcome, but it does 
underpin any explanation of Malta’s vote in the referendum. The narrowness of the 
‘yes’ vote only serves to demonstrate that this aspect of Malta’s identity remains 
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contested. Is Malta a European or a Mediterranean state? Most in Malta would accept 
that the answer is ‘both’. Yet some might still place the ‘Mediterranean’ before the 
‘European’. To an outsider this might seem a matter of semantics, but it reflects the old 
divisions in Maltese society, divisions that take a more contemporary political form in 
the cleavage that separates traditional MLP and PN families.58 
The inability of the Maltese to accept additional partialities to their national identity 
points to the selectivity and exclusivity of nationalism in Malta. The picture that 
emerges is that of a community with too many unresolved issues regarding their 
national identity, to be able to assume easy ‘layering’ of identities. One of the issues, 
which will be discussed again in Chapter 5, is what Cini refers to as the ‘old divisions in 
Maltese society’.  This is an old debate. In fact, the political philosopher Peter 
Serraċino Inglott wrote how after 1964 when Malta became independent: 
...there seems to have occurred a sharp polarization of the Maltese people into two 
groups and, it is very tempting to say, almost two ‘nations’. Superficially, it might seem 
as if two socio-cultural networks have come into being, with different economic, 
religious and moral values.59 
Serraċino Inglott goes on to say that this was a false perception: 
I think that there was real danger of this happening for a number of years, but the very 
fact that the danger was averted, in the sense that nothing like a civil war broke out, is 
a strong piece of evidence in support of the judgement that the people of Malta firmly 
assumed the mantle of nationhood in 1964.60 
Serraċino Inglott’s thesis has been strongly contested by the sociologist Godfrey 
Baldacchino. In two papers aptly entitled ‘A Nationless State’ and ‘Pangs of 
Nationalism’ Baldacchino lays out his argument for the lack of development of one 
nation amongst the Maltese and goes to show the reverberations of a lack of national 
identity in contemporary Malta.61 According to Baldacchino, it is only with the advent 
of mass irregular migration that Malta, for the very first time, was presented with a 
unified front by both political parties, which up till then had acted as leading two 
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‘nations’. Baldacchino calls these new revelatory political processes, motivated by an 
identification of a ‘significant Other’, as constituting a ‘nascent nationalism’ in Malta.  
Baldacchino says: 
While one should not discount the influence of EU membership on the Maltese psyche 
in the medium to long term, the ‘significant other’ so far has not been a diffident 
Brussels bureaucracy but the Sudanese migrant who entered Maltese waters seeking 
safe refuge in Europe. Mind you, the two referents may yet combine as the 
complementary facets of a tragic narrative, if the EU is felt by an increasingly racist 
xenophobic Maltese to be avoiding, or even obstructing, an adequate response to the 
‘immigrant threat’. Being part of the EU has encouraged the evolution of a secular, 
national character in Malta from a somewhat unlikely quarter.62 
It is not surprising that an increase in an exclusionary nationalist sentiment, or a 
‘nascent nationalism’, has been triggered by irregular migration. The choice that has to 
be made is between a partial cosmopolitan political culture that includes nationalism, 
and an exclusionary nationalist one that shuns cosmopolitan ideals. The latter appears 
to be on the increase and this does not augur well for cosmopolitanism and human 
rights. 
5.3.3 The right to hospitality, international solidarity and the Dublin 
System63 
Cosmopolitanism certainly illustrates a picture of Malta as a country with sovereignty 
thrust upon it in the absence of a national identity. Awakening to nationalism only half 
a decade later with the arrival of boatfuls of ‘significant Others’ from 47 different 
countries. If these ‘cosmopolitan’ paradoxes were not enough, this section proffers 
another two paradoxes this time related to EU and inter-state solidarity: the first is 
how the rescue of people at sea is being increasingly criminalised, and the second is 
the Dublin System which is set up to regulate immigrants into the EU but puts unfair 
burdens on border Member States. 
One of the noble and less-mentioned acts of humanitarianism that Malta has always 
expressed a commitment towards in both rhetoric and in practice, is the rescue of 
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migrants at sea. This activity could be seen as an implementation of the cosmopolitan 
right to hospitality. In practice, there have been instances, as described in Chapter 3, 
where immigrants’ rescue at sea was delayed due to differing interpretations of 
maritime law with neighbouring Italy and problematic issues with Libya. In general, 
however, the principle is well respected and the accompanying rhetoric from both the 
Government and society, advocate this as a moral obligation. 
EU laws in this regard are seen as acting against this principle. The researcher and 
deputy director of the Institute of Race Relations Liz Fekete shows how EU 
governments are increasingly seeking to criminalise acts of solidarity like the rescue of 
migrants stranded at sea. She recounts an incident which took place in August 2007.64 
A group of seven Tunisian fishermen rescued a group of 44 Eritrean, Sudanese and 
Ethiopian migrants whose inflatable dinghy was about to sink. The fishermen were 
arrested when they landed on the Italian island of Lampedusa, and subsequently 
moved to a prison in Agrigento in Sicily where they faced prosecution. The charges 
brought were of aiding and abetting illegal immigration. This is an offence that carries 
a maximum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment in Italy. Following a petition signed 
by a 100 MEPs, five fishermen were released and allowed to return back to Tunisia, 
whereas the other two were still in prison at the time Fekete was writing.65 Fekete 
uses this example to show how the new approach of criminalising those who, for 
humanitarian reasons, assist asylum seekers or undocumented migrants is ‘putting in 
jeopardy the oldest of all humanitarian laws, that of rescue at sea’.66 Fekete goes on to 
explain the situation that sailors find themselves in: 
The constant demonisation of the boat people means that every sailor knows that a sea 
rescue brings with it unpopularity, hardship for the entire crew and possible 
imprisonment. They know fully well what kind of leadership to expect from elected 
politicians who are more concerned with how to stop the survivors landing on their 
shores than how to prevent their deaths. This has led UNHCR representative Laura 
Boldrini to conclude that, between them, the various Mediterranean countries are 
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turning the sea into a ‘Wild West in which human life has lost its value and people in 
danger are left to fend for themselves’.67 
Another cosmopolitan paradox brought about by the EU’s reaction to irregular 
migration is the Dublin System. The EU, an institution which claims as one of its 
founding pillars the principle of solidarity, enacts a system to regulate asylum seekers 
applications which puts undue pressures on border Member States. On the one hand, 
the Dublin System as a set of regulations to process asylum applicants could be seen as 
a modern day implementation of the Kantian norm of hospitality, regulating the 
reception and management of a specific group of non-EU immigrants. On the other 
hand, the internal structure and unfairness of the system on border Member States, 
appears to blatantly eschew the principle of solidarity. Malta, like most of the other 
new Member States, feels that it is being treated unfairly in this area. 
Malta’s situation, due to the small size and dense population, is even worse than that 
of other border Member States. This has led the Government of Malta to lobby 
incessantly with the international community, but particularly within the EU. The 
following excerpt is a popular presentation by the Maltese Government of the extent 
of the phenomenon of irregular migration for the country: 
The Minister Tonio Borg focused on how difficult it is for a country such as Malta, with 
a surface area of 316km2 and a population of 400,000 people, to cope with the influx of 
migrants and asylum seekers arriving on the island... The average annual number of 
arrivals is equivalent to 45% of Malta’s annual birth rate. One person arriving illegally in 
Malta is equivalent, in terms of population, to 140 in Italy, 150 in France or 205 in 
Germany. On the basis of the country’s size, the numbers are even larger: one 
immigrant would be equivalent to 953 in Italy and 1129 in Germany.68 
Under the premise of human rights and global justice, EU accession forced Malta to 
take on additional responsibilities for outsiders, by taking a role in the asylum process 
and more crucially taking on full responsibility for irregular migration under the Dublin 
Regulation.69 Initially therefore EU membership appeared a hopeful beacon for 
irregular migrants’ rights. The Dublin Regulation’s aim to determine rapidly the 
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Member State responsible for the asylum claim and prevent applicants from 
submitting applications in multiple Member States is commendable. However, by 
putting the responsibility on the country of first arrival, an arguably unfair and 
excessive burden is put on border countries. For this reason Malta, by being at the EU’s 
southern-most border and the smallest and most densely populated Member State, is 
particularly disadvantaged. In addition, not being part of mainland Europe means that 
immigrants have no easy way of moving on from the island and relieving the ‘burden’, 
even if on a temporary basis. The EU has instated rectifying measures to help balance 
the situation like the European Refugee Fund. The Government has however insisted 
that in the case of Malta ‘burden-sharing’ mechanisms for moving on immigrants need 
to be institutionalised. Without inter-state solidarity, the success of any actions 
implementing the cosmopolitan norm of hospitality can only be limited and of a 
temporary nature. Inter-state solidarity should be seen as part of the cosmopolitan 
vision 
In view of the perception of unfairness with regards to the Dublin System and the 
increasing difficulties that Malta is facing with respect to rescue at sea, it is not 
surprising that the dominant discourse of international solidarity in Malta is framed in 
terms of the lack of solidarity with Malta. This situation has largely brought about the 
belief that irregular migration is not a ‘Maltese problem’, but one brought about by 
international circumstances and the Dublin System. It has also served to confirm the 
pre-existing bias that cosmopolitanism is an alias for larger, foreign states seeking their 
own interests, against which the Maltese need to fight in order to secure their own 
national interests. It certainly has not helped in the adoption of cosmopolitan norms 
and if anything has only fuelled a form of exclusive nationalism. The cosmopolitan right 
to hospitality and international solidarity are two sides of the same coin. The EU 
appears to have contributed to their separation in Malta. 
5.4 Towards a human rights culture 
Layers of different historical, social and political processes all contribute towards a 
predominant approach which hinders cosmopolitanism in Malta. The mere resilience 
of such an approach in a developed country which hosts over one million tourists a 
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year, where holidays abroad are commonplace and where the internet is widely and 
easily accessible by all, demonstrates how powerful the forces are that need to be 
addressed. 
Key to bringing about the necessary cultural shift is education. Maltese historiography, 
which is present in school textbooks but also conditions public debate, should include 
the role of foreigners and migration in the construction of the Maltese nation and the 
state. Special consideration should be given to review the dominant independence 
approach to history which depicts the Maltese as helpless, oppressed victims prior to 
independence and as triumphant and successful thereafter. The cultural approach to 
history is not mainstreamed into Maltese studies. The leading historian, Henry Frendo, 
has widely published accounts of Maltese history in the tradition of history as a grand 
narrative of events and leading people. The adoption of this conventional style by 
Frendo runs counter to the insights afforded to us by postcolonial theory which have 
demonstrated the plethora of information that such ‘grand narratives’ leave out. The 
leading proponents of postcolonial theory asserted that by failing to depict a full 
picture of history, grand narratives also run the risk of being reified in popular myths 
that were essential in nation-building processes. The risks are that these constructions 
only serve to reproduce the logic of colonialism. It is only in recent years that the 
historical anthropologist Carmel Cassar introduced a different approach to Maltese 
history by writing a history of culture, more than a history of people and events. This 
approach should be promoted and will serve as a good complement to Frendo’s 
reading of history. Overall greater care should be taken to present historical narratives 
in a way which is fair and properly contextualised. 
The launch of a project to set up a ‘Migration Museum’ on the lines of other Migration 
Museums in different countries has been recently inaugurated.70 Reports on the media 
would suggest that the idea behind this project is to document the post-war history of 
emigration of the Maltese in recognition of the emigrants’ contribution to the ‘patria’ 
and their preservation of Maltese culture. It would be good if the Migration Museum’s 
rationale was extended to encompass the unique role that several waves of 
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immigration played in the construction of Maltese society and nation over the years 
and in contemporary times. 
On a more generic level, a conscious political choice needs to be made to reconstruct 
nationalism in a way that allows the accommodation of cosmopolitan norms. This 
would entail the renunciation of the dominant selective and exclusive nationalist 
movements. The risk and dangers of allowing these movements to flourish without 
contestation in the contemporary globalised world is political and cultural isolation. 
Following on this, specifically in the irregular migration field there should be 
awareness-raising amongst policy makers of what constitutes a cosmopolitan political 
culture to ensure that this approach underpins all policies and projects undertaken by 
state bodies. The Government should strive to support non-governmental 
organisations’ activity supporting a cosmopolitan approach. Human rights campaigns 
should take special care to put forward the idea of one global moral community and 
portray it as a source of strength and not vulnerability. 
Addressing the negative effects of nationalism is more difficult. However ways need to 
be found to challenge the justification that exclusivity and prioritisation of Maltese 
citizens is always desirable and morally right. Public rhetoric which poses the basic 
needs of irregular immigrants in competition with the basic needs of the Maltese runs 
counter to human rights. Human rights education is particularly useful in this regard 
because it introduces basic cosmopolitan norms, equality and non-discrimination. The 
Government should endeavour to provide different avenues for such human rights 
education both for school children and also the general public. 
Finally, the lobbying efforts of the Maltese Government in EU circles need to be 
sustained. The cosmopolitan norm of hospitality requires inter-state solidarity. This 
cosmopolitan norm ought to be exercised by the EU as a block in various areas: rescue 
at sea, asylum applications, migration management, visa regulations and so on. The 
mere notion of an inaccessible, selective and exclusive ‘Fortress Europe’ is singularly 
against the philosophy of human rights. It is within this larger agenda that the Dublin 
System needs to be reframed to ensure that it reflects the principle of solidarity. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
The human rights understanding of cosmopolitanism, similar to Appiah’s ‘partial 
cosmopolitanism’, presents a cosmopolitanism which is constantly developing. This 
definition of cosmopolitanism is supported by a perception of human beings as 
adaptable, flexible and able to connect to different communities simultaneously. It 
views different identities and partialities as a normal part of life in a cosmopolitan 
system. Partialities or biases are the strategic tensions which bring about flux and 
change by encouraging a continual renegotiation of boundaries. 
By exploring Maltese society’s cosmopolitan orientations, a picture emerges of a 
country which as a result of various historical, social and political processes has 
embraced stringently a selective and exclusive nationalism. The necessary re-
articulation of nationalism that should occur to accommodate social and global 
changes is hampered. This explains the lack of incorporation of cosmopolitan norms. 
This analysis has served to explain the symbolic significance of what is perceived as 
being put ‘under threat’ in the wake of irregular immigration. The independence of 
Malta and then EU membership, ostensibly might have been seen as opportunities for 
promoting a cosmopolitan approach, in contrast to the propensity to insularity. The 
cultural history and recent developments indicate that these two events served to de-
cosmopolitise Maltese society and radicalise the notion of an exclusive nationalism. 
Such trends hinder the internalisation of the cosmopolitan norms of human rights. It 
serves to explain why irregular immigrants in Malta are perceived not only as non-
citizens, but as outsiders to the political community and as such, as individuals with 
whom there is no moral connection. 
Irregular migration happens at converging points of several paradoxes concerning 
cosmopolitanism in Malta. Clearly, irregular migration emerges as a useful ‘concern’ 
for nationalist processes attempting to construct a national identity against a 
‘significant other’, without discounting at this stage a possible perception of a threat of 
being subsumed into a larger European identity. These forces are so intense that the 
remaining political space for any cosmopolitan ideas almost becomes irrelevant. 
Human rights however require the Maltese to consider that there are also moral 
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obligations towards irregular immigrants. An existential sense of the cosmos and the 
moral obligations binding the global community justify the need for a cosmopolitan 
system.  
A human rights culture clearly requires a cosmopolitan approach which rises out of its 
universalistic aspirations, its belief in the moral connection between all people and its 
vision of peaceful coexistence of peoples. Cosmopolitanism provides a political culture 
which incorporates local particularities with an inclusive global vision. Human rights lay 
the basis for a partial cosmopolitanism and a cosmopolitan nationalism. 
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Chapter 6: ‘A disempowering system’: Which kind of 
democratic practices should be encouraged for the 
realisation of human rights 
6.1 Introduction 
Democracy has been presented by the modern human rights movement as the 
political system best suited to accommodate human rights principles. In 2005, the UN 
declared that ‘democracy, development and respect for all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing’ and that ‘while 
democracies share common features, there is no single model of democracy.’1 The 
former asserts the relationship between human rights and democracy, the latter 
shows an interestingly liberal and nuanced view of democracy. The human rights 
movement concerns itself with both formal aspects of democracy, like the rule of law, 
and substantive aspects of democracy which show that the state is functioning as a 
democracy.  
The notion of democracy, across centuries, has served to raise hopes that oppression 
by the rulers, or those in political office, would be eradicated. The democratic 
philosophy of political freedom entails a conviction that by giving people a say in 
government, societies would be more fair and just, and the risk of oppression and 
exploitation by a privileged few would be minimised. The sociologist Craig Calhoun 
says: 
It was democracy, and more generally the rise of a way of thinking that said 
governments get their legitimacy from the people and not from divine right, ancient 
inheritance or sheer power, that transformed relations among the different groups of 
citizens. Democratic thinking depended on notions such as ‘the will of the people’, 
which in turn depended on constituting or discovering some such common will.2 
The historical convergence of the rise in popularity of democracy as a political system 
and the idea of individual rights in the 19th and 20th centuries, has led many to assume 
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an intimate relationship between the two. This is however not self-evident. The 
contemporary association might very well be due more to the product of historical 
coincidence, and less to theoretical similarities. Indeed, the philosopher Hans Köchler 
has argued that representative democracy in particular, by allowing a delegation of the 
exercise of power, creates an ‘empirical political will’ which strips the individual of the 
right of sovereignty, in the political sense, and is therefore not compatible with human 
rights.3 Only a system of direct democracy, Köchler asserts, could theoretically concur 
with human rights since it does not allow a ‘delegation’ of the political will.4 Direct 
democracy is however impossible to implement in practice in complex societies. For 
this reason modern societies have opted for representative democracy making it 
currently the most popular system. The human rights scholar Jack Donnelly alludes to 
this when he writes: ‘Democracy and human rights have very different, and often 
competing, theoretical and moral foundations.’5 There are therefore innumerable 
perils that come with the assumption that democracy is ‘naturally’ the best political 
system for human rights to flourish. 
This Chapter explores why and how democracy and democratic institutions in Malta 
have hindered the inclusion of irregular immigrants. The following quote by an 
international NGO worker identifies several issues related to the democratic political 
system, like the relationship between the Government and the public, the lack of an 
informed public, the externalisation of hatred on public sites, and the election of 
political representatives. Change is unlikely, according to this interviewee, because the 
political system ‘disempowers’ the public (or the masses) and actively militates against 
the recognition of irregular immigrants’ human rights: 
I think the situation will remain as it is, because the Government is led by public 
opinion. In such a case the need for an informed public is paramount: a public that 
takes stands, knows how to campaign, that protests, and is active and alive and 
believes in the fundamentals of democracy, and understands that detaining people is 
against their human rights.  When I read those nasty and racist comments on the online 
newspapers I get very angry. I mean, there aren’t only a couple or two extremists – that 
I could handle – but it’s the average, overall sentiment. If you see the comments left by 
                                                          
3
 Hans Köchler, Democracy and human rights: do human rights concur with particular democratic systems?, 
International Progress Organisation, Vienna, 1990, p. 20. 
4
 Ibid, p. 21. 
5
 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, Second Edition, Westview Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 154. 
192 
Chapter 6 
people on The Times of Malta website - it’s sad, it’s very sad, shocking. And if I am the 
Minister why would I dare do otherwise, if I risk losing my position in the next election.6   
This suggests that the theoretical tensions between democracy and human rights are 
also reflected in the substantive aspects of democracy. For this reason the social 
scientist Nicolas Guilhot’s approach to democracy as a ‘field’ of practices is particularly 
useful: 
In writing this book, the approach that I have found most useful was certainly to think 
of human rights and democracy as constituting a ‘field’, in the sense of sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu. This means considering that democracy and human rights do not exist 
outside a dense network of activists, practitioners, institutions, bureaucrats, 
documents, monitoring technologies, normative practices, legal documents, styles of 
activism and learned credentials, and that the task of the research is not only to 
describe these various elements, but also to analyze their mutual relationships to the 
extent that they form a distinct, coherent and relatively autonomous sphere of social 
activity, a ‘field’ of practices.7 
The overall question being pursued in this Chapter is: What aspects of substantive 
democracy (or democracy in practice) are hindering the improvement of the situation 
of irregular immigrants in Malta? The Chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
section will focus on how democracy is presented by the modern human rights 
movement to ensure minimum standards of respect for all people – or, in other words, 
what are the necessary and sufficient conditions of democracy necessary for a human 
rights culture? This will be followed by a discussion on three constitutive aspects of 
democracy which have an impact on the implementation of human rights. As in the 
other Chapters, the choice and identification of these three aspects was informed by 
theoretical debates as well as by issues arising out of my own fieldwork. These are: a) 
the tension between the Government and the ‘masses’; b) the role/characteristics of 
bureaucratic machinery within a democracy, and c) the idea of active citizenship. The 
second section will apply these aspects to the case study of irregular immigrants in 
Malta. Since formal democratic structures are largely in place the discussion will focus 
on understanding the gaps in the practice of democracy that need to be addressed to 
facilitate a human rights culture. The third section will offer concrete proposals to 
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address these gaps. The Chapter concludes with a confirmation that the forces of 
democracy need to be moulded in a way that ensures that a human rights culture can 
take root. 
6.2 The challenge of democracy for the human rights movement 
The need of a democratic culture and the rule of law for the implementation of the 
human rights vision is evident in the first international human rights treaties. In these 
early documents, the continuous mention of the ‘will of the people’ clearly refers to 
democracy even though the term ‘democracy’ itself is not used. No other political 
system is ever mentioned. Democracy is accepted as the best available system because 
the maintenance of human rights would be inconceivable in any other political system 
which constrains the participation of individuals - ‘the will of the people’ - in 
governance. In fact, the direct contribution of citizens to governance is stated as a 
human right, as the following two examples from the UDHR and the ICCPR illustrate: 
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives.  2. Everyone has the right to equal access to 
public service in his country.  3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections 
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held in secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures.8 
Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity… (a) To take part in the conduct of 
public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and be 
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the 
electors; (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his 
country.9 
In the last decade, the global human rights movement shifted away from an exclusive 
focus on two processes tied to global democratisation - the promotion of the right to 
democracy and the consolidation of democracy – to an attempt to identify the 
constitutive elements of democracy and democracy in practice. The dominant policy 
                                                          
8
 United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217 A(III), adopted 10 
December 1948, Article 21. 
9
 United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, Article 25. 
194 
Chapter 6 
now views the concepts of democracy and human rights as interdependent in 
unequivocal terms. This can be seen in a resolution passed by the UN Commission on 
Human Rights in 2003 entitled ‘Interdependence between democracy and human 
rights’ which calls upon the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to take action by engaging further with the topic. Article 2 of the Resolution 
states that the UN Commission: 
Reaffirms its conviction that democracy, development and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing...10 
This document lays out a clear vision of democracy as an all-encompassing system of 
governance which is not restricted to official state structures. Human rights are 
presented as a fundamental constitutive element of democracy. This is seen in Articles 
4 and 7 which state: 
Recognizes the comprehensive nature of democracy as a system of governance that 
encompasses procedures and substance, formal institutions and informal processes, 
majorities and minorities, mechanisms and mentalities, laws and enforcement, 
government and civil society.11 
Notes that international human rights instruments enshrine many of the principles, 
norms, standards and values of democracy and may guide the development of 
domestic democratic traditions and institutions.12 
However, these declarations should not be taken to mean that the theoretical and 
moral foundations of democracy and human rights are similar. As already introduced 
in the previous section, the self-evident presentation of this relationship has been 
meaningfully contested. The following are three ‘fault lines’ that appear in the 
relationship between democracy and human rights: 
 A systemic aspect of democracy: Spinoza’s concept of ‘the fear of the masses’ 
which refers to the fear felt by the masses, which in turn induces fear in rulers. 
His belief was that the principal danger of the state is always internal. By 
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proposing an attitudinal way of life which is respectful of all, a human rights 
culture could address these fears. 
 The need for empowerment: The primary means of implementation of 
democracy in complex states is public bureaucracy. The anthropologist Michael 
Herzfeld demonstrates that ‘indifference’ is used in bureaucracies to establish 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. This can have a strong disempowering role for 
outsiders who might not even have other social support alternatives to turn to, 
and ultimately creates problems for the enactment of a human rights culture. 
 The notion of participation: Democracy is by definition ‘governance of the 
people’ and therefore active citizenship plays an important role. I propose that 
Hannah Arendt’s concept of citizenship as vita activa is a good prototype for 
the kind of active citizenship needed for healthy democracy and a human rights 
culture. 
6.2.1 The ‘fear of the masses’ 
Whereas scholars like Köchler concentrated on the competing moral political claims of 
the popular will and the individual within a democracy, the philosopher Baruch Spinoza 
(1632-1677) focused interestingly on another inherent contradiction in democracy. 
This was the ambivalent relationship between the ‘masses’ and the ‘ruler’ which is 
critical to any discussion on democracy and human rights because it could have a 
direct influence on minorities’ access to human rights. Spinoza could be seen as an 
unlikely choice in this discussion because for him, in complete contrast to, for example, 
Köchler, ‘an absolute reduction of individuality to the mass’ is not unthinkable, leading 
to Étienne Balibar’s labelling of Spinoza’s approach as ‘anti-Orwellian’.13 For Spinoza 
the rule by the ‘masses’ is looked upon uncritically in relation to individuality since he 
believes that ‘individuals alone do not possess sufficient power to preserve themselves 
and as a consequence unite with others out of necessity to survive’.14 Notwithstanding 
this contrast with human rights, Spinoza’s focus on the masses, ‘the rule by the people’ 
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as opposed to a monarchy, tyranny or political elite, is essential to understanding what 
makes democracy distinctly different to any other political system.  
The shift of responsibility from governance by a small political elite to governance by 
the people entails a significant endowment of responsibility to the masses (a collective 
of individual subjects).  However, Spinoza points out that the relationship between the 
power of the masses and the power of the ruler or ‘dominion’ is an inverse 
relationship. The more power amassed by the masses, the less is available to the 
dominion, and the more power that accrues to dominion, the less is available to the 
masses (and by extension to individuals). Spinoza attempts to find the equilibrium 
between the power of the masses and the power of those who govern in his Political 
Treatise.15 This continual shift in power creates the two-way ‘fear of the masses’, 
which is the fear felt by the masses and instilled in the rulers by the same masses. 
Balibar explains this concept in the following way: 
‘The fear of the masses’ should be understood in the double sense of the genitive, 
objective and subjective. It is the fear that the masses feel. But it is also the fear that 
the masses inspire in whoever is placed in the position of governing or acting politically, 
hence in the State as such. So that, arising in the context of the power (puissance) of 
the masses and their movements, the problem of the constitution or reform of the 
State is first posed in the context of fear – which may be as extreme as panic or may 
remain rationally moderated, but which never purely and simply disappears.16 
In spite of this ‘vertical’ tension that Spinoza identifies as arising out of the shift of 
power from the rulers to the masses, Spinoza suggests that democracy is the best 
political system to safeguard the interests of the individual. Democracy, or popular 
governance, serves to balance individual and popular right, since it more closely 
guarantees that the beliefs of the masses will correspond with the belief and actions of 
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the dominion.17 This will make states more stable, since states have always been in 
greater danger from their citizens, that is, internally, than from external enemies.18 
Citizens have the potential and responsibility to address the ‘fear of the masses’ 
continually produced by a tension inherent in democracy. Individuals, for Spinoza, 
carry the responsibility for enacting a space of freedom from ‘fear and violence’. The 
following is Balibar’s interpretation of Spinoza: 
No collective means or political practice corresponds to the practical task that is 
imposed on the citizens: to conserve or develop for themselves the constitution, the 
form of agreement or mutual relation which liberates them to the greatest degree from 
fear and violence. Democracy is desirable, but it is unarmed.19 
Citizen’s role in democracies and their task of upholding the Constitution will be 
presented in further details in the discussion of the concept of active citizenship.  
6.2.2 Bureaucracy and ‘indifference’ 
The modern democratic state relies heavily on public bureaucracy for its realisation. 
The complex interaction and interdependence of public bureaucracy and political 
institutions is now well acknowledged in literature on governance.20 Bureaucracies, 
more specialised and technocratic, have developed in response to the increasing 
complexity of societies. Commonly-held definitions of bureaucracy fall into two 
categories, which are inter-related but nonetheless distinct, and which I argue are best 
seen as two sides of the same coin. The first can be described as ‘rule by officials’ and 
the second is ‘a particular form of organisation’.21 ‘Rule by officials’, coined by the 
political scientist Harold Laski in the 1930s, reflected his ongoing concern with 
safeguarding liberty. For Laski bureaucracy constrained citizens’ liberties, and 
therefore is: 
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A system of government, the control of which is so completely in the hands of officials, 
that their power jeopardizes the liberties of ordinary citizens.22 
The sociologist Max Weber, on the other hand, sought to highlight the benefits of 
bureaucracy. Weber seems to have been provoked by the dominance of Laski’s 
approach to bureaucracy which reduced the organisation to the aforementioned ‘rule 
of the officials’. He contested Laski’s concerns and argued that bureaucrat officials 
were not ruling, but simply obeying the rulers. They were vested with the authority to 
govern but lacked the legitimate political power that rulers enjoyed.23 Weber’s 
definition of bureaucracy is summarised by Kenneth Meier and Gregory Hill as 
characterised by the following: 
1. Fixed and official jurisdictional areas ordered by rules, laws, or regulations. 
2. The principle of hierarchy whereby structures are established with superior and 
subordinate relationships. 
3. Management of the office entails reliance on written files. 
4. Occupation of offices based on expertise and training. 
5. Full time employment of personnel who are compensated and who can expect 
employment to be a career. 
6. Administration of the office follows general rules that are stable and can be 
learned.24 
The contrasting perceptions of bureaucracy put forward by Weber and Laski still 
constitute an important debate in contemporary times. This can be seen in the political 
scientist Eva Etzioni-Halevy’s work which combines the insights of both perceptions in 
her analysis of bureaucracy. In line with Weber she points out that the growing power 
of bureaucracy has actually ‘favoured democracy’ or is at least ‘indispensable for it’.25 
At the same time, drawing on Laski’s approach she says that although bureaucracies 
have not become more powerful than politicians, bureaucrats in most modern states 
have become sufficiently powerful to pose a threat to democracy. This is due to the 
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ability that bureaucrats have to allocate resources, to influence outcomes (through 
administrative decision-making) and to control positions of power.26 Bureaucracy seen 
as an internal threat to the practice of popular governance, is a worrying trend for the 
human rights movement. 
Another study of bureaucracy exposes an additional threat to human rights from 
bureaucratic practices. This study, on the cultural and social processes of public 
bureaucracy in Greece by the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld, demonstrates that 
bureaucracy is in fact far from apolitical, objective and fair. This undermines Weber’s 
reading of bureaucracy in which bureaucrats are reduced to impersonal ‘cogs in the 
wheel’.27 Herzfeld finds that indifference within bureaucratic structures is not an 
automatic result of the system, but a process whereby insiders decide who the 
outsiders are. He shows how societies with proud traditions of hospitality may 
paradoxically produce at the official level some of the most calculated indifference. 
This happens due to the excessive reliance of bureaucratic practices on the symbols 
and language of the moral boundaries between insiders and outsiders. Herzfeld 
argues: 
I have challenged explanations of bureaucratic indifference as the more or less 
automatic outcome of bureaucratic structures. Such arguments being hopelessly 
teleological, are far too close to the predestinations advocated by some of the more 
totalitarian forms of nationalism. If social boundaries emerge in social interaction, 
where they are constantly negotiated and redefined, blaming ‘the system’ is implicitly 
to accept the argument of those who defend their territories, and who excuse their less 
laudable actions on the grounds that these were dictated by the system or by its 
supreme guards. We would do well to remember that this was the defence argument 
at Nuremberg.28 
It would therefore be mistaken to view bureaucracy as apolitical. Herzfeld’s argument 
goes by asserting that state bureaucracy creates social indifference, which not only 
disempowers, but denies ‘selfhood’ – does not even take the person into account. 
Herzfeld says: 
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Indifference is the rejection of common humanity. It is the denial of identity, of 
selfhood.29 
For the purposes of this discussion, this ultimately means that bureaucracy needs to be 
treated with the utmost caution since bureaucrats have an active role in determining 
or perpetuating the moral boundaries of who is an insider and who is an outsider. 
Since bureaucracy is at the implementation end of democracy, this, in effect means 
that in spite of rules, regulations and laws passed by parliamentarians, service 
provision might not be reflecting the same agreed-to responsibilities towards outsiders 
that are enshrined in laws. 
6.2.3 ‘Vita activa’ as the prototype of democratic citizenship 
Active citizenship is the third aspect which strongly links human rights and democracy. 
Arendt’s participatory concept of vita activa, although it is inspired from a society 
founded on hierarchies which is far from the vision of human rights, presents a good 
framework to understand the vision of democratic citizenship put forward by the 
human rights movement.30  
Based on the direct participatory models of the city-states of antiquity, the concept of 
vita activa is the basis of political life requiring: a) a public sphere where citizens act 
together through the medium of speech and persuasion, and constituted of ‘sameness 
in utter diversity’31 and; b) an understanding of local cultures which provides the 
context of the public sphere.32 For Arendt vita activa could not happen in a totalitarian 
state or a liberal capitalist state, since the public sphere – the freedom for citizens’ 
deliberation and action - is limited or altogether missing. Arendt gives importance to 
civic engagement and collective deliberation about all matters affecting the political 
community. This political activity is valued not because it may lead to agreement or to 
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a shared conception of the good, but because it enables each citizen to exercise his or 
her powers of agency, to develop the capacities for judgment and to attain by 
concerted action some measure of political efficacy. 
As an extension of her belief in direct and universal participation in politics, 
representation was also problematic for Arendt. She viewed it solely as a substitute for 
the direct involvement of the citizens, and as a means whereby the rulers and rules 
could reassert themselves. For Arendt even the idea of voting, as independent and 
anonymous, according to private opinions, runs counter to citizen’s empowerment. 
People should be able to see and talk to one another in public, to meet in a public-
political space, so that their differences as well as their commonalities can emerge and 
become the subject of democratic debate. In this way, citizenship would be reaffirmed 
and political agency effectively exercised by engaging in common action and collective 
deliberation. 
Arendt argues that the state should create space and structure for the model of 
citizenship of vita activa. According to her, modern liberal democracies fall short of 
this, and although her primary criticism is towards totalitarianism, she suggests that in 
a similar way liberal democracies might not give enough space for the empowerment 
of the individual. Liberal democracies in embracing capitalism have, not unlike 
totalitarian states, limited the national public sphere in a way which is detrimental to 
active citizenship. The international relations scholar Kimberly Hutchings comments on 
this when she says that for Arendt: 
...the kind of shrinking of public space that is carried to its extreme in totalitarian 
regimes is characteristic...of the development of the modern capitalist state in general 
and that therefore her view of politics is not only set against Nazism and Stalinism but 
the trend of liberal democratic rule as well.33 
As an alternative to a system of representation based on bureaucratic parties and state 
structures, Arendt proposed a federated system of councils through which citizens 
could effectively determine their own political affairs. Such a federation would ensure 
that everyone has the space to participate directly in politics. The human rights 
movement’s support for the active participation of non-state actors embodies a similar 
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rationale. States are also expected to encourage political engagement by non-state 
actors. The UDHR also gave a clear role to non-state actors in the education of people 
about human rights, reinforcing the argument that the drafters believed in the role 
that non-state actors could play. Inbuilt in the human rights system are now specific 
mechanisms by which non-state actors and civil society are encouraged to take a more 
active role. 
Based on these forces which characterise the relationship between democracy and 
human rights, the following section will look at formal and substantive aspects of 
democracy in Malta and how these influence the treatment of irregular migrants. 
6.3 The setting: Democratic practices and structures in Malta 
Malta is a democratic republic founded on work and on respect for the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual.34 
This, the opening article of the Constitution of Malta, introduces democracy as the 
political system of the state. The major democratic institutions are regulated by the 
Constitution. Executive authority is vested in a President who is appointed by the 
House of Representatives every five years. The President in turn generally appoints as 
Prime Minister the leader of the party that wins a majority of seats in a general 
election for the unicameral House of Representatives. The President also nominally 
appoints, upon recommendation of the Prime Minister, the individual ministers to 
head each of the government departments. The cabinet is selected from among the 
members of Parliament, the number of which may vary between 65 and 69 members 
elected on the basis of proportional representation. The Constitution provides for 
general elections to be held at least every five years. Candidates are elected by the 
Single Transferable Vote (STV) system, where the surplus votes of an elected candidate 
are transferred to the candidate receiving the second preference votes. Malta’s 
judiciary is independent. It is appointed by the President upon recommendation by the 
Prime Minister, who is required to take a decision based on consultation with the 
leader of the Opposition. The highest court which is the Constitutional Court hears 
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appeals in cases involving violations of human rights, interpretation of the Constitution 
and invalidity of laws. 
The Local Councils Act, enacted in 1993, was drafted in line with the European Charter 
of Local self-government and divides Malta and Gozo into 68 localities. Councillors are 
elected every three years by inhabitants who are registered as voters in the Electoral 
Register. Provisions in the law allow for the establishment of ‘communities’ (hamlets), 
with elected representatives, within localities and for an elected chairperson to sit in 
on Council meetings. Local Council elections are held by means of the system of 
proportional representation using the STV. The Mayor is the head of the Local Council 
and the representative of the Council for all effects under the Act. The Executive 
Secretary, who is appointed by the Council, is the executive, administrative, and 
financial head of the Council. All decisions are taken collectively with the other 
members of the Council. Local Councils are responsible for the general upkeep and 
embellishment of the locality, local wardens, and refuse collection; they carry out 
general administrative duties for the central government, such as collection of 
government rents and funds and answering government-related public inquiries. 
Malta passes the tests of formal democracy successfully.35 In addition the Maltese 
people participate enthusiastically in elections, with general elections consistently 
having a near-universal turnout. This is complemented with participation in political 
debates and activities. Most of the merit of this is attributed to the two major political 
parties who, Professor Edward Warrington says ‘set the tone of political life in Malta’. 
Paradoxically, Warrington argues, it is not the formal democratic structures that pose a 
threat to the political order in Malta, but the political parties who are not ‘even 
mentioned in the Constitutional document’. He describes this in the following quote: 
...the two major political parties, equipped with pervasive grassroots organisations, 
data bases, newspapers, radio stations and television channels, and increasingly 
networked with powerful business interests. Every one of these political resources is 
utterly opaque to independent external scrutiny. It is these powerful interests, fronted 
by and also manipulated by, the political parties, which set the tone and agenda of 
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political life in Malta. It is here that threats to the constitutional order are most likely 
to be generated — threats to the values of multi-party democracy; to human rights 
and freedoms; to parliamentary, judicial and independent scrutiny of the Executive; 
threats to the integrity of elections; threats to the peace, order and good government 
of Malta.36 
The omnipresence, polarisation and totalising discourse of politics brought about by 
the two political parties characterises Maltese politics and largely conditions the 
practice of democracy in Malta.37 Both parties have treated irregular migration as a 
security and foreign relations matter, positing the issue in political discourse as a 
burden on the nation. In addition, the two parties have presented a united front on 
irregular migration. This is not a typical situation since they generally take different 
approaches and disagree on almost all major issues. The following sections will analyse 
the democratic practice in Malta according to the three theoretical issues discussed 
previously. 
6.3.1 The strength of the masses or brainwashing/loyalty to the 
political elite? 
The power of the masses is most clearly seen in how the right to vote is exercised. In 
fact, decreasing levels of voting worldwide have created huge debates and 
controversies on the effectiveness and legitimacy of democratic systems. Not so in 
Malta where there is a near-universal turnout. Voting in general elections, although 
not compulsory, is consistently very high. Malta’s voter turnout in the last four general 
elections in 2008 was 98 per cent, in 2003 – 95 per cent, in 1998 – 95 per cent and 
1996 – 98 per cent.38 Indeed Malta has the highest turnout of all democratic nations, 
including those countries, like Australia, where voting is compulsory.39 Echoing the 
aforementioned observations made by Warrington, the political scholar Wolfgang 
Hirczy writing on political engagement in Malta puts this down to: 
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...intense two-party competition for highly centralized governmental power, grounded 
in strong and pervasive partisanship in the population at large.40 
The competition is not only between parties, but is present at a local level between 
candidates of the same party. Taking into consideration that the electoral system runs 
on an STV system, the resulting situation is anomalous when compared to other 
countries which use STV. Although the STV electoral system allows voters to cut across 
party lines, this rarely happens in Malta. In addition, each of the two main political 
parties fields a relatively big number of candidates per district to appeal to as many 
voters as possible. However, the high voter turnout is probably acerbated by what 
Hirczy identifies as two types of competition which happen simultaneously and 
mutually support each other. He says: 
Two types of competition are relevant to turnout, competition between and within 
parties. Candidates mobilizing voters to boost their own chances of winning in turn 
make the parties more competitive. Where in a single election voters exercise choice 
among candidates of the same party, the candidates will have an additional incentive 
to see to it that their constituents cast their ballots because they face a more 
competitive environment. Hence turnout will be higher. Malta’s electoral system makes 
the candidates the direct beneficiaries of their own electioneering efforts. The 
participation-enhancing effect of dual competition is likely to be affected by the 
desirability of the offices at stake in the election. 41 
This explains why Ministry officials in Malta often told me that they ‘ultimately work 
for the electorate’ and why they claim they are almost held to ransom by the 
electorate. Ministry officials’ concern was that the electorate would turn against their 
Minister, and many examples were described of Ministerial plans being scrapped in 
the field of irregular migration either due to a public outcry, or resistance by a 
significant group of people. The officials stopped short of using the word ‘blackmail’ 
although the examples they gave me were akin to that. In addition the language used 
and the widespread concern, reinforces this initial comment that the perception is one 
of blackmail. The following is an example from an interview with a Ministry official: 
The Government doesn’t have a problem with purchasing and investing in a centre for 
migrants. The problem is that you need to find a property where the people living 
around will not create problems. Because first you have to start with the Maltese: are 
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you ready to have an immigrant living next to you? I mean, it’s one thing having them 
in Ħal Balzan with the nuns, at least there are the nuns. The people say, ‘it’s okay, I live 
next to the nuns’. But if one fine day you throw a few immigrants in a house right next 
to your house, how would you as a Maltese feel about it? And this is something the 
Maltese don’t want to answer, because the reality is that they do not want them next 
door. And they start telling us: ‘it’s because they stink...because they don’t 
wash...because they steal’. Is it true? At the end of the day it doesn’t matter, nobody 
wants them.42 
This attitude could also be interpreted as shunning responsibility and hiding behind 
‘the wishes of electorate’. Indeed, this kind of concern was hardly acknowledged and 
generally treated dismissively within the NGO sector where the lack of leadership for 
social change was attributed to politicians and Ministerial officials. No sympathy was 
extended in this regard. People working in the NGO sector often mentioned that the 
‘political will’ was missing. No ‘political mileage’ could be gained out of immigrants, 
they explained to me over and over again. By this they meant that immigrants did not 
hold votes, and in addition, that any pro-immigrant activity might entail a loss of votes. 
People working in NGOs repeatedly came back to the point that politicians’ primary 
focus is to ‘appease their electorate’: 
I think that essentially politicians have – let’s put it this way, the human rights aspects 
of their policies are only one consideration, and they would probably at least, officially, 
they would pay lip service to human rights and the importance of human rights. But at 
the end of the day it’s not necessarily even the top priority. It’s fair to say that there are 
a lot of competing interests, including how they are perceived by their electorate...43 
The dominant view amongst NGO workers is that politicians carry a higher moral 
responsibility in ‘educating’ the public in this field by virtue of the privileged position 
they occupy in Maltese society. Indeed as the anthropologists Jeremy Boissevain and 
Jon Mitchell, amongst others, show in their respective studies on patron-client 
relations and nationalism in Malta, politicians have great importance in Maltese 
society.44 This explains why Maltese NGOs have very high expectations of politicians to 
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live up to their responsibility of addressing widespread populist concerns - like the fear 
of invasion, fear of contracting untreatable tropical diseases, and so on – which foment 
deep insecurities amongst various sectors of society.  This theme of political 
irresponsibility was an issue that created deep anguish amongst my informants, since 
they believed that fears were intentionally fuelled, if not at times constructed, by 
politicians and high-level officials with the intention to gain political mileage. The NGO 
workers often recalled the frequent presence of the then Minister for Justice and 
Home Affairs, the then respective Shadow Minister and the Police Commissioner 
during the peak of international criticism by human rights organisations, defending 
detention as necessary for security purposes, public health reasons and as a deterrent 
to other immigrants. This lack of action could also be interpreted as a manifestation of 
conservative politics which typically demonstrates an aversion to risk and social 
change. The following quote depicts this sentiment of prioritising preservation. It also 
demonstrates the previous point which is seen when the interviewee blames the 
politicians and mentions the complacency of the ‘people’. He says: 
...they [politicians] already have an idea of what the people want. It’s a huge vicious 
circle. The Government is happy with keeping things as they are because it doesn’t 
want a more informed public, therefore it is not going to get involved in any public 
awareness; the people are therefore fine with the situation as it is, and they’re never 
going to change, they are going remain as they are. Nothing is going to make it change: 
not the crappy situation, not an NGO, because no one takes it seriously any more, and 
no one really cares.45 
The high voter turnout, usually considered one of the democratic virtues of Malta, was 
often mentioned by my informants as a counterproductive measure for the respect of 
the human rights of irregular immigrants.  The criticism was that this encouraged more 
populist policies and less space for lobby groups, since the voter turnout is intimately 
linked with the political culture. This appears to be a well-founded criticism, but 
apparently contradictory to democracy, for which voting is always presented as one of 
the essential mechanisms that safeguard the principle of popular governance. 
Moreover, the finger pointing between the Government/politicians and NGOs is 
unhelpful when trying to make sense of the situation. Spinoza’s concept of ‘the fear of 
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the masses’ sheds a little more light. Seen within this framework one can better 
understand that what is going on is a ‘tug of war’ between the two equally legitimate 
foci of political power within a democracy. The argument goes beyond both one-sided 
‘blackmailing by the electorate’ and also irresponsibility by politicians who ‘should 
know better’, but that as a little bit of both it is part of the democratic process. 
6.3.2 Fearing the bureaucrats? ‘Indifference’ to irregular immigrants 
Ministries are composed mainly of public officers, with each Minister having at his 
disposal a personal fund to employ their own staff. One can visibly see within each 
Ministry a complex power game between the bureaucrats and the politicians (and 
their personal staff). Ministers clearly have a lead since they retain the power to 
choose public officers appointed to represent the Government in leading agencies, or 
boards. A much-cited, by now infamous, pre-election promise by the current 
Government made in response to calls for greater transparency in governance, states: 
‘Pt 258. Appointments on government boards will be made following a public call.’46 
One would have thought this would in essence be a straightforward electoral promise 
to implement, albeit a courageous step in a political setting in which politicians rarely 
put themselves or their actions up for public scrutiny. Notwithstanding this, it does not 
look set to be implemented soon. When brought up in Parliament by the party in 
Opposition, Parliament Secretary Chris Said on behalf of the Government tried to avoid 
the question altogether, but finally relented. The following is an excerpt from his reply: 
...this is not a straightforward issue that one can just take a decision from one day to 
the next. It is a complicated issue that needs time to be implemented. Electoral 
promise 258 is clear, that appointments on government boards will only be done after 
a public call. The government has a legislature of five years ahead and in this period will 
implement a number of promises made in the electoral programme. 47 
This quote is particularly revealing of the typical reluctance of any Maltese 
Government to let go of any privileges intrinsically tied to a political culture still heavily 
reliant on clientelism and patron-client relations. In the last years, particularly with EU 
                                                          
46
 Partit Nazzjonalista, Iva, flimkien kollox possibbli: Programm Elettorali 2008-2013, Publikazzjonijiet Indipendenza, 
Pietà, 2008, p. 62. 
47
 Malta’s House of Representatives Debates, The Eleventh Parliament, Session no. 13, House of Representatives, 
Valletta, Malta, 4 June 2008. 
209 
Chapter 6 
accession, the reluctant reliance of politicians on bureaucrats and experts has been 
evident, even in areas of governance traditionally the stronghold of politicians. 
Notwithstanding this shift in power however, the overall balance still tips onto the 
politicians’ side. 
Although Maltese society is overwhelmed by a ‘crisis of trust’ akin to an observation 
made by the philosopher Onora O'Neill about modern societies, bureaucrats appears 
to fare better in this regard than politics. O’Neill argues that the ‘crisis of trust’, 
whether real or perceived, has a debilitating impact on society and democracy. Public 
services, institutions and the people who run them, and professionals, are all treated 
with suspicion. O’Neill questions whether trust can be restored by making people and 
institutions more accountable, or whether these same systems of accountability and 
control themselves damage trust. This is undoubtedly true of Maltese society. 
However popular rhetoric suggests that there is greater trust in bureaucracy than in 
politicians or at least in the motivations of bureaucrats than politicians. This is because 
the dominant perception is informed by the Weberian concept of a bureaucrat being 
nothing more than a helpless cog in the administrative machine at the whim of the 
politician. A perception which works in bureaucrats’ favour, because politicians are 
generally seen as scheming, dishonest and generally ready to do anything for a few 
votes.48 The notion that bureaucrats might also be non-partisan political agents in their 
own right is largely missing. Even if the bureaucrat is active in partisan politics outside 
of work, it is not seen as a matter of choice, he is still perceived as ‘a helpless cog’ in 
the party machinery. Baldacchino and Scicluna write about this totalising discourse of 
bi-partisan politics: 
Technocrats, professionals and intellectuals are not perceived to be able to exist 
separately from (political) parties. It is not deemed possible for individuals to place 
national interests before party affiliation, wrote Pirotta, who suggested that as a result 
individuals often find it more beneficial to take sides. Similarly, Baldacchino noted that 
whoever declines to adopt a political profile has less ‘social credit facilities.49 
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Many of my interviewees aired their frustration at how not only the basic services, but 
even services geared specifically towards irregular immigrants, were not delivering. 
Many of the people I interviewed had first-hand experience of the difficulties that 
irregular immigrants faced when trying to access services. The stories of lethargic 
responses by public servants, complete inactivity and techniques like foot-dragging, or 
shifting of responsibility, were common themes. More worrying are the clear reasons 
behind the inefficiency. One of the NGO workers I interviewed explained it in this way: 
The problem in this field is that the whole concept of people, the mentality of people 
towards this client group is quite widespread, so you find even people working within 
the field - so social workers working for asylum-seekers for example – having the wrong 
idea, and having the mentality of the government and the mentality of the other 
people...Even them thinking that these people should not be here: ‘what are these 
people doing here?’; ‘Detention? Just fine, leave them in there. And agreeing with 
certain policies that are being taken that are detrimental to the clients...we’re going 
wrong somewhere.50 
One of my informants, working with an NGO providing a service in collaboration with a 
government department for irregular immigrants, recounted an incident when 
applications of a serious nature were not being processed. The way it happened 
demonstrates how bureaucracy is used to make immigrants’ lives difficult. The 
incident, which stretched over weeks, started by a phone call my informant received 
from the government department asking him to slow down the processing of 
applications. The reason given was that since immigrants needed to go in person to 
collect the document, too many were showing up at the department and they ‘stank’ 
(bad smell). It was a period of time when there was quite a high demand for the 
service. My informant told them that there was nothing he could do to stop the flow of 
applications. A few days later, on being told by the immigrants that they were not 
being given their documents, he called again and was told that the special paper, on 
which the documents had to be printed, was out of stock. This excuse was, to say the 
least, highly suspicious. The situation stretched on, reaching a crisis point where 
immigrants were at risk of losing their right to the document as well as a lot of money 
they had invested in the application procedure. Immigrants were spending long hours 
outside the government department, waiting. Although highly visible, this occurrence 
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appeared to be left unquestioned and ignored, and put down to immigrants’ arrogance 
and their uncivilised ways. My informant, a front office volunteer, decided to take the 
matter in hand and informed his superiors, who in turn contacted the director. Paper 
was miraculously back in stock less than an hour after the director held a meeting with 
the Minister responsible.51 The meaning of this incident is rich on a number of levels, 
but it is particularly interesting to see what appears to be a bureaucracy working 
independently of politicians. The Minister only acted when a crisis point was reached, 
which is typical in the field, leading many workers in the field to come to the 
conclusion that the reason behind ‘inefficiency’ is: 
The problem is that the political drive behind it isn’t clear, and if it’s disorganised, it just 
brings more disorganisation.52 
Whether brought about by a breakdown of trust or an intense power game between 
politicians and bureaucrats, or inefficiency, the overall question remains here: to what 
extent is the bureaucratic machine working towards upholding democracy and human 
rights? Or, in other words, which bureaucratic practices are hindering democracy and 
the safeguarding of human rights principles? And the crux of the matter here is a 
common concern voiced by people working with immigrants in Malta: that the system 
‘disempowers’ immigrants. One of the NGO workers I interviewed speaks at length 
about this disempowerment. This quote captures a mention of detention but he is 
referring to the totality of the structures and services that cater for irregular 
immigrants. He says: 
One of the biggest obstacles that we face, even in persuading people to take action 
when their rights are violated and take their case to court for example, that the people 
we work for are totally disempowered and the system disempowers them. Part of the 
reason, it’s not the only reason, is that the system disempowers. The whole message of 
detention is that you are the outsider and we are locking you up. Yes, I choose to 
believe it’s not too much to ask because I think it’s essential and as long as it’s only us 
talking it’s not half as effective, and we can’t – alone, if we are speaking on behalf of, or 
if I’m speaking as a Maltese national to my Government saying that I want my 
Government to respect my rights including migrants, ok I can, but there’s a limit to how 
far I can go. As a lawyer I can only go to court if I have a victim who’s ready to complain, 
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and I can’t give up on it, but it does remain one of our biggest stumbling blocks. But the 
tragedy is that there’s a limit to how far we can go.53 
Disempowerment hits at the very soul of democracy and cuts through democratic 
principles and human rights.  Disempowerment of irregular immigrants in Malta 
happens through some bureaucratic practices, including institutionalized indifference, 
which constrain the participatory, deliberative and liberal democratic principles in the 
irregular migration field. Blaming inefficiency is an easy way out. But disempowerment 
does not come by with inefficiency. 
Clearly, in my fieldwork I also came across ‘bureaucrats’ who were more humane and 
sympathetic to immigrants, but even then the struggle to escape the pressures of the 
system are usually easily identified in contradictory statements they come up with. 
One of the Ministry officials shared how difficult he found it to be in his position at 
times: 
I am not the one to blame, but at the same time you feel bad because these are people 
our age and it’s like you’re denying them a future, and you feel bad you know. 
Sometimes it is not easy and I think that’s why, maybe egoistically, I spent some time 
volunteering in open centres because I wanted to feel that I’m doing something for 
them, because in here I used to feel: what good am I doing to them? I might have done 
it for purely for myself. I don’t know. I felt I had to do it and I felt I had to hear the other 
side of the story.54 
This same person, right after sharing this went on to describe a totally fabricated story, 
one of many that circulate in Ministries, depicting immigrants as uncivilised, ungrateful 
and dangerous. This contradictory behaviour suggests that sympathy is just a facade to 
look good and used to achieve a footing in some moral high ground to be able to talk 
down to, and about immigrants. This reinforces Herzfeld’s theory that the indifference 
created by bureaucracies contributes to making societies well-known for hospitality 
become utterly hostile.55 
 
 
                                                          
53
 L, Personal Interview – NGO Worker, 11 January 2009. 
54
 C, Personal Interview – Government Official, 29 October 2008. 
55
 Michael Herzfeld, The Social Production of Indifference,  London, 1992, p. 1. 
213 
Chapter 6 
6.3.3 The difficulties of vita activa in a restricted public sphere 
Citizens in Malta have ample opportunities for civic engagement particularly in the 
third sector (voluntary organisations). A national report on volunteering in Malta 
mentions the key role that volunteering has historically played in Maltese society and 
the important role it now carries in democratic processes. The following is an extract 
from the report: 
The NGO sector on the islands of Malta and Gozo is regarded as vibrant and diverse, 
with organisations and associations stemming from political and cultural groups, sport 
organisations and band clubs, as well as from foundations of different kinds. A rich 
culture of volunteering is a long established tradition (about one century), which is 
especially rooted in the activity of the Church organisations, particularly their 
missionary work....With the substantial growth of the third sector over recent years, 
voluntary organisations play an important role in the democratic processes in Malta 
and contribute to the formation of a robust civil society. An increasing number of 
people are now working in the non-profit sector, which is generating more income and 
investing more money to help a greater number of people than ever before. The sector 
attracts new donors and hundreds more regularly volunteer.56 
However this is not the model of civic engagement envisaged by Arendt. For Arendt 
the concept of vita activa necessitated a national public sphere in which ‘collective 
deliberation’ of issues of the state would take place. Arendt presupposed that citizens 
would act in loyalty to the state, driven by a sense of responsibility towards their 
polity. The public sphere in Malta is however driven by other motivations. Whether it 
is loyalty to a political party, or some other form of allegiance, the motivation is not 
the state. Different and complex motivations therefore inhibit transparency in 
deliberation. 
The public sphere is present and active in Malta but is limited by the characteristics of 
a small community. These characteristics include: a) the pervasiveness and loyalty 
expected by the political parties; b) the fear of speaking out leading to the saying that 
everybody should mind their own business; c) the fear of retribution. This clearly is 
nowhere close to Arendt’s concerns with the lack of freedom and restriction of the 
public sphere in a totalitarian state, or by liberal capitalism. However in a similar way, 
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the public sphere is not restricted by one central authority but by several, smaller, 
different entities. The result is a lack of freedom. 
In brief, civic engagement can be found but in a particularly limited way. This approach 
is supported by the widespread presence of charity-based NGOs, which eclipse the few 
human rights NGOs. A policy advisor within the Ministry says that the lack of a rights-
based culture and of citizen empowerment is due to the strength of the traditional 
ethic of charity which he links to the Catholic Church, and in particular the presence of 
the Catholic Church in the NGO sector. This, he says, works counter to the ideas of 
human rights: 
I think the strength of today’s emerging civil society has its roots in Christian charity 
and therefore this idea of dialectical debate and argumentation about human rights 
and this and that, it hasn’t really emerged from our history of what today we call the 
NGO world. This is our own blend of NGOs or voluntary organisations, and it might 
never change, because the influences are still there. You can have an elite 
understanding of NGOs or import a foreign model and try to impose it on the Maltese 
people – but it will never kick off. What ultimately is more successful is what emerges 
from the grassroots and what emerges from the grassroots is ultimately a charitable 
understanding of civil society. So if you ask me whether the human rights dimension 
will ever be very strong in Malta, I would say no, I would say only the local branches of 
foreign NGOs of international NGOs, will ever in Malta, have a very large, significant 
voice on human rights. Which is a pity but which is also understandable, you cannot 
fight your history and your traditions in a short period of time. It will take ages.57  
Not only is it difficult for civil society – voluntary activity, social and civic organisations - 
to embrace human rights, but in the irregular immigration field those who do take on a 
human rights approach have been targeted with violence. In fact, between 2004 and 
2006, during a peak of debates on irregular migration, several acts of violent vandalism 
took place against a church-linked (Jesuit) NGO, individual activists and journalists who 
stood up for the safeguarding of the human rights of irregular migrants.58 On the 
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whole, irregular immigrants have been visibly absent from debates about irregular 
migration itself. The media expert Carmen Sammut comments on this: 
Up to now some immigrants were heard in relation to human-interest media stories 
that focus on the drama of their personal accounts. However, they still remained 
absent and voiceless in broader debates that affect their fate. On many occasions they 
fell into a spiral of silence or else were analysed as voiceless ‘others’.59 
Active citizenship and the national sphere are therefore conditioned by the largely bi-
partisan political agenda. This explains why public discussions and debates have not 
managed to cut away from the dominant discourse of irregular migration as a national 
threat and burden. The targeting of pro-immigrant activists and lack of presence of 
immigrant-run NGOs means that the negotiation and re-negotiation of national 
identity, which according to the Arendtian model should take place in the national 
public sphere, does not really take place in Malta. 
6.4 Towards a human rights culture 
Although Malta’s political system is formally a democracy with a solid rule of law, a 
number of issues arising from democracy have been identified which disempower 
irregular immigrants and hinder a human rights approach to irregular migration in 
general. The two main political parties are the strongest threat to democracy in Malta 
due to their obsession on control as a mode of operation and a form of aggressive 
competitiveness. The parties are a strong divisive force in society and demand loyalty 
which often takes precedence over the national interest. Addressing this situation 
directly, when it is so deeply entrenched in the social fabric of Maltese society, is very 
difficult. Several proposals have been made by small political parties to amend the 
Constitution so as to allow smaller parties a fair possibility to elect their 
representatives in Parliament. This might partially address, but only in a minimal way. 
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In the eventuality of such amendments, the likelihood is that the same voting patterns 
would be reproduced. Drawing primarily on the analysis above, what I am proposing 
are changes to empower immigrants and to encourage a human rights culture that will 
target the political culture in a more holistic manner to encourage a human rights 
culture. 
Changes to the system 
The right to vote comes along with the right to correct information. The two key 
entities that can ensure this are politicians and the media. Since politicians occupy 
such a privileged position in Maltese society, they should embrace the accompanying 
moral responsibility that comes along with it. Public speeches about irregular 
immigrants and any innuendos which create insecurity should not be used to gain 
political advantage. The role of an independent media in responsible reporting also 
cannot be over emphasised since it has a huge influence on public perceptions of 
immigrants. Reporting should be fair and correct to ensure that voters are presented 
and have access to information. 
Malta’s non-mandatory high voter turnout results, at times, in short-term populist 
policies which are in the interests of the majority and put vulnerable groups at a 
further disadvantage. The global human rights system has been actively encouraging 
states to set up independent human rights institutions or ‘Ombudsperson institutions’, 
to address this issue. Malta has undertaken this approach in several fields of 
disadvantaged groups like that of disability, children, and women. With regards to non-
discrimination on the basis of race, nationality and ethnicity, the responsibility has 
been entrusted to the NCPE. There appear to be various shortcomings in this field. The 
most urgent however are the independence of this entity from the influence of the 
Government and the facilitation of access to it by immigrants. 
Some bureaucratic practices by acting ‘indifferently’ to irregular immigrants are 
(re)producing the boundaries between insiders and outsiders.  The bureaucratic 
system is also burdened with inefficiency because Ministers abuse the system to 
ensure that their clients/electorate is prioritised, however foot dragging techniques by 
the bureaucrats themselves can also be seen as a show of power in reaction to the 
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often repressive leadership styles of the Ministers. Codes of ethics need to be strictly 
adhered to as well as monitoring and complaints mechanisms. A person-centred and 
efficient public bureaucracy would address the general feeling of helplessness and 
disempowerment amongst irregular immigrants. The Office of the Ombudsman which 
deals with complaints of injustice and inefficiency within the public service should be 
more accessible to irregular immigrants. 
Encouraging participation 
Education on the benefits and obligations of all citizens to take an interest and 
participatory role in politics which goes beyond their immediate interests should be at 
the centre of government policy. It is however the current system of patronage which 
hinders such an approach. This needs to be tackled in a more systematic way by 
ensuring a fair, efficient and accessible public bureaucracy. Citizenship education in 
secondary schools is part of the National Minimum Curriculum. This is a laudable 
activity. 
In view of the current dominance of charity-based NGOs, government policy should 
support human rights NGOs and those associations which embrace a human rights 
approach. This could be done by specifically funding projects which are human rights 
based. In addition transparent investigations and protection of activists who are 
targeted is essential. 
Empowering irregular immigrants 
Irregular immigrants need to be supported in organising themselves and speaking out. 
Apart from their participation and contribution to the national public sphere, this 
would have several corollary positive ripple effects particularly for immigrants’ 
integration which is the topic of the next Chapter. 
Irregular immigrants are not tolerated, and are therefore not visible, in the national 
public sphere. As such they cannot contribute to the debates and regeneration of ideas 
that feed into the national imaginary. Given the current state of affairs and an increase 
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in irregular migrants, the active participation of immigrants, including irregular 
migrants, in the national public sphere must be facilitated and encouraged. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The overwhelmingly uncritical presentation and acceptance of the relationship 
between human rights and democracy as almost a natural liaison, is problematic for 
human rights. This relationship is far from being self-evident. For this reason the 
assumption that a democratic political culture would automatically include a human 
rights culture is wrong. An understanding of the inner workings of democracy and how 
this, in practice, can be very different to the formal structures is thus essential for the 
enactment of a human rights culture. Viewing democracy as a ‘field of practice’ brings 
out the continual negotiation that is going on between human rights and democracy. 
This happens at different levels and between different actors. More crucially, it can 
have serious implications for the basic well-being of immigrants. Liberal representative 
democracies, in which the Constitution not only ensures due process and the rule of 
law, but also establishes the protection of human rights as one of the major tenets, 
face such challenges. This Chapter should be seen as providing a contribution to this 
challenge 
In the Maltese case, irregular migrants are at the unfortunate end of these tensions. 
Endeavours to establishing a human rights culture must take into consideration the 
political force that ‘the fear of the masses’ plays in the democratic arena. This works 
against the interest of minorities or disadvantaged groups which are numerically small. 
Irregular migrants, by not even holding any votes, are disadvantaged in a more 
extreme way. 
In addition, some bureaucratic practices acerbate the politics of exclusion and produce 
a ‘disempowering system’ which negates immigrants’ access to basic services. 
Although such practices are less visible, they constitute an important part of the 
human rights praxis and ought to be identified and discussed more. It is unfortunate 
that there are not enough significant forces from within civil society acting as a lobby 
for irregular migrants. On the other hand, NGO activity appears to be embedded in a 
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dominant overarching framework of charity that does not allow a human rights 
approach. The expectation of political engagement from civil society on governance 
issues from a human rights point of view is therefore curtailed. This needs to be 
addressed together with the responsibility of citizens to participate in popular 
governance. Both must be framed in the broader democratic rationale of warding off 
the negative forces of oppression and tyranny. Finally, this should include the 
realisation that the empowerment of irregular migrants is crucial to establishing a 
human rights culture within a democratic setting. Human rights philosophy therefore 
requires a particular democratic culture which consciously accommodates and 
prioritises human rights principles. 
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Chapter 7: ‘After the roads’: How equality in human 
rights translates into a model for social justice 
7.1 Introduction 
So you do not give me first priority, but excuse me, if you’re not going to give me first 
priority, where are you going to put me on your scale of priorities? Are you going to put 
me at the very bottom, after the roads? It’s a question of setting social priorities. I think 
there’s a reason behind the fact that we don’t give enough support to these foreigners 
coming to our country. It could be due to a lack of will, or that we don’t recognise their 
rights – and equally the reason for this could be that our resources are limited and that 
we are not able to manage them well. But at the end of the day, it’s a question of 
values also, scale of values.1 
This quote is taken from a personal interview with a Church Agency employee who 
commented on the lack of equality and fairness that characterises the treatment of 
irregular migrants in Malta. The state of the roads in Malta is a constant in political 
rhetoric and popular jokes due to the persistent presence of pot holes. The pot-holed 
roads are therefore associated with public goods which are not adequately 
maintained. This quote should not be taken as a libertarian comment, in contrast to a 
communitarian stance, focusing on the common good and public goods. Rather the 
interviewee, perplexed by the lack of care for human beings, uses this allegory to 
explain how irregular immigrants fail to feature in Malta’s list of social priorities as 
they are relegated to some obscure place after the maintenance of public goods. 
This Chapter asks: how is it possible to safeguard civil and political rights when 
satisfactory economic and social conditions are not in place? How can irregular 
immigrants in Malta express their humanity if they are destitute or lack the basic 
means for subsistence? Placing irregular immigrants’ issues ‘after the roads’ would 
suggest that the Government feels justified in not meeting the minimal standards 
required for basic needs. As a result, many irregular immigrants in the community are 
excluded, living almost in segregation, vulnerable to destitution, at risk of absolute 
poverty, with many living in tent villages ‘infested by rats’, and more, as this Chapter 
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Personal Interview Q – Church agency employee, 23 January 2009.
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will illustrate.2 In addition to the suffering caused to the immigrants themselves, 
widespread intelligence that the creation of such ghettos is hardly ever in the national 
interest, seems to be ignored. Ghettos risk becoming hubs of illegal and criminal 
activity, and generally play a significant part in exacerbating negative sentiments and 
contempt between the host community and the migrants. This Chapter also confirms 
the assertion made in Chapter 4 that the ill-treatment of immigrants in detention is 
abominable but it is also indicative of the presence of deeper structural problems. This 
kind of unequal treatment is not acceptable from a human rights point of view. Indeed, 
the concept of equality was identified earlier in the introductory chapter as the fourth 
building block of a human rights culture. 
Equality in the human rights movement is presented in a multi-dimensional, albeit 
delimited, way. The human rights logic is based on the principle of ‘moral equality’, 
which is derived from a shared humanity and expressed in the concept of human 
dignity, and promotes a dualistic understanding of ‘social equality’. Social equality is 
important for two reasons, firstly to counter cultural domination and discriminatory 
practices through policies and a provision of services that ensure ‘equality of 
opportunity’. Secondly, equality is also used in an economic sense to denote a fair 
distribution of resources which prioritises the most vulnerable. These different 
aspects, or dimensions, of the same concept present in the UDHR should not be seen 
as separate, but as two interdependent characteristics of the same concept.  
The critical theorist Nancy Fraser makes a strong argument for a multi-dimensional 
understanding of equality. She argues that a theory of justice needs to be just as 
sensitive to socio-economic injustices as to cultural injustices. The former, she says, 
necessitates ‘redistribution’ of resources, the latter can be addressed through 
‘recognition’. Addressing both these forms of injustice, or dimensions of equality, will 
enable ‘representation’,  or ‘parity of participation’ to occur in society, which apart 
from being a means of addressing injustice in itself, also demonstrates the structural 
position of disadvantaged groups in a given society. This Chapter will use these three 
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Advocacy Network on Destitution, A report on a pilot study on destitution amongst the migrant population in 
Malta, Jesuit Refugee Service Malta, Birkirkara, 2010; Mario Cardona, You will always have the poor among you: A 
report about poverty in Malta, Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice, Valletta, 2010; Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, following his visit to 
Malta from 23 to 25 March 2011, CommDH(2011)17, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2011. 
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constitutive elements of equality (redistribution, recognition and representation) to 
identify the gaps between the kind of ideal-type equality presented by human rights 
and the current practice of equality with irregular immigrants in Malta. The aim is to 
demonstrate how the notion of social equality as presented by human rights is a 
powerful concept that serves to highlight the multiple and subtle ways in which 
irregular immigrants are treated unequally in Malta. This leads me squarely into the 
central questions of this Chapter: How are social priorities set in Malta? What does this 
say about social equality and social justice in Malta? What possible directions are 
suggested when using the notion of social equality as presented by human rights to 
analyse the situation? 
This Chapter will show how the concept of social equality in human rights philosophy 
should guide political decisions on a state’s redistribution of resources. The main 
message that this Chapter imparts is that first everybody’s human rights need to be 
safeguarded and only once this is attained could decisions be made on other forms of 
social and public spending. In practice this might mean a decrease to the general 
standard of living of the polity (Maltese citizens in this study), insofar as this decrease 
in the standard of living does not threaten the basic livelihood of this polity. This 
reasoning could be seen as an internal application by states of the principle of 
universality. In other words, human rights logic promotes a redistribution of resources 
that caters first for the basic needs of all. The Professor of Public Policy and 
Philosophy, Allen Buchanan, notes with regret a lack of engagement between theories 
of egalitarianism and human rights literature. He says: 
Recent philosophical theories of egalitarianism have generally proceeded as if there 
were no human rights movement or as if the idea of human rights was not an 
important expression of the commitment to equality. Human rights lawyers and 
activists have generally not drawn on recent philosophical egalitarian theories to help 
ground the conventional conception of human rights....3 
This Chapter could also be seen as an attempt to contribute to this gap. It is divided 
into four sections. In the next section, the multi-dimensional notion of equality 
necessary for a human rights culture, as informed by Fraser’s theory, is outlined. The 
following section demonstrates how irregular immigrants’ needs are excluded from 
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 Allen Buchanan, ‘Equality and Human Rights’, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Vol. 4, no. 1, 2005, p. 87. 
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the national list of social priorities. Furthermore, two issues stand out for their use in 
justifying unequal treatment and exclusion. These are, the discourse of a ‘lack of 
resources’ and the absence of an integration policy. I argue that this leads to rampant 
unequal treatment, best described as exclusion, and to the positioning of immigrants’ 
basic needs to ‘after the roads’. The following section puts forward some proposals 
towards addressing this situation. The final section asserts the need for a cultural shift 
towards an egalitarian society for the nurturing of a human rights culture. 
7.2 The concept of equality in human rights theory 
The concept of equality is mentioned no less than thirteen times in the UDHR (either 
as ‘equality’ or as ‘equal’). This gives an indication of the importance of the concept for 
the modern human rights movement. Buchanan has unequivocally stated: 
The modern human rights movement is arguably the most salient and powerful 
manifestation of the commitment to equality in our time.4 
The concept of equality in the modern human rights movement is understood in a 
multi-faceted way. Equality is first used as an overarching moral-philosophical principle 
of universal human dignity. It asserts the Enlightenment idea that all human beings are 
equal in worth and have equal human rights. This can be seen in the UDHR Preamble 
and article 1 which state: 
Preamble: Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world, 
Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights... 
Its second use is more substantive and more clearly geared towards the achievement 
of social and global justice. This includes articles which promote non-discrimination 
and ensure equality of opportunity. The concept of equality thus cuts across the 
traditional categorisation of human rights into civil and political rights (associated with 
‘freedom from’), and economic, social and cultural rights (associated with ‘freedom 
to’). For example, in the UDHR equality as negative rights would include article 7 the 
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 Ibid, p. 69. 
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right to non-discrimination and article 10 the right to a fair hearing. Equality as positive 
rights would include article 21(2) the right to access to public services, article 23(2) the 
right to equal pay for equal work and article 26(1) the right to education. 
Fraser makes no claims to put forward specifically a human rights view, however her 
theory is grounded in a similar nuanced understanding of equality which is the reason 
why her theory is amply used in this Chapter. Fraser can be seen as articulating the 
message inherent in the UDHR, that the practice of social equality, or addressing 
societal inequalities, requires appropriate political, cultural and economic conditions. 
The following quote explains the inter-relation of representation, recognition and 
redistribution, the three main characteristics of Fraser’s theory of justice. She says: 
It is my general thesis that justice today requires both redistribution and recognition. 
Neither alone is sufficient, as soon as one embraces this thesis, however, the question 
of how to combine them becomes paramount. I contend that: the emancipator aspects 
of the two paradigms need to be integrated in a single, comprehensive framework. 
Theoretically, the task is to devise a two-dimensional conception of justice that can 
accommodate both defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for the 
recognition of difference. Practically, the task is to devise a programmatic political 
orientation that integrates the best of the politics of redistribution with the best of the 
politics of recognition.5 
Fraser supports a dualistic view of social justice. She points out that the two aspects 
are increasingly and misleadingly portrayed as antithetical, mutually exclusive and 
even, at times, polarised by theorists.6 Therefore, in much the same way as the politics 
of recognition and difference are not properly acknowledged by theories of poverty 
reduction and wealth redistribution, the politics of recognition also tends to put aside 
redistribution concerns. According to Fraser this failure is based on two false 
assumptions: a) that inequality in modern capitalist societies is solely conditioned by 
the market whereas; b) in pre-state societies inequality was based on kinship.7 Fraser 
argues, on the other hand, that inequalities in modern capitalist societies are generally 
produced by a combination of so-called traditional hierarchy-setting mechanisms, like 
kinship, and also by market forces. In other words, inequalities are never the result of 
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 Nancy Fraser, ‘Social justice in the age of identity politics: Redistribution, recognition, and participation’ in 
Geographic Thought: A Praxis Perspective, eds. G. Henderson & M. Waterstone, Routledge, Oxon, 2009, p. 73. 
6
 Ibid, pp. 72-73. 
7
 Ibid, p. 82. 
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one or the other but are usually a combination of both. Fraser also laments the 
decreasing interest in egalitarian redistribution which she considers crucial to a proper 
theory of justice. She explains it thus: 
The demise of communism, the surge of free-market ideology, the rise of ‘identity 
politics’ in both its fundamentalist and progressive forms—all these developments have 
conspired to de-centre, if not to extinguish, claims for egalitarian redistribution.8 
Fraser’s main argument is that justice requires social arrangements that permit all 
members to participate in social interaction on a par with one another in all spheres of 
life – politics, the labour market, family life and so on. Parity of participation is a 
demanding requirement for the state to implement because the creation of effective 
conditions for participation requires more than the elimination of legal discrimination, 
it also demands positive action. Fraser describes the different dimensions of justice as 
such: 
The redistribution paradigm focuses on injustices it defines as socio-economic and 
presumes to be rooted in the political economy. Examples include exploitation, 
economic marginalization, and deprivation. The recognition paradigm, in contrast, 
targets injustices it understands as cultural, which it presumes to be rooted in social 
patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication. Examples include 
cultural domination, non-recognition, and disrespect.9 
The following sections will explore social inequalities from the Fraserian perspectives 
of ‘recognition’, ‘redistribution’ and ‘representation’ to facilitate the subsequent 
analysis of irregular migrants in Malta. By dissociating the three concepts I am aware 
that I might appear to be falling into the trap that Fraser herself warned against. 
However, this is not a conceptual dissociation but is pursued purely with the intention 
of ease of analysis, as can be seen in the resulting conclusions which combine the 
three aspects. 
7.2.1 Redistributing wealth 
In Fraserian terms, ‘redistribution’ refers primarily to the socio-economic dimension of 
equality, which Fraser describes as such: 
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The redistribution paradigm focuses on injustices it defines as socio-economic and 
presumes to be rooted in the economic structure of society.10 
In this way, it is understood as the transfer of a nation’s wealth from those who have 
more to those who have less. The most typical examples are mechanisms like taxation 
and the welfare system. ‘Maldistributions’ of goods and resources in societies are 
therefore corrected to ensure that those most in need have their basic needs met.11 
Discussions around the implementation of the concept of equality have been ongoing 
for a long time. Theories of social justice were introduced into political discourse in the 
19th century by progressive social philosophers and social economists.12 Their aim was 
the inclusion of the poor and disenfranchised as equals within a given society because 
they could see that the poor were suffering as a consequence of unequal treatment. In 
a similar vein, the concern of human rights is to ensure that enough resources are 
directed towards disadvantaged individuals and groups in society to enable them to 
live in a way that is respectful of their dignity. Although this is not a mainstream 
approach, and may appear controversial, the ICESCR by reiterating that the ideal of 
human beings is to enjoy freedom from fear and want, clearly indicates the approach 
to be taken. The following is an excerpt from the Preamble of the ICESCR: 
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved 
if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural 
rights, as well as his civil and political rights.13 
In addition, the argument of resource constraints, from a human rights point of view, 
does not immediately justify and absolve any state from its obligations. Interestingly, 
article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) stipulates the obligation of state parties to take the necessary steps ‘to the 
maximum of its available resources’ to ensure the upholding of the human rights of all. 
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 Nancy Fraser & Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange, Verso, London, 
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 Nancy Fraser, Social justice in the age of identity politics, 2009, p. 73. 
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This was explained in General Comment 3 of the UN Committee on Social, Economic 
and Cultural Rights.14  Point 11 of this General Comment states: 
...even where the available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation 
remains for a State party to strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the 
relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances. Moreover, the obligations to 
monitor the extent of the realization, or more especially of the non-realization, of 
economic, social and cultural rights, and to devise strategies and programmes for their 
promotion, are not in any way eliminated as a result of resource constraints.15 
States’ obligation to ensure the conditions for the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights is however not unlimited. Equality is limited to the minimal conditions 
which are necessary for one to be able to seek and build a decent life. This is in line 
with Buchanan’s minimalist view, or what he calls the ‘Modest Objectivist View’ of 
human rights, the essence of which is described in the following quote: 
...according to the Modest Objectivist View, honoring the commitment to human rights 
does not require anything approaching equality of condition or outcome for all human 
beings, nor even that all human beings actually have decent lives; instead, it only 
requires that all have the opportunity for a decent life.16 
Buchanan does not resolve the difficulty of defining exactly what constitutes a decent 
life although the articles in the ICESCR and ensuing treaties, as well as General 
Comments by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), give 
clear directions. What is not negotiable is the prime value given to the concept of 
equality. The human rights logic decrees that the concept of equality comes first 
before status differences, citizenship, difficulties in management and so on. This can 
be seen in the following quote from the CESCR: 
...the Committee underlines the fact that even in times of severe resources constraints 
whether caused by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or by other factors 
the vulnerable members of society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption 
of relatively low-cost targeted programmes.17 
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 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General Comment 3, ‘The nature of States parties 
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It would appear that the problem in Western developed countries is the infiltration of 
rights-talk into spheres of needs which do not constitute basic needs. An example of 
this is the right to education. The right to education in the UDHR, as well as in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, states that all children have the right to 
primary education. However, taking into account that primary education is a basic 
right, it would be inconceivable for a human rights approach to be made for all 
children to have access to a privileged school, like for example Eton College. And yet, it 
is common knowledge that education at such a school, for a variety of reasons, 
generally enhances the life chances of a child. Should all children have a ‘human right’ 
to attend Eton? No. According to human rights, states are under no more than the 
‘minimal core obligation’ to ensure that children have access to quality education. 
Granting anything beyond this would be a state’s decision. For example, in Malta, as 
part of a policy to encourage young people to further their education by reading for a 
University degree, every student is supported by a maintenance grant. Students from 
low-income families are supported by a higher grant, and it is expected (according to 
the politics of recognition embraced by the state) that particular needs like 
impairments are to be taken into account. Are these human rights? Not necessarily; 
one could talk about human rights only if they are deemed to be indispensable for 
creating the right conditions for basic minimal standards.18 They are however inspired 
by the same principles like human rights but are essentially state concessions, policies 
or if enshrined in law, civil rights. ‘Expecting’ more than basic needs from human rights 
can be dangerous partly because it could lead to political contestations and the 
watering down of rights talk. More crucially, such higher expectations obscure the 
main message of human rights: that the very basic needs need to be prioritised by 
governments. As Henry Shue, professor of ethics masterly put it, human rights are the 
‘minimum core obligations’ for ‘a decent chance at a reasonably healthy and active life 
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 I am aware that this is a controversial statement, and I am also aware of the following article, amongst others:  
UN, ICESCR, 1966, Article 13, 2(c) ’Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, 
by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education’. Although this 
article could be interpreted, as it often has been, that the State has an obligation to  provide services that ensure 
accessibility to all, it does not detract from my main argument deriving from the spirit of human rights that policies 
should aim first to ensuring the basic minimum standards.  
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of more or less normal length’.19 The creation of the discourse of a ‘lack of resources’ 
discussed below must be seen against this backdrop. 
Wealth redistribution is a central tenet of every state, in both the global north and the 
global south. It requires complex mechanisms not least because fraudulent activity 
could jeopardise the whole system. In addition, it has been pointed out, by feminists 
and others, that the reliance of vulnerable people on state benefits does not 
necessarily lead to emancipation, but at times helps the reproduction of oppressive 
societal structures.20 In spite of these problems, wealth redistribution remains one of 
the keys to achieving social justice insofar as the focus remains on basic standards and 
therefore minimum core obligations owed by the state.21 It is worth noting that in 
spite of high economic development no country in the world has yet managed to 
achieve this for all the people on its territory. 
7.2.2 Recognising differences 
‘Recognition’ refers to the politics of identities and differences. Redress of injustices of 
this kind would be sought when a hegemonic culture is imposed as the norm.22 The 
increasing multiculturalism of modern societies can be seen as both a product (and 
reproducing) increasing differentiation between people. This, unfortunately, can give 
way to unequal treatment and injustices based on different stereotypes and roles.  The 
politics of recognition are not just a socio-political issue but also a moral and personal 
one because by undermining people’s sense of selfhood and self-worth the harm 
inflicted can be personally damaging.23 This explains why injustices of this kind have 
been presented as a form of oppression.24 Fraser describes this dimension of equality 
in the following manner: 
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The recognition paradigm...targets injustices it understands as cultural, which it 
presumes to be rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation and 
communication.25 
Equality before the law is one way in which these kinds of injustices can be addressed. 
Indeed, laws can support social change by addressing existing hierarchies within 
societies. Furthermore modern capitalist societies incorporate other distinct patterns 
of ordering and patterns of subordination which cannot be eradicated by legal reform. 
These processes of hierarchy-setting linked to status and role are often overlooked and 
wrongly perceived as remnants of ‘traditional’ practices and societies which have not 
been eradicated by capitalism.  
‘Modern’ and ‘democratic’ societies striving for equality also create groups of people 
who are considered inferior to such an extent that they are excluded.26 Exclusion, 
although a contested term, is generally taken to refer to those who are 
administratively excluded by the state, and as such, denotes an extreme case of 
inequality.27 It is with such cases that human rights are concerned and necessary. 
Returning back to the argument made in the previous section, by proposing a limited 
equality, human rights are indirectly reasserting their mandate to safeguard all 
peoples’ dignity. The human rights approach is not about safeguarding a particular 
standard of living, which may be already higher than the minimum necessary for a 
decent life, it is about finding the minimal standard which enables the politics of 
recognition to be implemented. In practice, one would expect the Government to 
invest first in eradicating gender discrimination at the workplace, before, for example, 
gender discrimination at luxury casinos. 
Given the severe and extreme nature of discrimination that some groups face, the 
temptation to treat the case study in isolation is greater. The risk, in doing so, is that 
social research becomes implicated in justifying the ‘difference’. In the case of non-
citizens, this is often the case. In such cases it is important to view groups according to 
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their structural position in society. This is the argument put forward by the feminist 
scholar Mariam Martínez whose research focuses on disenfranchised immigrants in 
contemporary societies. She writes: 
From a social justice perspective it does not matter if the source of the subordinate 
position of immigrant social groups in European societies is a different set of practices, 
conventions, music, language, or visual images. What matters instead is that because of 
this difference they stand in a structural position in which they find more obstacles to 
the pursuit of their interests and skilled professions; a structural position in which they 
have a small range of opportunities to achieve and develop autonomy or exercise their 
capacities.28 
Martinez’s approach is useful because it exemplifies how the human rights approach in 
the analysis of a social situation should look for the obstacles, or structural position, to 
use Martinez’s words, that cause inequality. In addition it is also inclusive because it 
maps immigrants’ disadvantage within the same parameters of other disadvantaged 
groups. 
7.2.3 Representation or ‘participation parity’ 
The third dimension of Fraser’s theory of justice is political ‘representation’, or 
participation parity. This dimension is different to the others in that it can also function 
as a normative tool to identify gaps in the system.29 Fraser proposes that this idea of 
participative parity should lead us to identify the existing disparities in participation as 
a consequence of asymmetries of power and barriers to participation. In an ideal 
world, ‘participative parity’ is a state in which all the barriers to participation in society 
are removed and in which people voluntarily participate out of their own free will. 
Participation parity, or political representation, can be achieved by ensuring 
redistribution of wealth and recognition of differences. She explains it as such: 
According to the norm [of parity of participation], justice requires social arrangements 
that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers. For 
participatory parity to be possible, I claim, at least two conditions must be satisfied. 
First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants’ 
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independence and ‘voice.’ I call this the objective condition of participatory parity. The 
second condition requires that institutional patterns of cultural value express equal 
respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social parity. This 
I shall call the intersubjective condition of participatory parity. ... either burdening them 
with excessive ascribed ‘difference’ or by failing to acknowledge their distinctiveness.30 
Apart from their normative use, the principles of ‘participation’ and ‘representation’ 
also need to be qualified from a human rights point of view. Retaining the ideal of a 
barrier-free society in which every member responsibly participates out of his own free 
will is laudable, but is no more than a guiding principle. Misguided assumptions, like 
that legal citizens automatically feel part of the political community and voluntarily 
take up their obligations, including participation in governance, should be contested. 
Examples easily come to mind of both citizens who are alienated or politically 
irresponsible, as well as non-citizens who are socially and politically committed to their 
host community. A more controversial area is when the political participation of 
migrants, who are by definition external to the polity, should be allowed. Just as 
participation in the labour market is often justified as necessary for the country, 
participation in governance and politics is an altogether completely different matter. 
An extreme example like the right to vote serves to highlight both some of the 
qualifications and at the same time, limitations of equality. Does everybody have the 
human right to vote? The ICCPR presupposes (official) political membership, as article 
25 states: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity...: 
a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free 
expression of the will of the electors; 
c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.31 
To take the discussion further, two hypothetical examples are proposed. The first is an 
immigrant who has been living and working in a country for fifteen years. He rents an 
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apartment and has a long-term residence permit which is renewed every ten years. 
The second example is of another immigrant who has been living in the country for 
two years. He has just managed to secure a temporary job. He spent the first eighteen 
months in a migrant detention centre and has been living in a migrant open centre for 
the last six months. He has a ‘temporary leave to remain’ permit. Understandably, the 
right to vote of the first immigrant would be more positively looked upon than the 
right to vote of the second immigrant. However, although giving the second immigrant 
the right to vote presents practical and moral difficulties the result is non-
representation which is likely to put the immigrant at a disadvantage and this might 
have serious implications if it affects his basic human rights or minimal core 
entitlements. Buchanan goes further and argues that if the link between democratic 
participation and representation of interests leads to the minimal conditions necessary 
if an individual is to have an opportunity for a decent human life, then democratic 
participation should be considered a human right for all. Below is his argument: 
Voting or otherwise participating in governance may not be a constituent of a 
minimally good life for all human beings, but there is considerable evidence that 
various constituents of a minimally good life are typically at risk when those who are 
governed are not able to participate in governance. Thus it is said that even if the right 
to democratic governance is not itself a human right, it provides the most reliable 
protection for human rights.32 
The starting point of human rights logic is the principle of equality. It is then followed, 
in a secondary instance, by considerations arising from the principle of difference. 
Citizens and non-citizens (including irregular migrants) as members of one universal 
cosmopolitan community should therefore have the right to become members of any 
polity. Human rights does not establish precise criteria - how long that should take, or 
under which conditions – but one can utilise human rights logic to arrive to a decision 
on what criteria would be legitimate and justifiable in a given context.33 The argument 
therefore is that any limitations should be made within a larger human rights 
framework which values moral equality and inclusion above difference and exclusion. 
In other words, the understanding of the concept of equality in human rights 
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philosophy cannot be compromised but it is ‘delimit-able’ under certain conditions. 
One can presume that attaining agreement on the justifiability of these conditions will 
create controversy. 
To sum up, the understanding of equality necessary for a human rights culture is 
distinctive because it is both multi-dimensional and limited. It is multi-dimensional 
because it demands the principles of recognition, redistribution, participation as the 
foundations for an egalitarian society. In addition, and most importantly, equality in 
human rights is understood as limited because it focuses on achieving minimum core 
obligations and action is therefore directed first to the most disadvantaged in society, 
that is to say, to those whose opportunity to live a decent life is under threat even if 
they happen to be non-citizens. 
The following section will analyse the situation of irregular immigrants in Malta. The 
allegation that irregular immigrants are not treated equally will be investigated and 
subsequently analysed using the Fraserian concepts of representation, redistribution 
and recognition. 
7.3 The structural exclusion of irregular immigrants in Malta 
Although this section will show how the majority of irregular immigrants are generally 
structurally excluded, the situation is somewhat appeased by charitable institutions. 
Paradoxically, the logic of this charitable approach might run counter to a human rights 
approach because it does not arise out of an egalitarian culture of entitlements.34 In 
Malta rights-talk is widely felt to ‘put peoples’ backs up’, and many Maltese feel much 
more comfortable employing a charitable approach. As one Maltese employee of an 
international NGO put it: 
Yes, we are very happy to be charitable because it makes us feel good as human beings, 
but if we recognise ourselves as superior, we do not recognise their right to work. 
‘Jaħasra’ [poor thing] is a common way of referring to immigrants which is highly 
pejorative. It still remains an issue of power. It is one thing if I willingly give you 
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something, because it’s nice to do this kind of thing, but as soon as you start 
demanding rights that’s a totally different matter. A lot of people have this kind of 
attitude...‘I’ll help you, of course, I’ll surely help you. But don’t come speaking about 
rights.’ Rights then are a different issue altogether. It puts peoples’ backs up.35 
From this perspective, being charitable and benevolent sustains the power imbalance 
which keeps outsiders firmly out. It would explain the reluctance to deal with issues of 
equality of non-citizens. Another NGO worker highlights this power imbalance: 
So let’s find them [immigrants] a small job, let’s help them, and with little pay but at 
least we’re [Maltese people] doing a lot because we’re helping them to have this job. 
Or else, there are a lot of them and we put them in detention centres and we give them 
food and ‘all they need’, and this is what we understand by helping them. As long as we 
feel that they’re inferior to us, we can leave them in that category. But we are helping 
them ‘jaħasra’ [poor things]. When we start seeing that they are trying to become like 
us – then we don’t accept it at all, then we become angry and fearful...36 
This is the dominant societal attitude and is unfortunately supported in large part by 
the lack of action by the Government to address these issues in a meaningful way. The 
‘inferior’ treatment, negative societal attitudes and stereotypes that irregular 
immigrants regularly have to endure are not being addressed systematically by 
governmental policies. This brings about a situation whereby it is acceptable that 
immigrants are treated unequally, and where they are not included in discussions of 
fairness and justice. 
The rest of the analysis will follow the Fraserian representation, recognition and 
redistribution. The presentation of the analysis will start by drawing on ‘participation 
parity’. This section will demonstrate that the inequality gap is huge and that this 
makes it difficult to think of the level of ‘emancipation’ of irregular immigrants, or as 
Martinez had said, the structural disadvantage. With this in mind, the focus on the 
following two sections, drawing on wealth redistribution and the politics of 
recognition, will focus on two dominant discourses which condition any initiatives in 
this regard. 
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7.3.1 The unequal treatment of irregular immigrants as a barrier to 
‘participation parity’ 
If representation and participation parity are the yardstick by which to measure 
irregular immigrants’ equality and emancipation in society, then what could be said of 
a group of people who are not represented or allowed to participate in any way? It is 
not possible to give a full description of the political, socio-economic and cultural 
exclusion that immigrants face, I have chosen to describe a few issues which depict 
unequal treatment. 
Irregular immigrants have been identified as a new category of people living on the 
poverty line and at risk of destitution in a report entitled You will always have the poor 
among you published by the Centre for Faith and Justice.37 However this is not 
acknowledged by the authorities. For example, the Maltese Parliament, in July 2009, 
declared that there was ‘no absolute poverty’ in Malta.38 Both sides of Parliament 
were in agreement on the presence of relative poverty. Member of Parliament Joe 
Cassar noted that the report did not make enough reference to immigrants because 
according to him, ‘It was also relative poverty when people resorted to waylaying an 
immigrant, beat him up and leave him helpless at the side of a road.’39 This assertion 
that there was no absolute poverty in Malta was heavily contested and serves to show 
that parliamentarians are far removed from the reality. Just a few days later the 
National Platform of Maltese Non-governmental Development Organisations (SKOP) 
publicly urged the Maltese authorities to acknowledge the existence of absolute 
poverty and to implement policies to support vulnerable people. The SKOP 
spokesperson was reported as saying: 
At the same time that the parliamentary debate rejecting the existence of absolute 
poverty in Malta, a number of social activists were holding meetings with a group of 
African women residing in the north of Malta and currently benefiting from 
humanitarian protection. This group of around 30 women, all with children, lack basic 
needs including food and nappies for their children. This amounts to absolute poverty 
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by any definition...Refusing or failing to acknowledge such categories of people was a 
sure way to guarantee that their needs would not be met.40 
SKOP’s statement is corroborated by another study conducted by ANDES which found 
that migrants in Malta fall into destitution because the benefits given to them are not 
enough to cover subsistence costs, not to mention accommodation and medical 
services.41 The following extract from a 2010 report issued by Thomas Hammarberg, 
the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights sums the present situation up: 
...progress in this area should be matched by...efforts on the part of the Maltese 
authorities to establish viable, long-term avenues for local integration, which should be 
supported by an adequate integration programme and eventually lead to family 
reunification and citizenship. To this end, the Commissioner finds that the system in 
place to support migrants, including beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, currently 
perpetuates their social exclusion and leaves them at serious risk of destitution. The 
Commissioner believes that in order to favour the gradual development of migrants’ 
self-reliance and integration into society, the system which currently makes financial 
support for migrants dependent on residence in the open centres should be 
discontinued. Also, financial support and social assistance should be available to all 
beneficiaries of international protection.42 
Apart from the parliamentarian’s comment mentioned above, the utter lack of 
awareness of the plight of irregular immigrants by Maltese Parliament attests to the 
political invisibility of irregular migrants and supports the usefulness of the concept of 
‘participation parity’. This sheds further light on the opening quotation that irregular 
immigrants’ needs are placed ‘after the roads’, and paves the way for the discussion 
below on the lack of resources and the absence of an integration policy. Certainly it 
exemplifies the scale of structural inequalities and as a result the gravity of human 
rights violations. 
Apart from the provision of services and benefits, those persons who live below the 
poverty line in Malta are supported by the Non-Contributory Scheme regulated by the 
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Social Security Act.43 Yet, irregular immigrants’ benefits do not fall under this scheme 
and the financial allowance they receive is the responsibility of another Ministry. Once 
released from detention, irregular immigrants receive an allowance which varies 
according to their status. The rates are outrageously low. On average, migrants receive 
approximately €130 a month, and those returned under the EU’s Dublin System 
(described in Chapter 3) receive around €80 a month. This support is received on the 
condition that they are residing at one of the migrant open centres. Just to get an idea 
of how little this sum is, it is worth comparing it to the weekly national minimum wage 
which itself is referred to as a ‘poverty wage’ by sociologists Angela Abela and Charles 
Tabone.44 In 2008 it was €142.70 per week, which is already more than immigrants get 
per month. If €142.70 is a ‘poverty wage’, one can only imagine how miserly the 
immigrants’ allowance is when it amounts to less than one fourth  of the national 
minimum wage. Abela and Tabone explain it thus: 
In 2008, the minimum wage in Malta was a mere €142.7 per week and has been 
referred to as a ‘poverty wage’. Caritas Malta Director, Monsignor Grech, has called for 
the minimum wage to be redefined to an adequate amount, pointing to the rising cost 
of living and medicine and the high cost of property as factors causing hardship among 
the poor.45 
In addition, the provision and access to social services for immigrants can be difficult. 
There are indications that this maybe be due to a lack of clear policies between 
government departments, a lack of training of professionals, the persistence of deeply 
entrenched prejudices and negative attitudes or a combination of the three. The 
following quote from an interview with a Ministry official shows the lack of 
collaboration between Ministries, and the quibbling over responsibilities and funding 
of services: 
Unfortunately some officials do not understand that illegal migration is not a Ministry 
for Justice and Home Affairs issue – it’s also a Ministry for Social Policy issue, and a 
Ministry for Health issue, and all the other Ministries...but what is their contribution?  
Close to nil, honestly, because financially the money has to come out all from the 
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Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs. Is that fair, or not? At a certain point the money 
finishes, even here!46 
At the other end, NGO workers lamented the lack of coordination between 
government agencies. This has very serious implications when the most vulnerable 
immigrants - minors, immigrants with a disability, victims of violence and so on – are in 
need of a service. The following quote from an interview with an NGO worker 
demonstrates the difficulties he faces when trying to access services for his vulnerable 
immigrant clients: 
In the social work field for example, there is a lack of knowledge as well. For example 
we take an African irregular immigrant who’s being beaten by her husband to APPOGG. 
We’re told, ‘sorry, we don’t know about these people, we can’t work with them’, and 
we’re referred back to OIWAS. At OIWAS we’re told that they’re not there to work with 
victims of domestic violence. The message that I get is that because the victim is from a 
different country, from a different culture, they won’t work with them. Even amongst 
social workers there’s a lot of fear...And then there is the problem that some social 
workers won’t work with them because they are refugees not Maltese, because ‘they 
shouldn’t be here and they shouldn’t be taken care of’. And ‘I have a long list, a waiting 
list and our Maltese clients come first’. But usually the policy is that victims are treated 
according to the priority of the case, not by who came in first – in units like child 
protection, in units like domestic violence, priority is given to high risk cases. When we 
go with an immigrant case they would say ‘sorry we have a lot of Maltese waiting and 
they come first’, even though in reality they have the same rights for those social 
services like anyone else in Malta has. If it’s a priority and if it’s serious they should be 
treated like other victims.47 
These institutionalised practices have a disempowering effect on the immigrants not 
least because they reinforce the attitude that immigrants are a burden on the nation 
and undeserving of being served. What avenues for appeal, recourse or contestation 
do immigrants have? Not many. When I was on fieldwork, Malta had just transposed 
the Equality Directive into Maltese law, entrusting an existing body, the then National 
Commission for the Equality between Men and Women (which subsequently became 
the National Commission for Equality – NCPE) with its implementation. However due 
to a variety of reasons, with the lack of funds being the one most cited by my 
informants, this body was not delivering, immigrants hardly knew of its existence and 
those who did displayed a general diffidence in the whole institution. This is not 
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altogether surprising since diffidence in state structures is widespread amongst 
immigrants coming from countries in conflict or who have been traumatised by 
migrant detention in Malta (or on their journey). Those few migrants, who tried to 
access services, or to contest decisions, were faced with impenetrable barriers. 
At the time that I conducted fieldwork, the situation was indeed dire and characterised 
by a general sense of hopelessness. The following quote from an interview with a 
refugee confirms this: 
I never saw an immigrant who wants to stay in Malta...Most of the people they don’t 
have any skill, most of them they have families in their home countries. In Malta there 
is no chance of getting reunited with one’s family, there isn’t training either in 
language, in skill, or in anything - so here it is just like someone stays floating on the 
Island, without having any clear future.48 
The use of the term ‘floating on the Island’ strongly denotes powerlessness. This shows 
that the absence of an egalitarian approach has a direct negative effect on immigrants 
because they fail to see the possibility of taking control of their life in their hands. 
Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas Hammerberg comments: 
Migrants I spoke to really show a high level of frustration and feel stuck in a limbo – 
unable to move to other European countries which return them to Malta because they 
are fingerprinted here; unable to return home; and unable to integrate in Malta. 
Measures enhancing migrants’ integration should be accompanied by determined 
action to eliminate manifestations of intolerance and xenophobia.49 
The above case study showing irregular immigrants’ access to a public service gives an 
idea of the extent of unequal treatment. The complexity of the issues clearly 
demonstrates Fraser’s point that it is not possible to separate the cultural politics of 
recognition and the economic politics of redistribution. The 30 migrant women in 
SKOP’s Press Release quoted above, invisible to the authorities, are the victims of both 
economic and cultural injustices. In practice, the concerns that irregular migrants had 
over basic subsistence often left little time for indulging in the politics of recognition, 
although theoretically both should be tackled to properly address the injustice.  
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Despite clear indications of immigrants’ exclusion, the overall attitude of the 
Government is unfortunately one of complacency. The vast structures and laws of 
formal equality that have been enacted are mostly motivated by EU accession as seen 
in Chapter 3. However the enjoyment of substantive equality for irregular immigrants 
remains elusive. There is not a framework which values ‘equality’ for irregular 
migrants. The way the Government approaches this issue starts from the principle of 
difference and inequality, and not a shared humanity and equality as human rights 
requires. This situation, or ‘structural position’ as Martinez calls it, is very far removed 
from the Fraserian ‘parity of participation’. Nonetheless this goal should remain 
foremost because there is the tendency, even for the social analyst, to replicate these 
structures of inequality by focusing on positive developments however remote and 
unsatisfactory they may be deemed in the larger social scheme. It is in this spirit, using 
Fraser’s ‘participation parity’ as a normative tool, that the analysis in the next section 
will be conducted. 
The description above only skims the surface and does not convey the extent of 
inequality that seriously affects immigrants’ position within Maltese society and leads 
to a situation of social injustice and exclusion. What has the Government’s overarching 
position been so far? Two issues stand out in the Maltese case: a) the argument that 
Malta does not have enough resources to meet the human rights of irregular 
immigrants, and b) the lack of positive integration policies. In the spirit of Fraser’s 
‘perspectival dualism’, the following discussions should be taken as looking at the 
problem of inequality from two perspectives and not as two disassociated problems. 
Both issues are examples of the dominant logic starting from difference – immigrants 
are different and it is therefore justified to use another set of standards for them. This 
contrasts sharply with the rationale of human rights which starts from the principle of 
universal humanity – we are all morally equal – and only then moves on to the 
discussion on how to manage the situation. 
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7.3.2 ‘Maldistribution’ or a ‘lack of resources’: Is it a good enough 
excuse? 
Since 2004, the official position of the Government of Malta on irregular migration has 
included a statement that Malta lacks the resources to manage irregular migration 
effectively and to take care of irregular immigrants’ basic needs.50 Reference to the 
absence of natural resources in the country, to the size and population density, 
abound. This argument is used by the Government, first, in relation to calls for 
international solidarity and ‘burden-sharing’ with the international community and the 
European Union. The Government also uses this discourse, in a second way, to justify 
substandard conditions, unequal provision of services and generally any other alleged 
or stated human rights violation with human rights entities. This section is a critique of 
the latter and not the former. 
In international fora, the lack of resources argument when presented by Malta, a very 
small island state without significant natural resources, appears particularly believable 
and therefore evokes sentiments of sympathy. Across the board, the Government, 
international organisations, NGOs and academics, uncritically acknowledge the 
resources challenge that Malta faces. Indeed the resources argument is often used 
unquestioningly by larger and smaller, richer and poorer countries. The objective 
economic disparity indicates that the scope of this argument encompasses more than 
simply economic limitations. 
The argument is that human rights ‘cost money’ to uphold and if faced with a choice, 
one will prioritise one’s own people. As a Church Agency employee put it, the general 
attitude is that: ‘I already have lots of problems of a social nature in the country which 
I cannot keep up with...and now you come to my country and I have to cater for you 
too?’.51 Resources are always finite, but as this Chapter is trying to illustrate, human 
rights should direct us to work towards safeguarding everyone’s minimal basic rights. 
As the philosopher, known for his writings on social economy, Leslie Armour points 
out, human rights advocate the ‘sharing’ of resources: 
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People may be entitled to rights that no society can provide. The answer seems obvious 
– what there is has to be shared. We can at least accept the logic of this situation. 
Because people may not be able to carry out their citizenly duties, moral and political 
rights of individuals are apt to be a sham. We cannot think of a society that possesses 
effective political rights and yet denies economic rights.52 
In a country ranked by GDP as 145 in the world, 83 per cent of the EU average in 2011, 
how can one justify that immigrants are accommodated in substandard tents, a hangar 
and containers for several years?53 In addition Malta is an international donor country. 
Raising taxes to cater for the ‘new’ disadvantaged group would have been in line with 
the Government’s social policy of ensuring that the most vulnerable live a decent life. 
This does not appear to have ever been taken into consideration. 
If the issue really were financial then there would not be such a long and costly 
detention policy! In fact, a recent report by the International Detention Coalition (IDC) 
stated that cost-effective and reliable alternatives to detention are being used in a 
variety of settings and have been found to beneﬁt a range of stakeholders affected by 
this area of policy.54 The IDC reports that the Toronto Bail Program, a leading 
alternative to detention in Canada, has given the Government a cost saving of 93 per 
cent.55 This is a popular argument by NGOs who at times challenge dominant 
discourses about lack of resources. This comment by an NGO worker highlights this: 
...detention itself is costing them loads of money, all those months in detention is 
costing them loads. So if detention were shorter, they [irregular immigrants] would be 
out before, they could work properly, they could have a work permit at least until their 
interview is done, then they would contribute to the economy. It would be a win-win 
situation. But it is not what the people want.’56 
This reinforces my argument that the problem is not one of finiteness of resources, but 
of a political choice on how and on whom to spend them, and it would seem, irregular 
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immigrants’ well-being is ranked low on the list of social priorities. In addition human 
rights principles in this regard are clear, as article 10 of the Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights entitled ‘Availability of Resources’ 
states: 
10. In many cases, compliance with such obligations may be undertaken by most States 
with relative ease, and without significant resource implications. In other cases, 
however, full realization of the rights may depend upon the availability of adequate 
financial and material resources. Nonetheless, as established by Limburg Principles 25-
28, and confirmed by the developing jurisprudence of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, resource scarcity does not relieve States of certain minimum 
obligations in respect of the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.57 
It is in this spirit that Magistrate Anthony Vella had criticised the ‘lack of resources’ 
argument in his ruling on the case Barboush v. Commissioner of Police in which the 
legality of detention was contested. In his judgement he specifically stated that the 
argument of a lack of resources does not constitute a ‘reasonable’ issue. Indeed, the 
same Maastricht guidelines also make it clear that states are responsible for ensuring 
that ‘minimum core obligations’ are met. Point 9 of the Guidelines states: 
9. Violations of the Covenant occur when a State fails to satisfy what the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has referred to as ‘a minimum core obligation to 
ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights.... Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals 
is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and 
housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, violating the 
Covenant.’ Such minimum core obligations apply irrespective of the availability of 
resources of the country concerned or any other factors and difficulties.58 
Although many NGO workers I spent time with during fieldwork questioned 
passionately the discourse of an objective lack of resources, they also found it difficult 
to think beyond this model. The farthest they arrived at was in identifying different 
instances where services were being duplicated and resources had been mismanaged. 
But few were aware, for example, that they were carrying out a service for which the 
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ultimate responsibility lay with the Government.59 The majority of NGOs ‘thought’ like 
the Government and on the whole, accepted the argument of a lack of resources as 
something fixed which cannot be changed. Note this quote from an interview with a 
Church Agency employee: 
As a people we acknowledge human rights however I’m afraid that we are not 
adequately resourced to implement certain human rights in particular sectors.60 
This discourse of resources fails to mention the EU funds that the Government has 
been receiving.61 Malta was however voted €126 million EU funds for migration – 
asylum, immigration and borders – for the timeframe 2008-2013, not including 
additional payments for emergency measures under the refugees and borders fund. 
Out of this sum, €500,000 are from the integration fund.62 During my fieldwork this 
was a common concern amongst NGOs. The Government, they claimed, appeared to 
be only embarking on those projects which were heavily financed by the EU. The 
repercussions of this is that the influence of the projects is limited since they are not 
part of a larger framework of supporting services and created huge frustration among 
immigrants, service providers and programme implementers. In addition, the Council 
of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner has recently flagged this reliance on EU funds 
as a matter of concern, because it fails to take into account the issue of long term 
sustainability of such projects.63 
The suggestion here is that the resources argument should not be taken at face value. 
The indications are that Malta does not want to take responsibility for irregular 
immigrants. The finiteness of the nature of the resources argument is politicised to 
create a distinct sense of panic among Maltese society which feeds the stereotype of 
the irregular migrant as a ‘burden’ and here to ‘take my daily bread’. Even in the case 
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of Malta, with its particular size and population density, such an argument coming 
from a developed country is rather weak and should be seen less as an economic 
answer and more as a political one. It indicates a lack of belief in the minimum core 
obligations that each state has towards irregular immigrants, and a persistence of an 
exclusively nationalist rationale that irregular migration is against the national interest. 
7.3.3 Misrecognition: Integration policies conspicuous by their 
absence 
Apart from the discourse of a lack of resources, the other prevailing discourse used by 
the Government is one that relates to integration. The overall consistent patterns of 
arrivals since 2002 call for a comprehensive integration policy which addresses all 
aspects of life and ensures minimum standards for a life of dignity for immigrants 
including the widening of life opportunities. This is not the case, primarily because 
there is still the denial that immigration is ‘here to stay’ and not a temporary 
phenomenon. According to the Government, immigrant integration is not preferable, 
or even possible, given Malta’s small size, high population density and small labour 
market prone to saturation. Indeed, long-term integration for the beneficiaries of 
international protection has been identified by the Government as the biggest 
challenge that Malta is facing.64 This overarching anti-integration rationale partly 
stems from the fact that Malta views itself as a ‘transit country for immigrants’ 
towards the rest of Europe.65 This brings about a denial of irregular immigrants 
continuing presence and the fact that some are settling down. The persistence of this 
rationale is impressive in light of clear signs that immigration to Malta will continue 
and that many migrants are not moving on to another destination. 
The mention of integration of immigrants, in unofficial Government circles, also 
provoked the sentiment that integration programmes leading to more immigrants 
settling down was not wanted. Not surprisingly rhetoric, as well as efforts, were 
directed towards resettling immigrants in the US and EU Member States, or 
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repatriating them to their country of origin or a third country (transit). In the 
meantime, most irregular immigrants are living in ‘clearly sub-standard’ conditions in 
open centres ‘with lack of adequate bedding, dirty floors...insufficient lighting and the 
presence of rats’ in a segregated area in tents, containers and hangars, as was also 
illustrated in Chapter 3.66 Clearly this is a reality which stunts the social process of 
integration. But since the Government does not believe in integrating immigrants, this 
is not seen as a problem. 
Instead the Minister for Justice and Home Affairs blames the conditions in the open 
centres on the ‘prolonged stays’ of the immigrants, brought about by the country’s 
innate limitations of integration. A situation which clearly requires positive integration 
efforts by the Government, is twisted and made to appear as unavoidable.  The 
Minister says: 
The difficulties faced by beneficiaries of international protection in integrating, mainly 
in view of the country’s innate limitations, translate into prolonged stays at the Centres 
by significant numbers of migrants.67 
Throughout the speech there appears to be an unwritten, underlying assumption that 
integration, should it happen, would happen naturally. This is also a common belief 
amongst government policy makers in Malta. I was often told that integration cannot 
be forced, that it could only happen ‘naturally’. In addition the dominant 
understanding of ‘integration’ is not one which is respectful of differences, but more 
akin to the concept of assimilation into a homogeneous whole. In practice this would 
mean that only if irregular immigrants become ‘like Maltese’ – white, Catholic and 
speaking the Maltese language - and abandon their cultural practices, could they be 
accepted within society. This accounts for the patronising rationale behind any small 
efforts at integration: 
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...there came a point where I stopped teaching English, but I started teaching manners, 
how to behave, because they had no idea how to, they have no idea how to eat.  I 
know it’s their culture to eat using their hands, but there’s still a way and a way how to 
eat.68 
It is therefore not surprising that Malta ranks low on anti-discrimination policy and 
programmes when compared to its European peers. In fact in MIPEX reports Malta 
scores lowest on anti-discrimination measures: 
By far the most conspicuous statistic arising from the chart regards the ‘field of 
application’ of Malta’s anti-discrimination measures, where Malta scores a very low 
8/100. This suggests that while adequate anti-discrimination laws do exist on paper, 
the areas to which they can be applied in practice remain too vaguely defined for the 
legislation to be effective.69 
Another common response to explain why the Maltese found it difficult to accept and 
integrate irregular immigrants was that of ‘illegality’. This referred both to the illegal 
mode of entry and also to the criminalisation of immigrants that the policy of 
detention brings with it. These associations with illegality are such that the Maltese do 
not want to mix with irregular immigrants. This popular response is contestable since 
barriers to integration are not limited to irregular immigrants but appear to afflict 
other resident legal foreigners in the country. An indication of this is the results of 
MIPEX which have shown that even British expats in Malta face barriers towards 
integration into Maltese society.70 British expats, in contrast to irregular immigrants, 
are generally financially stable, have moved to Malta out of choice and are therefore 
overall more empowered. If British expats experience such difficulties, one can 
imagine how much worse this would be for irregular immigrants.  These results suggest 
that the integration of foreigners into Maltese society needs a comprehensive 
framework. 
Within this anti-integration rationale, projects undertaken by the Government with an 
alleged aim of bringing about integration appear completely paradoxical. According to 
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the Government’s response to the Commissioner for Human Rights’ report, integration 
measures constituted of the following: 
These involved an employment-support initiative, the provision of language teaching, 
as well as Project Sparklet, which supported closed and open centres through the 
profiling of migrants, action research and knowledge transfer. The Mare Nostrum 
Project, organised by the Institute of Health Migrants and Poverty (Rome), Migrant 
Health Unit Primary Health Department and Department of Diseases Prevention, is still 
in progress and a screen programme for all migrants in open centres for communicable 
diseases is being conducted.71 
However, in this case, it is legitimate to ask if the presence of such projects is a sign of 
change from the dominant non-integration stance or if it is simply a matter of one-off 
initiatives set up to attract EU funding. This question is being asked because of the 
incongruity noticed between the lack of a political will to support integration based on 
the belief that Malta has innate limitations in this regard, and the presence of some 
integration projects mostly funded by the EU funds. Either way, without a framework 
of a national integration policy, the success of these one-off, uncoordinated projects is 
severely limited. The following quote is from a research project managed by NCPE: 
Although a number of periodic projects have been undergone to improve the living 
conditions, as well as the employability and educational standards of asylum seekers, it 
is evident that Malta still lacks an overarching integration policy. Maltese authorities 
have so far adopted a reactive stance – identifying problems and working towards 
solving them – rather than a pro-active stance with regards to discrimination on the 
grounds of race and ethnicity.72 
During my fieldwork there was a lot of hype on the appointment of NCPE as the race 
equality body (for the non-employment aspects) as mentioned earlier. NCPE’s remit 
was widened to cover Legal Notice 85 of 2007 ‘Equal Treatment of Persons Order’ 
which prohibits any form of discrimination in the provision of goods and services based 
on the ground of race and ethnicity. With regards to the provision of goods and 
services, this Legal Notice transposed the non-employment provisions of Council 
Directive 2000/43/EC, implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. However, complaints registered are few (less 
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than 20 in 2009 according to the FRA Annual Report) and do not reflect the pressing 
reality described above.73 This would suggest that immigrants might not have enough 
access and/or trust in NCPE yet. The following is a quote from a Press Release issued 
by NCPE during its 7th Annual Conference, the brevity of which also belies the 
effectiveness of NCPE: 
As to racial discrimination, NCPE during 2010 received complaints that involved 
allegations of racial discrimination in access to visa and in access to bars and clubs.74 
In October 2010, following the reporting of a series of incidents allegedly arising out of 
racial discrimination, the NCPE published a Press Release in which the illegality of 
discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnicity in all areas of social life was 
highlighted, as well as the role of NCPE to investigate such complaints. The NCPE 
stated: 
NCPE emphasises that it is illegal to violate the dignity of a person or treat a person less 
favourably on the ground of race/ethnic origin. This means that the race/ethnic origin 
of an individual should not determine their treatment in relation to social security, 
healthcare, education, financial services and the provision of other goods and 
services.75  
The limited impact of NCPE due to limited human and financial resources was picked 
up on by the Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union.76 Dr Simon Busuttil, a 
Maltese Member of the European Parliament, sheds light on its restricted budget as 
one possible limitation of the NCPE. This also supports Fraser’s thesis that the 
economic and cultural cannot be disassociated: 
A second problem area highlighted in the report is equality, where it says that Malta’s 
national competent authority that deals with racial equality lacks adequate human and 
financial resources and had effectively dealt with too few cases to allow a proper study. 
This is a pity because public authorities cannot deliver if they are starved of resources.77 
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Media reports show that research activity in this area might be picking up. NCPE 
launched a project called ‘Think Equal’ in 2011, estimated to cost some €250,000, co-
funded by EU PROGRESS funds. The ‘Think Equal’ project will include qualitative 
studies on discrimination experienced by LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) 
and racial groups in Malta.78 
The resources argument and the lack of a comprehensive integration policy are self-
fulfilling prophecies which serve to maintain the status quo. Migrants feel that they are 
‘in limbo’, powerless and without any hope for the future. The aim of this Chapter was 
not to conduct a comprehensive review but to show the structural disadvantage of 
irregular immigrants and the lack of a pro-active political will. of the institutional 
violence that irregular immigrants are subjected to on a daily basis.  
7.4 Towards a human rights culture 
What does Malta have to do to steer towards participation parity or social justice for 
all? The proposals below would help in bringing about the necessary institutional 
changes that would enable integration efforts to take root. At the moment the 
framework is largely conditioned by governmental policies or, at times, the lack of such 
policies. This Chapter strongly suggests that in the absence of clear and directed 
policies, any smaller projects or programmes designed for the integration of migrants 
will only have limited success. A comprehensive integration policy is necessary to 
spearhead institutional changes, which will in turn provide a framework with a 
coherent rationale within which civil society can also contribute. Such a policy needs to 
address economic, cultural and political inequalities. This will also ensure that irregular 
immigrants are included in practice within the country’s social priorities as a 
disadvantaged group. 
Irrespective of the fact that irregular migration is a relatively new phenomenon in 
Malta, or any misguided beliefs that it will end soon, there is now a sizable cohort of 
irregular immigrants living in the community on the poverty line, or even in poverty 
and excluded from social life. The indications are that this community will grow as 
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more immigrants arrive. This increases the likelihood of the formation of social ills 
which will then be more difficult to eradicate. Indeed allegations of illegal activity, 
criminality, prostitution, drug trafficking and others were already being made during 
my fieldwork. The call for action is therefore of an urgent nature. 
Relying on charity, laudable and virtuous as it may be, unfortunately serves to cement 
power imbalances between the Maltese and the immigrants which is counteractive to 
any long-term solutions. Being deeply entrenched in Maltese culture, the charity 
approach can only be addressed if rights-based approaches are encouraged by formal 
legal and institutional action ‘from above’ as well as encouraging informal civil society 
and grassroots activity. 
As part of a national integration policy it is necessary to have an independent equality 
watchdog to make sure that the core dimensions of equality - representation, 
participation and recognition - are safeguarded both before the law and in practice. 
The NCPE, currently the equality body entrusted with this mandate, needs to be 
adequately resourced and trained to meet the needs of a sector which have been 
characterised by neglect. Given that the issues of immigrants and particularly irregular 
immigrants are particularly susceptible to being instrumentalised by politicians, the 
independence of the institution which is entrenched in law needs to be safeguarded at 
all costs. 
The rhetoric surrounding the resources argument should be exposed in the public 
sphere because it only serves to foment panic among society and reinforces negative 
attitudes towards immigrants. In this regard, high-standing officials and politicians 
should avoid at all costs unnecessarily using apocalyptic jargon of resource finiteness. 
Arguments of a lack of resources should be presented by the authorities for what they 
are, political choices. This would open a space for discussion and proper engagement, 
in contrast with the resources argument which presents decisions as inevitable. 
Wealth redistribution and social priorities need to be set according to a state’s 
minimum core obligations with respect to safeguarding basic human rights. These 
should include irregular immigrants, with further due consideration given to vulnerable 
irregular immigrants. There ought to be no double standards between Maltese citizens 
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and immigrants on meeting basic needs like food, shelter and so on. 
Institutionalisation and clear policies are necessary to ensure a fair and just 
distribution. The aim should be to increase the life opportunities of irregular 
immigrants and support them should they decide to settle in Malta temporarily or 
otherwise. 
Irregular immigrants’ allowances are placing immigrants in a structurally 
disadvantaged position of poverty where they cannot meet their basic needs and are 
unable to improve their situation. These allowances should be raised to meet those of 
Maltese vulnerable groups. Other issues which do not encourage independence, like 
making the immigrants allowance dependent on being resident in an open centre 
would also need to be addressed. 
Various human rights movements and champions of equality of opportunity have 
demonstrated that the direct participation and contribution of members of 
disadvantaged groups is crucial in securing long-term solutions. Drawing on this, the 
contribution of irregular immigrants in the drafting of policy and the design of services 
should therefore be sought and institutionalised. 
7.5 Human rights culture requires a cultural shift towards an egalitarian 
society 
In Chapter 4 the concept of human dignity is described as a seismograph. The 
disrespect of human dignity in Maltese detention centres is presented as a warning 
that an earthquake in the form of momentous social problems is on the way. The 
above discussion suggests that the lack of an egalitarian society and the absence of 
social justice are the first tremors of this earthquake. It is in fact not surprising that 
mention of irregular migrants in Malta provokes a sense of unease and insecurity, a 
sensation that the pressure is mounting. There is clearly a limit to how much and how 
long you can oppress a group of people. Indeed the growing numbers of immigrants 
and the decreasing conditions of welfare only adds further pressure. 
The concept of equality necessary for a human rights culture has to be multi-faceted, 
bridging the so-called theories of recognition with egalitarian theories, but also limited 
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to prioritise those who lack opportunities of a decent life. The priority of human rights 
activity, as proposed by human rights theory, should focus on those areas where 
recognition and redistribution have failed people. Such individuals are economically 
and culturally disadvantaged, but are also less empowered and have limited life 
opportunities, and therefore establishing minimal standards which will enable them to 
live a dignified life, is essential. 
Unfortunately, the inability of the authorities in Malta to view the irregular migration 
situation for what it is, a long-term social phenomenon, is perpetuating and reinforcing 
the unequal treatment and exclusion of irregular immigrants in Malta. With regards to 
minimal standards, unequal treatment is unacceptable from a human rights point of 
view. The concern, shared by many in Malta, that if more than the 2000 to 3000 
immigrants a year arrived, the country might not be in a position to manage without 
external help, is very real. Whilst it is understandable that the management of a state 
requires long term planning, from a human rights point of view, in the current 
situation, it is not acceptable to treat immigrants so meagrely that they are unable to 
live a minimal decent life. At the same time, the same philosophy of human rights calls 
for action and change not only by Malta but also, and this is perhaps just as pressing, 
at a global level. 
This Chapter has implicitly argued for the interdependence of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights, which is still an issue in contemporary times. Leslie Armour 
reminds us of the negative impact of the lack of economic rights on the expression of 
humanity. She says: 
The theory that we can choose widely and freely on an empty stomach is empty. Sick 
men and women are a problem to society as much as to themselves. The situation is 
worse than it appears. A whole social complex is necessary for civil rights to be 
organised. My argument is that economic rights are the correlative of duties, but are 
also necessary conditions for the expression of humanity in the world. Without them 
people must live pinched lives, something less than the full humanity of which they are 
capable. They may surmount the barriers, and many do, but they are marked and 
scarred by the process.79 
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This study is arguing that a possible solution is establishing a human rights culture. This 
would serve both as a short-term safety valve and a long-term solution. A human 
rights culture requires an egalitarian society in which all members, including its newest 
or temporary members, are treated similarly. Human rights covenants have been clear 
that states are responsible for ensuring that the minimum core obligations towards 
everyone is met, particularly in their own country. This Chapter is also a stark reminder 
that human rights remain a call for change. Change, of a social, local and global nature, 
which needs to be continuously rearticulated. 
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Chapter 8: On embracing a human rights culture 
8.1 Introduction 
This study set out to understand why irregular immigrants are ill-treated in Malta, 
despite the fact that Malta considers itself, and is considered, a member of the human 
rights community. Sheer frustration at the ineffectiveness of human rights in the 
Maltese situation was one of my main motivations for this study. It was however 
largely counteracted by an equally strong sentiment, a fervent belief, that human 
rights could still make a difference. Nothing prepared me for the realisation that 
human rights are also being used to create and reproduce abominable structures in 
which human rights violations are inevitable. The most typical example is that of 
‘detention’ as described in Chapter 4. In what I call an ‘absurd’ situation the 
Government of Malta sustains its argument that the practice of detention is acceptable 
by human rights standards, even in the face of evidence of inhumane practices and a 
violation of human dignity. Notwithstanding such inconsistencies, this study has shown 
that human rights are still relevant and can be effective in addressing the grave 
injustices that irregular immigrants face on a daily basis. The Introductory Chapter 
suggests that a cultural paradigm shift might be needed. This study demonstrates that 
nothing short of that will do.  
In Chapters 1 and 2 it was ascertained that the legal and institutional focus of the 
human rights movement needs to be broadened in such a way so as to enable the 
internalisation of human rights principles. This study shows that the concept of a 
human rights culture can serve as a tool which leads to a deeper understanding of the 
local social and cultural processes that need to be addressed for this to take place. The 
Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture is a useful heuristic tool which 
systematises and facilitates analysis that identifies those hidden processes that should 
be addressed for a human rights culture to be established. 
The Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights yields four concepts that are considered 
basic building blocks of a human rights culture. These are: human dignity, 
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cosmopolitanism, democracy and equality. This Model was used to analyse the case 
study of irregular migration in Malta. It highlighted those areas where action needs to 
be directed for the cultural paradigm shift to take place in Malta. In this concluding 
Chapter, the implications and contributions of this study for the broader research 
context will be outlined. Human rights culture as arising from this study will first be 
described. This will be followed with a summary of the main findings that the study 
yields about the case study of irregular migration in Malta.  The Chapter ends with 
some reflections on the Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture and possible 
ways forward for the human rights movement to achieve its mission of constructing ‘a 
world made new’.1 
8.2 Understanding human rights culture 
The main argument of this study is that humane solutions towards the better 
treatment of irregular immigrants in Malta can be found by nurturing a human rights 
culture. This would serve both as a short-term safety valve and a long-term solution. 
The concept of a human rights culture is composed of the following four building 
blocks: human dignity, cosmopolitanism, democracy and equality. These concepts are 
not easy to define because they are used in different ways, across different disciplines 
and are all contested concepts. For this reason the focus on the human rights praxis, 
the nexus where human rights theory and human rights practice meet, was retained 
throughout. The discussions of the case study and how the four building block 
concepts translate into practice enrich the theoretical understanding as well as provide 
possible solutions to the case study in question. The result is an overall better 
understanding of the concept of a human rights culture, and how this can be nurtured 
in Malta. 
The first building block, or characteristic, is the concept of human dignity. Human 
dignity serves to give a bearing to human rights and retains the focus on the human 
person. For this reason, human dignity is referred to as the ‘human’ in human rights.  
As Chapter 4 demonstrates, human dignity is of such critical importance to human 
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rights that when it is put aside, human rights risk turning against human beings.  The 
surprising lack of understanding of the critical role of human dignity in grounding 
human rights philosophy is possibly the biggest indication that human rights is on the 
wrong track. 
Cosmopolitanism, the second building block necessary for a human rights culture, rises 
out of universalistic aspirations of human rights. An existential sense of the cosmos 
and the moral obligations binding the global community justify the need for a 
cosmopolitan system. The tacit assumption that human rights norms are cosmopolitan 
has meant that cosmopolitanism as a concept remains under-explored in relation to 
human rights. This is unfortunate because, as Chapter 5 shows, human rights present a 
particular conception of cosmopolitanism which embraces different and contesting 
partialities and is therefore in a constant state of flux. This contrasts sharply with the 
more popular definition of cosmopolitanism which is often presented as a rigid global 
structure related to world governance. Cosmopolitanism in human rights culture 
provides a framework for the incorporation of local particularities within an inclusive 
global vision. 
Democracy is the third building block necessary for the enactment of a human right 
culture. The relationship between democracy and human rights is often erroneously 
taken to be self-evident, and this obscures the dangers that democracy presents to 
human rights. Chapter 6 discusses various instances in which the inner mechanisms of 
democracy can themselves work against human rights principles. In addition, the limits 
of the democratic polity and its emphasis on membership can pose grave problems for 
the safeguarding of the human rights of immigrants.  What human rights culture 
requires is a particular democratic culture which accommodates and prioritises human 
rights principles. 
The fourth building block of a human rights culture is equality, understood not simply 
as the promotion of an egalitarian culture but primarily as the implementation of 
social justice. A human rights culture therefore requires a society in which the 
treatment of all members, including its newest or temporary members, is subject to 
minimum core obligations. The concept of equality necessary for a human rights 
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culture is multi-faceted bridging the so-called theories of recognition with egalitarian 
theories, but is also delimited since it prioritises those who lack opportunities of a 
decent life. The priorities of human rights are those areas where recognition and 
redistribution have failed people. It is these particular gaps that minimum core 
obligations of human rights aim to address. Individuals suffering economic and cultural 
disadvantage are less empowered and have restricted life opportunities and within a 
human rights culture would be the priority. 
In addition to the above, three horizontal themes arose. The first is the perception of 
the human being. Apart from the centrality of the human person to human rights 
philosophy as articulated in further depth in Chapter 4 when human dignity was 
discussed, a particular idea of the human person emerges. The human person is 
perceived as adaptable, sociable and willing to change. Therefore, the human person is 
seen as able to connect to different communities simultaneously and is an active agent 
in negotiated boundaries and conflicts which may arise. This is particularly seen in 
Chapter 5 in the presentation of partial cosmopolitanism. The human person is 
primarily perceived in the Aristotelian sense of a political animal. This comes out most 
strongly in the presentation of active citizenship and the responsibility that citizens 
carry towards their political group, as seen in Chapter 6. 
The second horizontal theme is a reassertion of the interdependence of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights which are popularly known as the five pillars of 
human rights. This age-old debate which has characterised the modern human rights 
movement since its inception is between ‘freedoms to’ and ‘freedom from’, or 
‘negative rights’ and ‘positive rights’. The development of the discussion of human 
rights culture in this study clearly reinforces the critical importance of keeping the five 
pillars equally in focus. This is most clearly seen in the nature of Chapter 4 where the 
main issues related to detention issues constitute ‘freedoms from’ and Chapter 7 
which discusses issues related to social justice categorised as ‘freedoms to’. 
The final horizontal theme is that human rights ultimately remain a call for change. 
This should be considered the mandate of human rights culture. Human rights can 
never be a conservative agenda used for retaining the status quo. As each chapter has 
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shown, but best articulated at the end of Chapter 7, human rights are about facilitating 
change, ‘of a social, local and global nature, which needs to be continuously 
rearticulated.’ 
8.3 Nurturing a human rights culture in Malta 
The case study of irregular migration in Malta was analysed using the Tetrahedron 
Model of Human Rights Culture. By taking one building block at a time, the case study 
was explored from four different perspectives in order to find patterns in Maltese 
political culture which are leading to the violation of the human rights of irregular 
immigrants. Various trends and issues were exposed which need to be addressed. The 
collection of findings shows that human rights have the potential to guide political 
decisions for the improvement of the treatment of irregular migrants in Malta. More 
importantly, action on the identified issues serve to nurture a human rights culture. 
The creation and maintenance of detention, as a direct action by the state, which is 
devoid of respect for human dignity is evidence of a flawed understanding of the 
modern human rights doctrine. By putting into question the very concept of human 
dignity which from the construction of the modern human rights movement has 
unquestionably been at the heart of human rights, detention is indicative of a grave 
problem with regards to human rights.  Clearly, the removal of the detention policy, 
which is indeed a pressing issue, would be a huge step ahead but would not solve the 
problem of ill-treatment of irregular immigrants. Dehumanising centres like migrant 
detention centres serve as a barrier to human rights culture. This is because they 
become generators of dehumanising practices. Without a focus on the human person, 
as Chapter 5 has shown, it is very easy to get lost in issues of fairness, legalities, and 
political interests. 
Another issue that came out of the analysis of case study, this time from a 
cosmopolitan point of view, is related to the ubiquitous and predominant nationalism 
in Malta. Chapter 6 shows how as a result of various historical, social and political 
processes Maltese society has assumed a selective and exclusive nationalism. A re-
articulation of nationalism is needed to accommodate global changes and 
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cosmopolitan norms. Irregular migration emerges as a useful ‘concern’ for nationalist 
processes attempting to construct a national identity against a ‘significant other’ and 
when facing a perceived threat of being subsumed into a larger European identity. 
Human rights require the Maltese to consider that they have moral obligations 
towards irregular immigrants, even though irregular immigrants are non-citizens. 
Irregular migrants in Malta are also at the unfortunate end of tensions that ‘the fear of 
the masses’ creates in the democratic arena. In a country which boasts of a near-
universal turnout at general elections, not holding a vote effectively means exclusion. 
Chapter 6 goes on to identify bureaucratic practices as exacerbating the politics of 
exclusion by creating a ‘disempowering system’. Although not highly visible, this 
practice needs to be addressed because it encumbers immigrants’ access to basic 
services. In addition civil society, a precious space for citizens’ participation, is 
dominated by a traditionally entrenched framework of charity which currently 
hampers human rights-based approaches and does not facilitate the participation of 
irregular immigrants. The tensions inherent in the relationship between democracy 
and human rights need to be addressed for a human rights culture. 
Finally the predominant mentality that immigration is not a long-term phenomenon, as 
evidenced by the lack of a national integration policy and the lack of resources 
argument, is proving detrimental to irregular immigrants and perpetuates their 
unequal treatment and exclusion. The mentality, which can best be described as self-
preservative and protectionist, puts superfluous needs of Maltese people over and 
above basic needs of irregular immigrants. Malta should endeavour to meet the basic 
core minimal obligations towards irregular immigrants, in a bid to nurture a human 
rights culture. 
There are two other issues which have come up in this study several times. These are 
human rights education and the concept of an independent human rights institution. 
Human rights education is one such issue which has been mentioned in various 
chapters in this study as key to the acculturation of human rights principles as well as 
an authentic basis for human rights based social change. One is led to ask however: 
what kind of human rights education? Is it enough to have ‘human rights’ inserted in a 
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secondary school’s curriculum? How can human rights education be tailored to be 
truly effective in the Maltese setting? As part of mainstreaming human rights and a 
human rights approach in Malta, another issue mentioned but which would require 
further exploration is the concept of an Independent Human Rights Institution. The 
dearth of human rights culture in Malta, partly brought about by intense partisan 
politics and traditional customs, appear to make a good case for such an institution. 
The practices described above are the result of social and cultural processes which are 
less visible than formal practices, institutions or laws. This does not however make 
them less important because they constitute a significant part of human rights praxis. 
More significantly they are critical for the nurturing of a human rights culture. 
8.4 The Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture: The way forward 
The Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture served a dual role of providing 
structure to the analysis and facilitating a ‘human rights’ logic. This was made possible 
by highlighting the inter-connections, tensions and interplay between the original four 
elements and the four building blocks of human rights culture. This is the strength of 
this model. It also makes the model an adequate representation of a complex system 
which is continually being (re)produced as a result of the intricate interplay of the 
various elements and actors involved. 
This study shows that the Tetrahedron Model is useful as a heuristic device but might 
also carry potential as an analytical tool. It has certainly served to provide new insights 
into the complex phenomenon of irregular migration in Malta. More importantly, it 
has generated a set of proposals and policy directions that complement existing ones. 
It is unfortunate that the links between the building blocks, which can be indirectly 
gleaned from the discussions, could not be explored in further depth in this study. This 
is the most exciting element of the Tetrahedron Model of Human Rights Culture that 
should be further explored. The potential of the Model to analyse complex human 
rights situations has been demonstrated in this study, but it can clearly be taken to 
different levels with more emphasis on the ‘links’. The following kind of questions 
could be asked: 
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- How do the concepts of human dignity and cosmopolitanism relate to each 
other? Can a sharper conception of human dignity contribute towards the 
enactment of a partial cosmopolitanism? 
- How are the concepts of equality and partial cosmopolitanism to be 
accommodated? Wouldn’t the acceptance of a partiality risk leading to 
inequalities?  
These kinds of questions would enrich the analysis and pave the way for further 
research.  
 
Finally, there appears to be scope for further research on the applicability of the 
Tetrahedron Model. The Tetrahedron Model has worked for Malta, but would it work 
on larger countries too?  
8.5 Towards a human rights culture: The global responsibility to make the 
world anew 
This study has focused on the local. However, a human rights culture cannot be 
nurtured in isolation. This is clear from the discussion on the implementation of the 
cosmopolitan right to hospitality by Malta presented in Chapter 5. The norm of 
hospitality, however, is part of a greater global vision. Malta’s efforts at 
implementation of this norm would need to be matched by other states’ action in this 
regard. In a similar spirit, inter-state solidarity is indispensable, particularly in those 
cases when a state cannot effectively implement this norm any longer. The global 
‘suspension’ of such norms which involve human lives and life chances can only be 
justified as a very last resort. Maltese governmental action in this regard is conditioned 
by the realpolitik of international relations where inter-state solidarity is not 
institutionalised in the migration or asylum field. Even attempts to lobby for an EU 
system of ‘burden-sharing’ or ‘responsibility-sharing’ in the case of asylum-seekers 
have not, as yet, registered success. 
Secondly, the responsibility for nurturing a human rights culture is truly global in the 
sense that it is universal. The local practice and horrors of detention in Malta, for 
example, are the shared concern of the local community and global society, both of 
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which include Maltese and non-Maltese citizens. On a deeper level, the urgency of 
eradicating the presence of grave violators of human dignity or ‘generators of 
dehumanising practices’, like detention, is a universal responsibility. 
Thirdly, human rights culture is a popular culture, it is everyone’s, and cannot be 
exclusive to a profession or arena. The cultural internalisation of human rights 
principles require a change in the broader political culture, that is, how people treat 
each other and how political decisions are made. It is only in this way that human 
rights culture, in Francesca Klug’s words, can ‘unleash the potential of human rights’. 
Helena Kennedy articulates it such: 
The cultural shift has to include everyone. Once human rights are reduced to the finely 
argued interpretations of words or cases, or time-consuming meritless arguments in 
the courts, the huge, embracing possibilities for change will be lost. If human rights are 
about anything, they are about a set of values, whose spirit and philosophy should 
inform everything from government policy to personal relationships. To travel this new 
journey we need new words and new methods and all of us have to be engaged.2 
Finally, the efforts at nurturing a human rights culture should also be directed to 
irregular immigrants and the excluded in societies. This is necessary to break cycles of 
exclusion. If only they were allowed, irregular migrants in Malta - with their dual hard-
won identity of migrants and victims of human rights violations - could play a central 
role in the promotion of a human rights culture. 
 
                                                          
2
 Helena Kennedy, ‘Foreword’ in F. Klug, Values for a Godless Age: The story fo the United Kingdom's new Bill of 
Rights,Penguin Books Ltd, London, 2000, pxiii. 
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